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Preface

There are three that testify:
The Spirit and the water and the blood,
And these three agree (I John : )
Anima mea liquefacta est (Song. : )

This book is all about a restoration that is supposedly absurd to attempt. Yet, if philosophy is still about argument, I see no reason why
someone might not hope to make a return to Aquinas; to write the
kind of engaged Thomism that once defined leading Catholic institutions, like the School of Philosophy at Louvain. This book is, if you
like, an attempt within Thomism to imitate the ‘‘muscular Christianity
of Paul’’ (Zizek). Whether the ‘‘restoration of the old metaphysics’’ is
impossible (Marion)1 rather depends on what that metaphysics is
thought to have been. No one more than Marion has helped clarify
what ‘‘the old metaphysics’’ was, and even, humbly acknowledge when
he misunderstood it. Still, to abandon the metaphysics of Aquinas at
the moment that the Analytic tradition is finding new inspiration in
his works, and when strains of theology are returning to the ‘‘radical
orthodoxy’’ of the Middle Ages, seems precipitous.
Most basically, this book argues that a return to Thomas’s metaphysics of the body provides the theologian and philosopher with a
unique analysis of the body: a conception that avoids conceiving of the
body as riven by metaphysical violence. More, it is the failure to adopt
Thomas’s theory of the body as the foundation of contemporary sexual
xi
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politics that well justifies the Church in its remarkable claim that Talmon’s distinction between liberal democracy and totalitarian democracy is now vitiated.2
Presented in these pages is an argument built from the ideas of three
thinkers, some more obscure than others. Thomas, of course, is well
known. However, if asked about his theory of the body, very few theologians and philosophers could speak at any length about what is his
theory. Probably, what would be said would leave Thomas indistinguishable from Aristotle. It is never a bad thing to be associated with
Aristotle, of course, but Thomas does have a distinctive theory of the
body, informed by theology and Christian metaphysics. This book
began as a semester-long series of graduate lectures on Thomas’s philosophy of the body given at the Higher Institute of Philosophy at the
Catholic University of Louvain in the autumn of . Ever since I
wrote my dissertation at Louvain in , I had been struck by the fact
that no book-length study of Thomas on the body existed. This is
really quite odd, given that Thomas remains a normative Catholic
theologian and Catholic theology is all about the body if it is about
anything at all: the Incarnation, Eucharist, transmission of original sin,
resurrection of the flesh, bodily assumption into heaven, and so on.
How could Catholicism’s premier theologian not have thought extensively about the body? This book is not meant to be a simple history
of how someone in the Middle Ages thought about the body, although
it has a contribution to make here. To describe Thomas’s theory of the
body certainly requires an approach that one would find in a book
given over to the historical analysis of a medieval thinker. However,
this book is written so as to respond to the fact that the body has
become both a much-studied topic over the last two decades and a
central focus of political interest. People from a host of disciplines in
the humanities and social sciences are only too happy to raid Catholic
authors like Thomas for some choice words about what Catholics are
supposed to believe about the body. And it is on the basis of such
raiding that they assess the worthiness of the Church’s positions over
matters in sexual politics. Discussing contemporary thinkers throughout the book, my hope is to appeal to historians but more especially to
theologians and philosophers who are surely looking for a developed
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theory of the body that is able to work in a contemporary setting. As I
say, the book is meant to be a work of old-fashioned Thomism:
Thomas as a philosopher-theologian relevant to contemporary debate.
My fear is that it might not satisfy either the historian or the working
theologian—always a risk with a book that aims to address multiple
parties. Nonetheless, I hope to make it clear that such raiding cannot
possibly capture the complexity of Thomas’s thought, ignoring as it
must, the dense metaphysical and theological framework in which
Thomas discusses the body. With this appreciated, the sustained reasoning behind Catholic sexual politics demands that the worthiness of
those political positions be honestly reevaluated.
Catholic intellectuals must share some of the blame for such raids
and their consequences. I am constantly amazed at attempts by contemporary theologians to construct a new Catholic body: their ideas
are typically very unsophisticated compared to Thomas’s. And yet, this
can hardly be surprising. Of all the bizarre intellectual phenomena of
the last half of the twentieth century one of the most bizarre must
surely be the manner in which Catholic theologians jettisoned thinking
with Thomas and decided to try to go it alone. How any Catholic
could have presumed to think about the Catholic body apart from one
of the top philosophical minds of Western history is quite baffling.
Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II is an exception. Wojtyla cuts a strange
figure. On the one hand, he is the most famous person alive. No other
human in world history has been seen by as many people as John Paul
II. Yet, as a thinker his ideas are little known. His books, and even his
papal encyclicals, are little read. At least, at the Catholic university
where I work in the United States, his books are little read. This too is
a little strange because there is nothing more contested both in universities and in culture at large—at least in the West—than sexual politics,
and the positions of John Paul II are infamous: he is against contraception, gay marriage, women’s ordination, abortion, and so on. Yet, sexual politics is a topic Wojtyla has thought a lot about. Thus, while we
all know what he thinks, almost no theologian or philosopher knows
by what reasoning his conclusions were arrived at. It is often overlooked
that in the history of recent philosophy, Wojtyla was ahead of his time.
Very few philosophers have ever written on sex—Plato, famously so;
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Schopenhauer, certainly; but even today it is a topic that not many
philosophers write about. It certainly is not true that there is some
well-worked-out theory of sex and sexual ethics that most people in
the Academy subscribe to and which has filtered down into the population at large. Actually, in a very interesting book, noted political scientist Jeffrey Waldron has observed that barely anyone has taken the time
to think out a justification for the idea that all humans are basically
equal to one another. And much less intellectual thought has been
given to the nature of sex than to matters of equality! Certainly, there
is no Heidegger or Wittgenstein standing behind contemporary sexual
ethics. Wojtyla should be given credit for having written two quite
rare books in the history of Western letters, and, of course, Roman
Catholicism generally should be given some credit for at least having
thought at length about sexual ethics.
I ought to stress that while Thomas is definitely a theme in this
book, Wojtyla is not. Consideration of his thinking appears in the
book in three ways. I argue that his ideas have been developed from a
close reading of Thomas. In particular, he has taken from Thomas the
idea of the ecstatic body. I first present Wojtyla as a commentator on
Thomas and as a thinker applying Thomas’s basic insights into the
ecstatic character of being and the good. A large part of his thinking is
given over to the justificatory reasoning for the sexual ethics presented
in Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae. In a second way, then, Wojtyla’s thinking
is addressed when considering the ontological character of contraception in chapter . It is in this chapter that Wojtyla/John Paul II becomes most clearly a theme of this book. I hope to have shown there
that his position on contraception stems from a complex mix of theology, metaphysics, anthropology, biblical exegesis, doctrinal definition,
ethical and political theory, humanism, and phenomenology. Wojtyla
is present in a third way as John Paul II. That is, I have centered my
discussions of sexual politics around some of the papal documents that
are his contribution to the tradition of Catholic social thought. Chapters , , and  are each built around such documents.
Theologians often regard John Paul II as a philosopher in the phenomenological tradition, owing a special debt to Max Scheler. While
there is some truth to this, caution is required. Whereas Wojtyla saw
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in Thomas a grounding of moral norms ‘‘under the light of truth’’ (PC
) he sees Scheler as defending the idea of a norm as a value, ‘‘a
function of pure feeling’’ (PC ). Indeed, Scheler’s analysis of values
is ultimately ‘‘an oversimplification and obfuscation of the essential
contours of this whole issue’’ (PC ), Wojtyla insists. Thomas’s conception of morality is ‘‘completely different’’ from Scheler’s (PC ;
; –) and so ‘‘we in the Thomistic school,’’ we are told in ,
‘‘should maintain a necessary distance’’ from phenomenology (PC, 
and ). George Weigel puts it well, characterizing John Paul II’s overall philosphical stance as ‘‘the metaphysical realism of Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas and the sensitivity to human experience of Max
Scheler’s phenomenology.’’3 There is a sense in which Wojtyla overstates the difference between Scheler and Thomas, however. It is Kolnai who helps us to see this.
Aurel Thomas Kolnai (–) is the least known of our principal authors. He is not famous in any way and barely anyone has read
his books and papers. While I do not think I have to justify my extensive use of an obscure thinker, it is worth pointing out that an interest
in his thought is emerging.4 Kolnai’s intellectual formation is remarkably like Wojtyla’s, including extensive study of Thomas and Scheler.
However, after living in many countries, he finally settled in England,
teaching at London University, where he became familiar with, and
appreciative of, analytic moral philosophy. A member of the British
intuitionist school, he came to defend a theory of ‘‘moral consensus,’’
arguing that natural law, especially as found in the ius gentium, expressed foundational and universal values. Kolnai is something of a
middle term between Scheler and his felt values and Wojtyla/John Paul
II with his strong emphasis upon norms, reason, and truth. I assume
much of his method throughout. Besides illustrating a certain continuity between phenomenological ethics and Thomas (and interestingly,
British intuitionism), Kolnai is used in this book as a corrective to the
political reasoning found in much of recent Catholic social thought.
Kolnai was hostile to aspects of Maritain’s thought and especially his
critique of privilege in favor of equality and rights. It is incontestable
that contemporary Catholic social thought is basically Maritain’s polit-
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ical philosophy, and in chapters  and  I show why Kolnai’s theory of
privilege best supports Catholic sexual politics.
It remains to thank both people and institutions for help in making
this book possible. Essays that are incorporated here have been read,
and usefully discussed, at Loyola Marymount University, Leuven, and
especially at the International Theological Institute, Gaming, Austria.
Thanks are due to my early teachers in philosophy who, despite the
fact that I was pretty rough material, did seem to enjoy teaching me or
were willing, at least, to sit through tutorials with me. Here Arnold
Zuboff, Bill Hart, and Brian O’Shaughnessy, all at London, deserve
special thanks. A special thanks also to John Seward, Peter Kwasniewski, and Michael Waldenstein, all of Gaming. John pointed me in the
direction of St. John of the Cross as a great interpreter of Thomas—
and I hope this book helps to confirm this. Peter’s essay in The Thomist
on Thomas’s theory of love5 introduced me to vital material, and Michael’s original work on the connections between Thomas’s theology
and that of Wojtyla/John Paul II has soothed my nerves when making
related claims. I owe a substantial debt to their thinking and thank
them for their love of Thomas. I would also like to thank the Directors
of Loyola College’s Catholic Studies Program, Father Joe Rossi, SJ,
and Paul Bagley, for the financial support they gave for my trip to
Gaming, and for their gracious support in many other ways since my
first coming to Loyola. I must thank students at Leuven, Loyola, and
Gaming for provocative interactions; and especially Kate Leahy and
Jamey Becker of Loyola. Colleagues in the Departments of Philosophy
and Theology at Loyola College are to be thanked, but none more
than Stephen Weber for hours of wonderful philosophic companionship and D. G. Leahy for some vital discussions. Whatever theological
wit I have is owed to Steve Sherwood, with whom I first began thinking about theology. Friends to be thanked include: Jörg Tellkamp, Alin
Christian, Dave Zinder, John Betz, and Trent Pomplun. Teachers and
colleagues who have made this book possible, whether through important questions or other assistance, are Carlos Steel, Linda Zagzebski,
Marilyn McCord Adams, Mark Morelli, Sr. Mary Beth Ingham, Rudi
Visker, Jozef Isewijn, and Robert Wielockx. In this regard, no one has
been more important than the late Jos Decorte, who promoted my
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dissertation and later allowed me to teach his classes at Leuven. Here I
must also thank two schoolteachers in Preston for their earlier, but no
less crucial, interest and help: Mr. Anderson at St. Cuthbert Mayne
High School and Mrs. Roche at Newman College. For the gifts of
family life which cannot be tallied, I thank my parents, my sisters
Janine and Diane, and especially Jennifer, my wife, and my children,
Julia, Charlotte, and Beatrice.
This book would never have been written but for the contributions
of all of these people. I am profoundly grateful for the influence of all
of them.
Lastly, I must thank those who showed confidence in the manuscript. Steve Fowl at Loyola and Greg LaNave at Catholic were always
encouraging. Enormous thanks to Merold Westphal, who proved to be
the shepherd, and to the editors of the series at Fordham, Fr. Joe Koterski, SJ, and Fr. Romanus Cessario, OP. I hope their confidence in the
text is not betrayed. Thanks also to Helen Tartar, Chris Mohney, designer Liz Cosgrove, and Patricia B. Cadigan for their many editorial
gifts.
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Chapter One

DESIRE AND V IOLENCE

But sacrifice is no more. The blood that is spilled, is spilled atrociously, and
only atrociously. There was a spirituality of Christ’s wounds. But since then,
a wound is just a wound—and the body is nothing but a wound . . .
—J. L. Nancy, Corpus

Thomas’s analysis of the body rests on a peculiar metaphysical claim,
and some might think this claim alone makes any putative restoration
absurd; yet, I do not think this ought to be conceded directly. From
Aristotle, Aquinas draws the idea that matter desires form (ScG II, c.
 and c. ; III, c. , para. ). In his Commentary on the Physics,
Aquinas asks if perhaps this is meant metaphorically, as Avicenna insists. Thomas, with Averroes, prefers to think that Aristotle meant it
quite literally (I Phys., lect. , n. ). Indeed, for Thomas, prime
matter is a principle of desire (De Verit., q. , a. ).1 While Descartes
may have transformed nature into dead matter, others of the metaphysical tradition, at least until Schopenhauer, have agreed with Thomas.
Schopenhauer scoffs at anyone who would think that iron filings are
pulled toward a magnetic body; rather do they desire to be united with
that body. Leibniz explains that the monads are centers of desire seeking perception. Augustine in the City of God sees each aspect of nature
as tripartite in structure, imitating the Trinity, and especially as centers
of desire imitating the Father. This passage impressed Schopenhauer,
as did ones he found in Suarez, but he could just as well have applied
to Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Aquinas for a related understanding
of desire throughout nature.
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Ecstatic Morality and S exual P olitics

What is most interesting is not that Aquinas is a part of this metaphysical tradition but the manner in which he explains the relationship
between desire and its object, the relationship between matter and
form. In his concept of the concreatum2—and it is unusual in the period—Thomas argues that matter and form are always already internally related; in other words, that desire is always already united to its
object. This is the import behind a common image in Thomas: natural
inclinations attain their ends as an arrow attains its inclination from
the archer’s act of shooting (ScG III, c. , para. ; c. , para. ). That
desire finds satisfaction in its object when attained (ScG III, c. , para.
) is the significance of the concreatum and marks Thomas’s metaphysics with a certain serenity (Gauthier) that is quite exceptional in the
metaphysical tradition. The material world with which we are familiar
is in its inner structure a host of such concreata. The term is quite
dense, for not only does it emphasize that the material world is a created world, it also telegraphs that there is a relationship between the
components of material things, of which things the human is a very
special kind. As will be seen, that relationship for Thomas is essentially
one of desire, order, and peace. Indeed, in a sense to be explained, I
show that the relationship is ecstatic. That is, the desire of the parts for
one another deposes each in the service of the other. That the concreatum is a reflection of the metaphysical order as such is shown in chapter
, and how its ecstatic dynamism shapes human moral experience is
the topic of chapter . Why Thomas developed this concept in opposition to Averroes’s description of material composites as congregatum
is explained shortly. It is in contrasting Thomas’s concept with the
aggregatum of Giles of Rome that I hope to show why one can claim
an exceptionalism for Thomas. Christian theologians and later Western
philosophy did not follow Aquinas’s lead, and this is seen as early as
his student, Giles.
It is quite important to note that the metaphysical basis of the concreatum is present in Thomas’s Sentences. Here (II Sent., d. , q. , a.
, ad ) Thomas makes a distinction between matter as a principle of
desire and the way of being possible for that principle (ratio possibilitatis). This is important because, although Thomas will use the concreatum in the Summa contra gentiles and link it to his powerful theory of
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Desire and Violence 

ecstatic being, he does not develop there his quite exceptional theory
of concupiscence. The metaphysics of such a theory is already present
in Thomas’s earliest works, but it is only in the Summa theologica that
Thomas, making use of distinctions from Aristotle’s political theory,
develops the idea of a cultivation of sensuality. In chapter  we shall
see how central this idea is to Thomas’s analysis of the body. Aristotle’s
Politics began circulating in the West only around , so it is no
surprise that Thomas would integrate some of his thoughts about this
text only later than this date. In fact, concupiscence is barely spoken
about in the Summa contra gentiles, though it will be readily seen that
his theory of concupiscence is but an application of themes from the
Summa contra gentiles. It is the combination of Thomas’s analysis of
matter (Sentences), theories of substantial composition and ecstatic
being (Summa contra gentiles), and concupiscence (Summa theologica)
that together generate his distinctive theory of the body.
Because desire is always already united with its object, and has—at
the very least as a promise—already attained a fullness of being, desire
is at peace. By contrast, Schopenhauer views desire as will and violence.
For him the body is an expression of the will, and the will is at war
with itself. Indeed, since desire is the very core of the world, existence
as such is violent. Where Schopenhauer posits a fundamental division
interior to desire, between a will that can never be satisfied by its representations, Thomas internally relates desire and the various forms it
becomes. Schopenhauer’s division has had a remarkable history. In his
work on Freud, Ricoeur has spoken of the opposition between desire
and culture, ‘‘the terrible battle for meaning,’’ noting that desire consistently fails to attain its cultural form on account of the ‘‘backward drift
of affectivity.’’3 In The Rebel, Camus casts life as ‘‘only an impulse that
endlessly pursues its form without ever finding it. Man is tortured by
this . . .’’ And one could keep adding to this list: Lacan, Bataille,
Foucault, Deleuze, Haraway, and so on. Schopenhauer’s division can
also be found in his predecessors. Leibniz builds an original imperfection into the desire of the monad such that it always fails to attain the
perception it desires. The antecedents go back much further though,
at least till Averroes, and it was to his conception of desire and its
object as congregatum that Thomas was certainly reacting, in part. The
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E c s t a t i c Mor a l i t y a n d Se x u a l Po l i t i c s

Summa contra gentiles, however, has not only Arabic philosophers like
Averroes in its sights but includes, I think, Christian thinkers among
the gentiles.
It has been thought that Thomas wrote the Summa contra gentiles
as a handbook for Dominican missionaries, to better prepare them for
meeting Muslim intellectuals while on missions. More recently, the
idea that the text was written as a response to pagan science, philosophy, and theology has become more common. Yet, one should add to
these ideas that Thomas was also responding to the dominant neoAugustinian metaphysics of the body. There is certainly a relationship
between the thirteenth-century version of this metaphysics and the
commentaries of Averroes. In comparison, Thomas’s metaphysics is a
form of exceptionalism, standing apart as it does from the AverroistAugustinianism much favored both at Oxford and Paris. It is, of
course, terribly old-fashioned to claim an exceptionalism for Thomas
(de Libera); it brings back all those memories of a narrow, neoscholastic insistence that Thomas’s thought stands head and shoulders
above all the other philosopher-theologians of the period. Nevertheless,
with respect to all those scholars who have labored hard during the last
twenty years or so to demonstrate that great thinkers were liberally
spread abroad in the Middle Ages (and I think I can include myself
among these scholars), it remains true that Thomas has a unique,
philosophically powerful theory of the body that can best not only his
immediate peers but those who stand with him as part of the Western
philosophical tradition.
When Thomas replaced Averroes’s description of the material substantial composite as a congregatum with his concreatum, he likewise
replaced the neo-Augustinian description of the same, the aggregatum.
The aggregatum is cast as a plurality of either forms, substances, or
things (res) which are combined to greater or lesser degrees through a
dominating, primary form:4 the forerunner of Leibniz’s dominant
monad as a ‘‘subject of adhesion’’ that exhibits ‘‘compressive force’’
(Deleuze). Neo-Augustinians agreed with Thomas, of course, that
stones, plants, animals, and humans were all material substantial composites, but they articulated anew both Augustine’s sense that the body
and the soul are not intimately related (evident in Augustine’s theory of
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sensation) and—what follows from this—that there is no metaphysical
intimacy between God and creatures.
With de Finance, I wonder at the sense of sacrilege that must have
been felt by neo-Augustinians when reviewing Thomas’s argument that
although creatures as composite and multiple in parts contrast with
God’s unity and simplicity (ScG II, c. , para. ; III, c. , para. 
and ), creatures nevertheless possess a degree of unity and simplicity
that befits recipients of God’s communication of likeness and wisdom
(ScG II, c. , para. –; c. , para. ; III, c. , para. ). For his part,
Thomas senses sacrilege, a limitation placed upon God’s generosity
and power, in the neo-Augustinian refusal to think of the creature as a
unity. Where Thomas sees nature as a reflection of God’s glory, as a
setting of the deus revelatus (ScG II, c. , para. ), neo-Augustinians
approach in humility a transcendent God, though certainly not yet a
deus absconditus. It is not, of course, that the neo-Augustinians doubt
creation—as had Averroes—but that they give metaphysical voice to a
spirituality in which the creature approaches God, but only through
an intensification of the good fight that has to be fought.5 Thomas,
evoking the monastic tradition,6 speaks of desire that comes to rest and
peace as having attained stabilitas (ScG III, c. , para. ). This, of
course, was a primary spiritual quality desired by St. Benedict for his
monks. When Thomas rejects (ScG III, c. , para. ) theories of
desire that make lack essential to desire—Averroes thinks that matter
desires on account of a diminutionem contingentem sibi—he may have
had in mind the gyratory monk—the very worst kind of monk in St.
Benedict’s opinion—as a spiritual sign of such a view of desire. It is
not only that there is a continuity in a violent conception of material
substance between thirteenth-century neo-Augustinian thought and
modern thinkers like Schopenhauer and Leibniz, but there is also a
similar lack of intelligibility among creatures. This medieval lack of
intelligibility that besets creatures that do not brightly reflect the glory
of God will become the darkness characteristic of nature in Romanticism, and both are contested by Rahner’s description of Thomism as
committed to the ‘‘luminosity of Being.’’ Thomas insists on the intelligibility of creaturely existence, affirming that a knowledge of nature is
intimately related to a knowledge of God (ScG II, c. , para. ). The
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Ecstatic Morality and Sexual P olitics

entire movement of the Summa contra gentiles rests upon this principle,
for Thomas insists there that nature is evangelical: that the material
world incites desire for God, that in ‘‘the goodness, beauty, and delightfulness of creatures’’ is a likeness of God that will help people to
love God (ScG II, c. , para. ). Such could not be the case, of course,
if the material substance was fragmented, unintelligible, and violent.7
When reading Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, like everyone else, would
also have had before him the commentary of Averroes. By comparing
the Thomistic and Averroan commentaries, whether their respective
commentaries on the Physics, Metaphysics, or De anima, it becomes
clear that Thomas develops a quite different theory of matter from that
found in Averroes. While the two agreed that matter desires form (De
pot., a. , a. , ad ), Thomas, from the outset, I would argue, had
before him the task of developing a theory of matter compatible with
the bodily resurrection (see TB, ). In his Destructio, a text which
Thomas did not know, Averroes describes resurrection as a substantial
union between a human soul and a celestial body. Thomas explicitly
rejects such a theory—obviously a common one and not particular to
the Arab philosopher—as it denies the possibility that the bodies we
have in the here and now will be resurrected. Thomas’s deep philosophical objection to Averroes is the implication that if the material
principle of our bodies cannot participate in beatitude in some fashion
similar to our souls, then metaphysically a discord has been built into
the human. Our material principle will be forever other than God and,
if directed to God at all, is so in a fashion constitutively different from
the directedness of the soul. And such is indeed the position of Averroes. For him, matter, although potency, is a substance, being and a
thing (res) which exists through itself prior to form (and thus creation)
and thus matter is a principle whose desire is not interiorly constituted
by form.8 This being so, there is no reason to think that God could
ever be a principle of satisfaction, though perhaps one of fascination,
for matter. The variance between desire and its object is compounded
in Averroes through his division of earthly and celestial matter. This
division of the matter of the world (universum) was hotly contested
by Thomas and other Christian thinkers. Averroes distinguished these
matters in a number of ways, casting celestial matter as a substance in
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act, for example, while maintaining that terrestrial matter was potency
(albeit of a metaphysically robust sort). Yet, more important by far is
what follows from this characterization of celestial matter. While
earthly matter has a desire for form, however at variance it might be in
principle from form, celestial matter itself, as in act, does not as such
have a desire for form at all, nor does Averroes anywhere say that it
does. The celestial soul that is attached to this celestial matter—the
two together making the celestial animal—indeed has a desire for God,
but its body does not. Celestial souls drag their bodies around with
them as they strive to imitate the perfection of God, and yet hopelessly
so, for their desireless bodies are perpetually recalcitrant to union with
God.9
Just as the Schopenhaurian will is never satisfied by its representations, nor monads by their perceptions,10 so Averroes’s metaphysics of
desire—and his metaphysics is not as far from Plato’s as is commonly
thought by contemporary scholars11—is signed by the ‘‘backward drift
of affectivity’’ (Ricoeur). If desire cannot find its satisfaction, it is hard
to see what metaphysical basis there could be for peace: it is, in fact, a
short step to take from Averroes to Schopenhauer. If to Thomas’s eyes,
Averroes’s metaphysics is one of hopelessness—a metaphysics in which
the hope, consummation, and peace of union of desiring and desired
is forever withheld—it requires only a slightly more assertive spirit, or
a less courageous one, to see annihilation as a resolution of the intolerable variance of desire and its object.
It is perhaps Schopenhauer who most forcefully brings home all the
implications of an Averroan-like conception of desire. If desire and its
object are not intimately related there is little reason to think that as
they come into contact with one another the result will be especially
merry. Schopenhauer speaks of the war internal to the will, and thus
the world, and casts this as a metaphysical original sin. Similar visions
of metaphysical violence are not hard to find. In Galen, the aberrations
of the intrinsically antirational passions are a consequence, as is all
disease, of primitive fracturing among the component parts of the
body;12 Machiavelli understands the city to be riven by a natural violent opposition between the nobility and the common people;13
Thomas Hobbes makes Augustine’s lust to dominate metaphysical (a

................. 11244$

$CH1

03-18-05 08:27:25

PS

PAGE 7



Ecstatic Morality and Sexual Politics

principle of the natural law no less!), as do Spinoza14 and Hegel;15 and
even Adam Smith, for whom Hobbes was the arch enemy, describes a
primordial ‘‘corruption of the moral sentiments’’ in our natural proclivity to admire aesthetic perfection and complexity more than virtue.16 Freud cast human existence as a combat of two immortal forces,
aggression and libido;17 and, at times, Carl Schmitt18 when he argues
that the friend-enemy distinction (and the war that stands as an everpresent possibility inside this distinction) is cast as an intensification of
the struggle constitutive of human life.
As early as his Sentences (–), Aquinas was developing a very
different theory of desire and the body, a theory that would be systematically argued for in his Aristotelian commentaries (–). I agree
entirely with Van Steenbergen who saw in Thomas’s commentaries an
attempt to give to the Latin world an entirely non-Averroan commentary tradition. As I shall show in this book, Thomas’s attempt to displace Averroes failed; at least, Thomas’s most brilliant student, Giles of
Rome, preferred the insights of Averroes to those of his teacher. In this,
I think Giles is pretty representative of the period: and I shall certainly
treat him as representative of the Averroist-Augustinian tradition.19
Rémi Brague has argued that the general task that faced the theologians
of the Middle Ages was to diminish the Greek inheritance of the exteriority of God to the world.20 Following Brague’s insight, a history of
the period could be written which would show, I think, this process
coming to fulfillment in Aquinas and thereafter a reaction—stimulated
by the Condemnations of —in which the Thomistic proximity is
rejected in favor of a new exteriority. Thus, if, in Averroes, God and
the world are ultimately divided, in Giles, God and the world are ultimately united, but this unification is not rendered without its moments
of violence. As shall be seen in chapters  and , it is a commonplace
of the philosophical and theological tradition to conceive of selfmastery in terms of violent self-rule; to assume that material substantial
compositions are held together through violence; and even among
theologians, to understand the reforming powers of grace as the violent
suppression of nature. Thomas objects to all three of these violent
analyses but sees all three are related to a central problem: the failure
to see the natural world as a setting for the deus revelatus. Thomas saw
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clearly that in dividing the world into two different orders of desire,
Averroes had in principle so reduced God’s governance of the world as
to make its exercise inevitably one of violence. For God’s presence
must make itself felt through impressing itself upon the otherness of
the material principles. Indeed, one of these principles—the celestial—is indifferent to that presence and yet a necessary cosmological
avenue, as it were, if that presence is to be felt in the terrestrial realm.
It is hardly a surprise, then, if God is unable to satisfy earthly desire.
Aquinas appears to see in Averroes a conception of a metaphysical, but
not a theological, God: actually, Thomas seems to have seen in Averroes’s works what al-Ghazzali saw before him. Thomas is quite clear
about the catastrophe that follows upon Averroes’s choice of the metaphysical instead of the theophanic: if the matters of the world are distinct (ScG II, c. , para. ) and as a consequence there are three
organizing principles in the world, the world becomes monstrous (ScG,
c. , para. ), with violence now structural.
Why Averroes made this distinction belongs to the history of astronomy, but this reason should be quickly reviewed here. It has already
been seen that his distinction is philosophically interesting, for it reveals Averroes’s fundamental metaphysical commitments. So, likewise,
the Christian reactions to the distinction also reveal fundamental
choices made. It was a commonplace of the Middle Ages to note that
while in the celestial sphere no generation and corruption was observed, such did define the terrestrial sphere. Averroes argued that the
difference was well accounted for by positing two structurally different
matters. As we have seen, Thomas rejected this explanation as a diminishment both of God’s revelation and our desire for union with God:
God’s unity is reflected in the unity of the world, Thomas insists.
Rather does Thomas preserve the distinction between the two realms
by arguing that there is a single principle of matter (or desire) in the
world (ScG II, c. , para. ; III, c. , para. ), but the way of being
possible (ratio possibilitatis) is many. Thomas thus argues that the specification of desire, the ratio that the principle of prime matter comes to
have, is determined entirely by the form (II Sent., d. , q. , a . , ad
; I Phys., lect. , n. ; I Gen. et corr., lect. , n. ; De pot., q. , a.
). This allows him to argue that prime matter as a principle is the
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same matter in the celestial and terrestrial realms (‘‘a principle common
to all bodies’’ [ScG II, c. , para. ]) but the rationes of its desire are
different because the forms are different. Celestial forms are able to
freeze (ligare) the pure potentiality of prime matter, whilst terrestrial
forms freeze the potentiality of prime matter for a limited period only
(ScG II, c. , para. ; III, c. , para. ). Thomas’s contribution here
is to enter into the interior structure of the desire of matter and this
allows him to account for the observed phenomena without conceding
the two-matters theory of Averroes. When Giles of Rome reviewed this
solution, he took a middle path. He rejected the solutions of Averroes
and Thomas equally but took something from both of their theories.
He rejected Averroes’s division in matter but kept his metaphysical
commitments and in so doing transformed Thomas’s distinction between matter as a principle and the way of being possible of that matter. In so doing, he makes an important intervention in the history of
ideas, one with quite a subsequent history, and especially with regard
to the philosophy of the body.
Giles changes Thomas’s distinction from that between matter as a
principium and its way of being possible as a ratio possibilitatis to a
distinction between matter as a res and its way of being possible as
a modus rei. Giles has thus converted Thomas’s distinction into the
metaphysical framework of Averroes, in which matter has a much
denser metaphysical character than is found in Thomas. Giles argued
that because Thomas’s distinction was not based upon a res-metaphysics, Thomas had ended up repeating Averroes’s division of two different kinds of matter. Giles argued that matter as a principium whose
potentiality is utterly ordered to form has too little metaphysical character to avoid simply being absorbed into the actuality of form: and, if
this is so, then celestial matter is a matter of a different actuality to
terrestrial matter. Giles argued that in Thomas there is no genuine
material or potential principle at all, and thus individual material substances are not really composed. If creatures are not really composed,
then Thomas’s insistence on the unity of the creature as an imitation
of the unity of God becomes even more scandalous: Thomas’s desire
to articulate the unity of the creature has pushed him into seriously
diminishing the sense in which creatures are composed at all.21 Thus,
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Giles defends the idea of the aggregatum as a whole composed of a res
(matter), a modus rei (a manner of desire), and a res (form) and in
so doing, he preserves prime matter as pure potentiality; secures the
distinction between the celestial and the terrestrial; and strongly marks
the creature as composed and different from God.
As will be shown in some detail in chapter , this transformation is
full of implications for how one conceives of the flesh, that is, the
relationship between reason and sensuality in the embodied soul. Matter, in Giles, is now a thing (res) having a much greater metaphysical
independence than in Thomas. Indeed, I think the division among the
parts of the composite undergoes a further intensification in Giles than
one even finds in Averroes. In Thomas, the concreatum is a unity of
two principia, form and matter, which together through their internal
relation establish one thing (res), an individual substance. The congregatum of Averroes is already a loosening of the tight Thomistic bond—
ultimately, a bond to be explained in the intimacy between desire and
its object—and form and matter become substances that together make
an individual substance a composite of two more primary substances.
The aggregatum of Giles—but a term common to many neo-Augustinians—is an even looser composition of matter and form with each cast
as things (res) and thus the individual material substance as a thing
composed of two other things. Actually, what might be called ‘‘elaborate plurality theses’’crossed the boundaries of the different mendicant
orders. Giles was the intellectual authority of the Augustinian Order
and, in comparison to some, a moderate on this issue: the Dominican
Robert Kilwardby and the Franciscan Richard Middleton both
thought of each component of the aggregatum as a substance, form,
act, and thing.
While there has been much dispute as to whether it is appropriate
to speak of a neo-Augustinian movement in the thirteenth century,
and who might be a part of it, there are, I am sure, ample grounds for
grouping a range of Christian thinkers who through the concept of the
aggregatum gave metaphysical expression to psychological and phenomenological descriptions found throughout Augustine’s works. Both
the Confessions—one of the more optimistic works—and the City of
God include descriptions of the fragmented self held together by vio-
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lent self-mastery. The texts that speak about these efforts in respect of
sensuality—texts which speak of war and conflict among the parts of
the soul—are famous, of course, and one can find similar texts in Plato,
Giles, Descartes, Kant, and Rahner, among many others. Giles is especially eloquent when putting this into a metaphysical register:22 since
the human being is a composite of matter and soul, and since flesh is
the meeting point of the material and mental faculties of the soul, flesh
has its origin in two distinct things, the thing that is matter and the
thing that is soul. It seems to be a rule that where there is greater
metaphysical division there is a greater possibility for conflict: at least,
this rule appears confirmed when examining the flesh in Giles, Descartes, and Kant (see chapter ).
This chapter has dealt with some of the primary metaphysical theories of desire found in the Middle Ages. I have claimed an exceptionalism for Thomas that stems from his concept of the concreatum. I have
argued that the basic significance of this idea is that it helps Thomas
to build a metaphysics of peace. Because the human as a composite of
matter and form is a concreatum, the place where matter and form
combine in lived experience, the passions, is already always ordered to
peace. How this metaphysics allows Thomas to develop a unique theory of the lived body is explained in the next two chapters. Thereafter,
how this theory of the body has been used by the Church to develop
its sexual politics will be a primary concern. It is argued that not merely
is the Church’s sexual politics defensible but that it is more theoretically cogent than the alternatives. More fundamentally yet, if all can
agree that a moderation of violence is a good, then the Church’s sexual
politics will have to be embraced by those seeking to limit the effects
of the culture of death.
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ECSTAT IC BEING

All creatures desire the divine likeness and in so doing desire their own
perfection. This is possible, for all being in Thomas’s conception is
ecstatic. Through examining this idea in the present chapter, it will be
possible to see that the metaphysics of ecstatic being in the Summa
contra gentiles (III, c. , para. –) allows Thomas to describe a philosophical anthropology in which the desires of the human reflect a
moral hierarchy (ScG III, c. , para. –) and to establish a foundation
for his natural law theory (ST I–II, q. , a. ). The four-part (ecstatic)
movement of human desire and its corresponding moral hierarchy will
be discussed in this chapter. The basic argument is that the human
body made ecstatic satisfies pseudo-Dionysius’s dictum: Bonum est diffusivum sui.1 In Thomas’s hands, of course, this dictum also captures
the giving and generative character of Being and all that participates in
God’s act. As de Finance puts it, ‘‘l’acte est essentiellement généreux.’’2
If we recall that this dictum is said of God (ScG III, c. , para. ),
then the structure of human desire can be seen to imitate the structure
of Being itself (MD, para. ). Chapter  will examine the basis for the
ecstatic structure of the body in the relationship between reason and
sensuality. Chapter  will complete the argument by claiming that natural law is rooted in eternal law, the expression of God’s wisdom and
love, and so directs humans toward an increasing ecstasy in imitation
of God’s own nature: ‘‘divine love makes ecstasy insofar as it makes the
appetite of man tend into lovable things’’ (divinus amor facit extasim
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inquantum scilicet facit appetitum hominis tendere in res amatas [ST
II–II, q. , a. ]).
The meaning of the term ‘‘ecstatic’’ in the following is at once ethical, metaphysical, and theological. The argument relies on the Dionysian maxim that the good is diffusive of itself. Thomas especially
discusses ecstasy in relation to this maxim. I argue that the maxim is
true in both an ethical and a metaphysical sense, and that Thomas
himself makes this argument. I later argue that this double sense is
more deeply underwritten by Christ as an exemplar of the love that
wounds the lover. Again, this is an argument that Thomas makes and
this is why, for example, I think Thomas’s natural law is thoroughly
Christological. It is also why Thomas’s analysis of a basic part of the
metaphysical order, the material composite (and one such composite is
the human being), can be identified as having an ecstatic structure. As
the text will illustrate, ‘‘ecstatic’’ is used here to capture a Thomistic
insight that the parts of the world are deposed in service one for another. I call this ‘‘Ecstatic Thomism.’’ Having identified the way in
which ecstasy structures Thomas’s ethical, metaphysical, and theological thought, I show throughout that Karol Wojtyla’s thought on these
matters is thoroughly Thomistic in just this sense. Because this is little
appreciated, I do not think the power of his sexual ethics has really
been recognized: that is, a rejection of Wojtyla’s sexual ethics is also a
rejection of Ecstatic Thomism. Kolnai’s emphasis on privilege as a response to an objective moral order is the political counterpart to Ecstatic Thomism. For privilege deposes man as the measure of political
order. It shifts the centre of political gravity from the sovereignty of
the individual and leaves man simultaneously exposed and elevated
through social order.
Natural appetite seeks the divine likeness as its own perfection (ScG
III, c. , para. ), and the higher in the scale of goodness a natural
appetite is, the more does it desire ‘‘a broader common good’’ (c. ,
para. ). Thomas provides four examples to demonstrate this principle.
An individual seeks its (proper) good to preserve itself in existence,
say, when an animal desires food. An individual can also act in a way
appropriate to the species, as when an animal seeks its ‘‘proper good’’
in the ‘‘protection of individuals belonging to his species.’’ Seeking
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continued existence and the protection of the young belong to ‘‘the
essential character’’ of an animal but in different modes, under the
mode of individual and the mode of species. A third mode is that of
genus, and here Thomas gives the example of the heavens: a planetary
body ‘‘seeks its proper good’’ as an equivocal agent, that is, by supporting the generation of terrestrial phenomena that are quite different in
character from its own celestial being. Here, the individual bodies of
the heavens help to sustain the genus of terrestrial being. In a fourth
and last mode, God, ‘‘Who is beyond genus,’’ as befits ‘‘His own goodness’’ ‘‘gives existing being to all.’’
Thomas describes a metaphysical order which in ascending in perfection becomes increasingly ecstatic as the more perfect members of
the order find their proper good in sustaining, protecting, and promoting other members of the order that are increasingly remote from
themselves. It is, if you will, a metaphysics of charity. ‘‘Hence it is said
by some people, and not inappropriately, that ‘the good, as such, is
diffusive,’ because the better a thing is, the more does it diffuse its
goodness to remote beings’’ (ScG III, c. , para. ). As the human
person is the most perfect being in nature (perfectissimum in tota natura), having the greatest worth amongst creatures (dignissimum in
creaturis [ST I, q. , a. ; De potentia, q. , a. ]), the human person
is most thoroughly structured by the ecstatic character of being. From
the individual who sustains and protects its own being one moves by
increasingly ecstatic stages to God, Who in giving being to all other
things conserves them. For divine love makes ecstasy (divinus amor
facit extasim ) as all things seek the divine likeness as their own perfection. God moves all being as an object of desire (ScG III, c. , para.
), including the desire of matter (ScG III, c. , para. ), and thereby
brings them to perfection (ScG III, c. , para. ). Insofar as a creature
attains the object of its desire, and its acts attain stability (stabilitas), it
simultaneously constitutes its own identity and offers itself in a relationship to others. Creatures are intrinsically structured to an otherdirectedness through which they yet attain their own proper good (ST
I, q. , a. ): they are thus internally ecstatic, a consequence of their
being good and so interiorly propelled to communicating that good:
bonum est diffusivum sui.3 There is then an inner unity in Thomas’s
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conception between ecstasy and generosity (generositas: producing well/
noble birth); or, in other terms, between love of the other and love of
self. Indeed, it is quite accurate to say that there is the good of others
written into the definition of appetite as such, and thus others are
included in the definition of what it is to be a human person. This
central principle is, in Thomas’s mind, the foundation of the ecstatic
dimension of the body: for if the body is desire, and after some fashion
for Thomas it certainly is, then the body has a propensity for the good
of the other; and if the body is part and parcel of what it is to be a
human person, then the human is always interiorly other-directed. The
passage to which we will turn shortly (ScG III, c. , para. –) will
show how this description of ecstatic being is a metaphysical-ethical
description of human desire.
That these passages establish a metaphysical ethics was not missed
by the Jesuits. The Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics () that
belongs to the Cursus Conimbricensis begins with these passages from
Thomas, and the first disputatio of the Jesuit commentary is designed
to provide a metaphysics for the ethical positions to be defended. The
Portuguese Jesuits (the text is a compilation of notes from various Jesuit
professors edited by Fr. Manuel de Góis)4 do not link these passages to
Thomas’s theory of love, however; nor do they link them to another
of Thomas’s passages, which I think is crucial for his account of moral
hierarchy (ScG III, c. , para. –). Nonetheless, the fact that the
Baroque Jesuits recognized the intrinsic relationship between Thomas’s
ecstatic metaphysics and ethics is important.5 The Coimbra commentaries had tremendous success throughout Europe in both Catholic and
Protestant universities and colleges. For this reason, we should not
perhaps be so quick to accept Levinas’s comment that the history of
Western philosophy is flawed because metaphysics was given a priority
over ethics. In Thomas’s conception of ecstatic being we seem to have
a simultaneity between the two. I shall argue later in this chapter (as
well as in chapters  and ) that there are profound, and as yet unexplored, convergences between Levinas and Thomas. And, as shall become clear, it is less the case that the body expresses the law ‘‘Thou
shalt not kill’’ but more a propensity to serve the common, and ultimately, the universal, good: which may, as the natural law makes clear,
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include the need to kill so as to love the other. The greatest confirmation that the simultaneity of metaphysics and ethics as conceived by
Thomas and some Jesuits was common intellectual currency comes
from an unlikely source: de Sade. The fundamental drive of de Sade’s
philosophy was to see the dis-incarnation of God. The target picked
by de Sade was God’s proxy, the natural law: and, as everyone knows,
de Sade thought up many ways to contravene the natural law. Nevertheless, despite all of these ways, de Sade’s desire was frustrated, for the
very continuation of things in being promoted Christian morality.
Thus it is that de Sade conceived of the greatest exaltation to be hurling
the sun at the earth so that both might be destroyed in the cataclysm
that would follow.6 The fantasy of de Sade reveals him to have had a
deep understanding of Christianity’s metaphysical ethics, an understanding that may lead to a useful correction of Levinas’s history of
Western thought.
The ecstatic structure of a creature is also a function of its status as
a concreatum. This is not only because the kind of desire the matter
has is a consequence of the identity given to matter through its creation
with form but more importantly that matter as desire is nothing other
than an orderedness to form and act (nihil igitur est aliud materiam
appetere formam, quam eam ordinari ad formam ut potentia ad actum [I
Phys., lect. , n. ; ScG II, c.  & c. ]). That is, matter is perpetually ecstatic in that it is intrinsically directed to form, and is so, without
remainder, as it were. A contrast with Giles’s aggregatum will show the
significance of this. The aggregatum for Giles is a composition of two
res which cannot be internally related and hence give the basis of a real
distinction (if not separation). Giles precisely develops this model to
distance his idea of matter from that of Thomas, for whom matter is
nothing other than an orderedness to form. To capture the metaphysics
of Giles with an image, it might be appropriate to think of the material
composite as built of matter and form cast as two magnets but with
their charges opposed, and so while able to be in close proximity a
residual distance always remains; indeed, a certain interior instability is
never absent from the material substantial composite in Giles’s conception. In Thomas, form and matter have always ecstatically reached out
the one to the other.
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The metaphysical order of ecstatic being—individual-conservation,
species-offspring, genus-community, universal-God—is expressed in
human desire. Human appetite is a set of ordered movements from
conservation (individual), to family (species), to civic life (genus), and
to God (universal). Thomas presents this theory at ScG III, c.  (para.
–). Thomas begins his presentation with the highest human ‘‘type of
desire’’ whose act is ‘‘knowledge of truth.’’ The satisfaction of this
appetite is pursued through contemplation and will be brought to final
contemplation only in the ‘‘vision of the First Truth’’ (para. ). A second lower desire is a consequence of human rationality and is ‘‘a certain desire . . . to manage lower things.’’ Its satisfaction is found in
‘‘the work of the active and civic life’’ and its object is ‘‘that the entire
life of man may be arranged in accord with reason, for this is to live in
accord with virtue’’ (emphasis original). That is, this desire and its act
is the ostiarius, the desire and act that allows the contemplated divine
law to suffuse the ‘‘entire life of man,’’ including his sensuality. Thus
Thomas writes that ‘‘prudence, that is, political prudence, ministers to
wisdom, for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for it, as an ambassador for a ruler (sicut ostiarius ad regem)’’ (ST I–II, q. , a. ). As with
the first desire, this desire will be fully satisfied only in the visio dei
when ‘‘reason will be at its peak strength, having been enlightened by
the divine light, so that it cannot swerve from what is right’’ (para. ).
The virtue of prudence thus perfects the desire to manage our lives
rationally, both in relation to others and to ourselves. Thomas then
discusses three applications of ‘‘political prudence’’ (para. –) which
are matters for the virtue of justice. These passages will be discussed in
chapter . The ‘‘third desire of man’’ is ‘‘to enjoy pleasures’’ (para. ),
and this is typically done, says Thomas, ‘‘in the voluptuous life.’’ This
appetite is concupiscence or sensuality and must be managed through
the cultivation of temperance, while a fourth desire for ‘‘preservation’’
(para. ) is the irascible appetite to be managed through fortitude.
Thomas explains that in the visio dei the blessed will ‘‘attain perfect
sempiternity’’ and the irascible appetite will thus be wholly satisfied
(para. ). About concupiscence, Thomas adds:
However, the most perfect delight is found in this felicity [the
beatitude of the visio dei]: as much more perfect then the delight

................. 11244$

$CH2

03-18-05 08:27:31

PS

PAGE 18

Ecstatic Being 

of sense, which even brute animals can enjoy, as the intellect is
superior to the sense power; and also as that good in which we
shall take delight is greater than any sensible good, and more
intimate, and more continually delightful . . .
(ScG III, c. , para. )
In ‘‘the vision of the First Truth,’’ an intelligible good, the Being that
is the Trinity will be communicated to concupiscence and grant to it
‘‘the most perfect delight.’’ Crucially, this intelligible good is not
merely greater than any sensible good but it will be ‘‘more intimate’’
to us than any sensible good can be. That intelligible goods are more
communicable than sensible goods relies on Thomas’s metaphysical
principle that matter is a principle of individuation. The full implication of this principle for the body and desire—that the bodily excludes—will be discussed in the next chapter. Here, it is important to
note that Thomas argues that concupiscence can become intimate with
a purely spiritual or intellectual principle. The visio dei, in which the
most intellectual of principles comes to characterize a person and her
desires, is an intensification of the virtuous life, in which sensuality is
characterized by reason. In this intensification, when God becomes
intimate to concupiscence, and when concupiscence imitates God
more, sensuality becomes ecstatic, opening to a wider good. Through
the virtuous life, and finally and definitively in beatitude, bodily desire
rises to God in ever greater intelligibility, universality, and generosity.
If, on the contrary, bodily desire moves away from God it becomes
evermore ‘‘deaf to reason’’ (Plato), particular, and closed in upon itself.
To begin to capture the implications of the ecstatic structure of
desire as presented by Thomas in these passages, we can ask: what is
the consummation of desire for each of the four levels of human desire?
As we move through these four levels it will be seen that the least
ecstatic desire converts its object into itself while the most ecstatic
desire is converted into its object. The hierarchy begins with the desire
for preservation, with nutrition as a good example (ScG II, c. , para.
). Here, food is absorbed into the creature, as the creature impresses
its form almost totally upon the nourishment. Although Thomas is not
known for his physiological reflections, theories of digestion in which

................. 11244$

$CH2

03-18-05 08:27:31

PS

PAGE 19



Ecstatic Morality and Sexual Politics

food is converted into blood which then becomes a matter for the
heart’s natural heat to operate upon as form were commonplace in the
thirteenth century.7 At this level of desire, the other barely appears.
With the next level, however, a crucial intensification of relatedness to
the other can occur. While natural appetite first structures all beings to
conserve themselves, in a second moment it structures sensuality (that
of animals and the human animal both) to an ecstatic involvement
with another. The desire for pleasure can be—but as we all know is
not always—a desire in which the conversion of the other to the self
can be transformed. In the case of offspring (ScG IV, c. , para. ),
although the child is impressed with something of the form of the
parents (their one flesh), nevertheless this impression is not at all total.
Another genuinely appears at this level of desire and therewith the
parents’ desire is made ecstatic (quando appetitus alicujus in alterum
fertur, exiens quodammodo extra seipsum [ST I–II, q. , a. ]). While
in the case of nutrition, the other is absorbed into the form of the one
desiring, in the case of offspring the emergence of another compels the
parents to a life of service; they become related to one who has a lawful
claim to education and cultivation (ST I–II, q. , a. ).
That this level of desire is made open to the other is a consequence
of sensuality being impressed by reason (LR, ; –). In the rule
of reason over sensuality, a double ecstasy opens up within the person.
Sensuality in obedience to reason overcomes a propensity internal to
its nature to convert the other to itself (LR, )—we shall discuss the
metaphysical reasons for this below—but so too reason, if its rule over
sensuality is just, overcomes a possibility (though not a propensity) to
transform sensuality inordinately into itself. The obedience of sensuality to reason that was one of the great gifts of God to Adam and Eve
should not be misunderstood. This obedience was not a collapsing of
sensuality into reason, it was rather that sensuality was guided to its
true satisfaction by a reason that had in view the good of all the parts
of human nature (the intricacies involved here will be discussed in the
next chapter).
Yet, to many today, the privileged role Thomas has for reason will
seem implausible. There is probably no concept more embattled than
that of rationality. The attack has really been led by post-modern theo-
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rists, and almost always with the concept of Kantian reason in mind.
Thomas would join in these attacks (!) and insist simultaneously that
his concept of reason is utterly different from Kantian reason. Kantian
reason is an autonomous law-giver and self-legislating. It is a consequence of this autonomy that Kantian reason is not ecstatic and differs
from Thomas’s conception on two counts. In Kant’s moral theory,
there must be a moral relationship to the self before there can be a
moral relationship to the other. The other is external to my morality
as such. The internal other, sensuality, is always external to the life of
reason in Kant’s thought.8 Sensuality relates to reason only as a threat
and thus reason seeks to control it through an autocratic rule so as to
nullify the movements of sensuality and therefore to nullify the internal
other as such.9 The internal other can never even appear in a moral
relationship with reason (LR, ) but only ever be a victim of the
brute assertion of reason’s autocratic rule. For the human as animal
rationale, says Kant, is nothing other than pretium vulgare. In Thomas,
as has been seen, the ecstatic nature of reason places reason in an always
constituted immediate moral relationship to the external other, as well
as the internal other, sensuality.
Thomistic reason is a governor or monarch with a dynamic of creativity that is an artistry imitating the divine artistry of wisdom. God
creates in wisdom (ScG II, c. , para. ; VS, para. –) as an artist,
says Thomas (ScG II, c. , para. ), and in looking to govern according
to the mutual proportion between things, reason acts, if I could put it
this way, as a constitutional ruler, a guardian of received divine law. It
is still more the image of reason as an artist under the patronage of
God that Thomas wishes to emphasize. He does so in a remarkable
passage that deserves to be quoted at length:
For, so far as their appetite moves their members, they [animals]
are said to move themselves, and in this they surpass inanimate
things and plants; but, so far as appetition in them follows necessarily upon the reception of forms through their senses and from
the judgment of their natural estimative power, they are not the
cause of their own movement; and so they are not master of their
own action. On the other hand, form understood, through which
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the intellectual substance acts, proceeds from the intellect itself
as a thing conceived, and in a way contrived by it; as we see in
the case of artistic form, which the artificer conceives and contrives, and through which he performs his works. Intellectual
substances, then, move themselves to act, as having mastery of
their own action. It therefore follows that they are endowed with
will.
(ScG II, c. , para. )
It is worth following Thomas closely here. He wants to explain human
freedom and begins with the case of animals, noting that they have no
will because they are not free. This phrasing is unusual: something is
not free because it has a will, but has a will because it is free. Thomas
argues that animal appetite moves necessarily upon the reception of
forms by bodily cognitive powers and after the judgment of natural
faculties such as the estimative power. By contrast, the human has will
because the human intellect devises, contrives, and invents (excogitio).
It is on the basis of the intellect’s contrivings (excogitata) that the
human responds to the environment. It is this distance from the life of
the senses and the imagination, a distance generated by the freedom of
the intellect to invent and devise, that is the foundation of human will
and the capacity for self-mastery. This capacity of the intellect to create
its conceptual life is the most fundamental site of freedom within the
person—human action is free because the intellect is free on account
of a capacity for concept-creation—and yet it is not a freedom of selflegislation but the artist’s freedom of inventiveness under the patronage
of God. It is not then a question of autonomous freedom—a self generating its law—but an ecstatic freedom with a self essentially involved
in practices of service in which the self is already and always given over
to others. Self-mastery, for Aquinas, is never the absolute self-mastery
or autocracy insisted upon by Descartes and Kant. The artistry of reason is (should be) an imitation of divine wisdom (Prologue, Commentary on the Politics, para. ), an expression of reason’s ecstasy toward
God (as artists eschew state patronage, and as many acknowledge that
the Romantic ideal of individual inspiration is now tired, there has
never been a better moment for the Church to reclaim her role as the

................. 11244$

$CH2

03-18-05 08:27:32

PS

PAGE 22

Ecstatic Being 

patron of the arts).10 Pickstock says nicely, ‘‘the placing of imitation
ahead of autonomy suggests that, for Aquinas, borrowing is the highest
authenticity which can be attained. One must copy in order to be, and
one continues only as a copy, never in one’s own right.’’11
The double ecstasy of sensuality in relationship with reason and
reason’s own movement toward sensuality is a condition for the possibility of a third ecstatic moment: at this level of desire; rational selfgovernment makes possible the appearance of another in a social and
political sense. Self-government, rooted in a double ecstasy that is
nothing like absolute self-mastery or a rule of self by one sufficient unto
himself, is always the foundation of political government: a rational life
of virtue for the common good of one’s own whole person is a condition of a rational life of virtue for the common good of society as such.
The self-command of ecstatic reason is precisely a rule of self in which
a standard other than oneself takes hold. Reason engages in a just rule
to the degree that it concerns itself with the mutual proportion of
parts, and the same standard determines a life of virtue in relationship
to the political good. We see here that a virtuous politics can only be a
politics of humility since humility is a condition for ecstasy. The difficulties involved in this politics of humility—where one sets oneself in
mutual proportion to another—is made more intense by the fact that,
for Thomas, the rule of reason over sensuality is founded on a moral
authority that must by moral persuasion evoke consent and obedience
from sensuality. When this model of self-government is applied to the
rule of government of the common good of society it is evident that
government must first and foremost be moral government. There can
be no such thing as a neutral state, nor indeed a Church that ceases to
proclaim itself as a moral and political authority.
With the fourth level of desire, and here we are able to use Thomas’s
definition of ecstasy in its fullest sense (extra connaturalem apprehensionem rationis et sensus [ST I–II, q. , a. ]), we reach a level at which it
is possible for intellectual desire to be satisfied through Truth when
Truth impresses His identity upon the lover. Here, desire is converted,
having completed a movement of humility, and made into the Other.
A (spiritual) food now converts desire rather than desire converting
(physical) food. The visio dei,12 as Thomas says, occurs ‘‘by imposition
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of a new form’’ (ScG III, c. , para. ), that is, the intellect comes to
reside ‘‘in (a new) position’’ (per novae formae appositionem), having
taken on ‘‘the likeness of the thing understood informing it’’ (ScG III,
c. , para. ; emphasis is mine). The intellect is now outside its original
position because it is now understanding ‘‘through something other
than itself ’’ (ScG III, c. , para. ; emphasis is mine). We thus understand how Thomas can insist that the visio dei is connatural to human
desire (ScG III, c. , para. ) despite there being an infinite gap between God and creature: the ecstatic structure of desire, the concreatum, is a natural (if potential) bridge between the natural and the
supernatural. Thomas can cogently speak of the created intellect being
united in an act of understanding with God while remaining ‘‘far away
from God in its being’’ (ScG III, c. , para. ). It is important to note
here that the conversion of the desire of the intellect into its desired
object, God, is not the satisfaction of desire in the sense of its cessation.
Desire, Thomas tells us, is perpetually ecstatic in the visio dei. No finite
object can satisfy the natural desire of the intellect, but once desire
comes to the infinite object, desire is incited further to know more
intimately the object now present to the lover (ScG III, c. , para. ).
Desire before the infinite God now possesses ‘‘an unmoving stability’’
(ScG III, c. , para. )—here the Dominican Thomas surely pays his
respects to the spiritual insight of Benedict—in which desire is perpetually drawn out of itself in wonder at Who the lover beholds fixedly
(ScG III, c. , para. ).
The appetite for self-conservation which reduces all objects to itself
is reversed in the appetite for the visio dei: a natural centeredness on
self is constantly being absorbed and transformed by an ecstatic othercenteredness. Thomas’s explanation of the visio dei helps to show that
his account of the four-part structure of human desire is itself structured by the theory that human desire, precisely because it is human,
is desire having a matter/form composition. In Thomas’s most metaphysical analysis of desire, the openness of matter as a principle of pure
potentiality, a potency toward being informed, always makes of desire
a movement beyond itself, even unto supernatural completion.
Thomas can thus speak of God and human ‘‘mutually united’’ (ScG
III, c. , para. ), for the human is now like God, marked by generos-
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ity, being diffusivum sui. Discussing Thomas’s metaphysics, Wojtyla
writes:
The inner measure of a being’s perfection necessarily moves outward, so to speak, transcending the being itself: the perfection of
a created being always causes that being to tend toward the ultimate end that is God, by virtue of the being’s own resemblance
to God. The higher this perfection, the more the being tends
toward God, for the better it represents God’s perfection in the
world. In this view, perfection itself is already a tendency: perfection is ‘‘charged’’ with purposiveness.
(PC, )
The fundamental import of Thomas’s description of the composition
of matter and form as a concreatum is that desire has a natural propensity to glory (lux gloriae), that is, such composites are always to some
degree or other ecstatic since the principles upon which they rely are
so ordered to one another: thus the flesh is a concreatum, with reason
and sensuality ecstatically united to one another. It is here that we can
return to the significance of the theory of composition in Giles of
Rome. Thomas’s insight at this point is that any conception of matter
other than that of matter as a principium of potentiality reduces the
degree to which matter has a propensity to go beyond itself. It might
be thought that the inverse holds, that Giles’s notion of the aggregatum
which has it that there is an otherness internal to the composite bespeaks a greater logic of ecstasy. Such otherness, however, is in fact a
‘‘closing,’’ for it is precisely Giles’s point that the res-status of both
principles means that they resist one another. The modus rei that is
generated in matter by the form, that makes desire into a desire of
some particular sort, cannot draw matter itself, but merely one of its
modes, into an intimate relationship with form. The modal intimacy
achieved bespeaks only a more profound remaining opposition.
Sensuality, argues Thomas, becomes generous when taken up ecstatically into the life of contemplation and reason. As sensuality becomes
more thoroughly structured by reason, it becomes more intimate with
God and therewith more diffusive of itself. While Thomas’s deepest
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reasons for arguing that sensuality independently of reason cannot be
ecstatic will be addressed in the next chapter, it is worth noting here
an odd fact: the thinkers most commonly thought to newly valorize
the body, those who are often celebrated for liberating us from the
Christian oppression of the body, see the body as metaphysically
caught in violence. Foucault regards the ‘‘soul’’ as no more than a
technique of power which is a prison of the body,13 an example of that
power which aims at the domination of the body. The body, however,
is a point of resistance and as such outside of power, yet always perpetually linked to power as an adversary in a ‘‘sphere of force relations.’’
Of these power or force relations, Foucault writes, ‘‘their existence
depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of
adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations. These points
of resistance are present everywhere in the power network.’’ Though it
might be thought that Foucault seems to grant in Rousseau-like fashion a pure innocence to the body—and certainly many liberal American commentators would wish him to have said this—he is quite clear
that such purity cannot exist: resistances ‘‘are the odd term in relations
of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite.’’
The body resists power in its ‘‘inflammations’’ which ‘‘fracture unities’’14 but is hardly innocent of power itself. There is a tinge of regret
about this in Foucault—and so perhaps a hint of Rousseau after all—
but no such regret is found in de Sade or Bataille, who are both happy
to celebrate this violence of the body.
Matters stand no better with Merleau-Ponty. Recalling both the
neo-Augustinian aggregatum and Leibniz’s composites cohering through
‘‘compressive force,’’15 Merleau-Ponty describes the expressive body so:
‘‘Despite the diversity of its parts, which makes it fragile and vulnerable, the body is capable of gathering itself into a gesture which for a
time dominates their dispersion and puts its stamp upon everything it
does.’’16 For him, flesh is the opening of desire, a desire operative in,
and constituted by, vision, ‘‘a combat which at times has no victor.’’
This opening of desire is a peculiar ecstasy for the terms involved as it
establishes a ‘‘line of fire between them.’’17 Being itself is in conflict
and ‘‘my glance’’ which diminishes the ‘‘aggressiveness’’ of being ‘‘takes
up its dwelling in being with authority and conducts itself there as in
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a conquered country.’’18 These passages are of a piece with MerleauPonty’s Marxism,19 where human relations succumb to ‘‘inevitable terror,’’ though with the Revolution this terror will be superseded in a
new reciprocity.20 How this initial starting point in terror can ever be
superseded given Merleau-Ponty’s violent conception of flesh itself is
unclear (I will make more of this point when treating of Gaston Fessard’s treatment of dialectic in chapter ). On some occasions, he seems
to have realized this problem and thought that one kind of violence
(Marxist) was at least preferable to another (capitalist).21 Certainly, he
courted the idea of a violent resolution to terror and rejected as a
‘‘pious dodge’’ those who wanted to separate politics from Machiavellian virtù.22 This should hardly be surprising since there is an historical
continuity between the ideas of Machiavelli and those of Marx.23 Like
Foucault, he seems trapped between his metaphysical commitments
and those of his liberatory politics.24
It is worth pausing at this point to make clear some fundamental
claims. Thomas’s argument is that a life of contemplation and a reasoned embodiment is a life of greater generosity than a life of sensuality. Such a life is more diffusive of itself—that the good is diffusive of
itself and that this is itself a good thing is a combined metaphysical
and moral datum—and that this is in imitation of the willed ecstatic
character of God25 is also assumed by Thomas. These claims combined
are a powerful argument against progressive liberal theology, philosophy, morals, and politics. Thomas’s ecstatic morality is effective against
such a theoretical position because both share a central assumption:
both want a diminishment in violence and an increase in justice.
Merleau-Ponty, albeit a Marxist, is nevertheless clearly a philosopher
committed to progressive humanitarianism, much like any liberal, and
so too, perhaps, Foucault. Anyway, it is undeniably true that when
these Continental ideas travel to England and America they are recast
in a progressive liberal mode. As the argument of this book unfolds, I
think Thomas will be seen to have the better of the argument and that
his ecstatic law-based conception of ethics and politics delivers a goal
supposedly shared by all of these thinkers: a moderation of violence.
Most basically, Thomas argues that the more flesh participates in
reason the more generous flesh is, the more other-directed it becomes.
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A typical progressive liberal appropriation of Merleau-Ponty and Foucault, and deep down such an appropriation may not be at all a betrayal
of their basic commitments, is to cast them as heirs to Rousseau: to
conceive of the body and its sensuous nature as not only good but
essentially unproblematic, more, as salvific. On such an account, once
the violent structure of mediation between humans, whether rationality, the state, social inequality, and so forth, is eliminated, intercorporeity will secure peaceful coexistence. Against such a conception, Thomas
affirms the reality of original sin, that is, and this is important, that one
of the dimensions of a double-aspected sensuality is a natural propensity to desire to dominate the other. A rational self-mastery that emphasizes the other natural propensity of flesh to ecstasy is necessary to
moral life. Actually, such a conception is by no means alien to the
liberal political tradition itself. Hobbes is absolutely clear that human
nature includes a natural propensity to hurt the other and that a rational exercise of this propensity is necessary if it is not to contradict itself.
It is equally true, of course, that other liberal theorists would balk at
this: Montesquieu identifying the desire for power over others as
bound up with institutions and Rousseau with the inequalities of society.
John Paul II has spoken glowingly of Levinas’s contributions to an
ethics promoting life. He regards Levinas’s synthesis of the person and
the law as ‘‘a testimony for our age’’ and clearly sees his own Theology
of the Body as in continuity with the Biblical personalism he finds in
Levinas.26 I think this appraisal is absolutely correct and as the argument develops over the coming chapters, I hope to show that had
Levinas had a deep knowledge of Aquinas27 he would have found an
ethics close to his own. In saying this, I do not propose a ‘‘Levinas
chrétien,’’ as Edith Stein once proposed an ‘‘Husserl chrétien’’ but
rather do I see Aquinas as a corrective. One might say that Aquinas is
a suitably moderated Levinas. Aquinas, as is well recognized now, is
quite separated from ‘‘une philosophie en radical rupture’’ (as found
in Heidegger), as is Levinas, but he is also quite separated from ‘‘une
philosophie rationnellement idéaliste’’ to which Levinas is clearly an
heir: Levinas’s loyalty to Descartes, Malbranche, Kant, and Husserl is
evident.28
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To some, Levinas’s emphasis on the morality written into the face
prior to reason is a further affirmation of the flesh, for through the
flesh, as Milbank puts it, Levinas longs for a ‘‘pure encounter of mutually exterior subjects without mediation.’’29 Whereas Levinas is critical
of the priority of metaphysics over ethics, Thomas synthizes the two at
a level as ‘‘pre-original’’ as aimed at in Levinas (TO, ) and can agree
with Levinas that there is a law ‘‘Do not kill’’ in the face. For Thomas,
however, this norm is a rational norm; a norm structuring our natural
appetite on account of a participation in eternal rational law (ST I–II,
q. , a. ). Nor, it should be added, would Thomas accept Levinas’s
assumption that intellect is intrinsically in opposition to its object, or
intent upon assimilating the object to itself in an adequation. Such a
conception of the operation is an inheritance of German Idealism, and
one, it seems to me, which the onto-theological criticism of Aquinas
relies too heavily upon. Levinas assumes a world (essence) of violent
clashes30 —hence Levinas’s interest in Pascal’s aphorism 31—which
reason tries to pacify (TO, ; OTB, ), but only by making a theme
and an object of ‘‘the foreign being’’ (TO, –). Thomas rejects such
a construal of reason but, more fundamentally, and without reducing
the other to the same or vice-versa (TO, ), rejects Levinas’s starting
point: that a ‘‘null-site’’ cannot be interior to essence, or, as Thomas
will have it, the natural law places the ‘‘null-site’’ anteriorally in essence. Just how thoroughly Thomas’s double aspect theory of the body
anticipates Levinas’s rapport social will be shown in chapter . Regarding how to understand reason, Thomas (ScG III, c. , para. ) makes
a distinction between tending toward an end ‘‘by way of assimilation’’
and ‘‘by way of cognition.’’ The former is the method of non-intellectual things that seek to appropriate objects converting them to themselves, as in digestion, for example. However, ‘‘by way of cognition’’ is
quite different, for here the object to which the intellect tends gives
birth to itself in the intelligible order. Thomas writes: ‘‘when the intellect understands something different from itself, the thing understood
is as the father of the word [concept] conceived in the intellect: however, the intellect itself gives birth rather after the fashion of a mother
as in her there happens a conception.’’32 Thomas here asserts the maternity of the intellect. It is this maternity which rationally orders sen-
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suality, ordering it to the law, that delivers the other in the ‘‘null-site’’
of the wound of the loving flesh.
In a fashion similar to Levinas, one might think that the Scottish
Sentimentalist tradition affirms sensuality over reason. There is the
same deprecation of the intellect, Adam Smith citing Malebranche favorably, that the passions justify themselves through cultivating a reasonableness.33 In another sense, however, the sentiments are rational at
a deeper level since they are structured by the natural law.34 And at
any rate, the sentiments do not establish an ‘‘encounter . . . without
mediation’’ (Milbank) since they are ordered by the impartial spectator, a ‘‘demigod’’ because in part social and in part rooted in the natural order.35 Smith’s position is not then a simple assertion of the moral
power of the sentiments but relies on natural law. Of course, the principles and explanation of natural law might not be the same in Smith
and Thomas but the point here is to recognize that ethics is not reducible to pre-rational sentiment or ‘‘passion.’’ Similarly Levinas’s rapport
social, as I shall show in chapter , shares not a little with what might
be called Thomas’s ‘‘natural norm analysis.’’
It must be acknowledged here that Thomas’s argument is much less
effective against someone like Bataille. As his Story of an Eye makes
clear, there is a frisson to be enjoyed in a neo-Nietzschean bathing in
violence. I am not sure that more can be done than simply to acknowledge that Thomas is ineffective against such an affirmation of violence.
I know of no real argument that can be made against someone who
glorifies violence: no assumptions are shared, and this makes argument
ineffective.
Amongst contemporary thinkers, it is, perhaps surprisingly, to
Nancy we should look for a theory close to that of Thomas. Some of
the surprise might be that one would expect to look toward a Catholic
like Rahner for such a theory, or, put differently, one would have
expected a more obviously Catholic thinker. Another aspect of the
surprise might lie in the fact that Nancy owes a debt to Merleau-Ponty
and yet it has been seen that his theory of flesh relies on a metaphysics
of violence. The phenomenological sensitivity of Nancy shows that
Thomas’s undeniably metaphysical approach gains confirmation.
There is a discontinuity between Merleau-Ponty and Nancy for, of
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course, Nancy is not at all invested in a Marxist metaphysics as was
Merleau-Ponty. It strikes me that Nancy’s theory of violence is
close—if not as completely sketched—to that of Thomas. Nancy is
eloquent on the violence done to the body but does not say enough
about how the body itself can be constitutive of violence.
Nancy clearly sees the double-aspect of the body, ‘‘the double structure.’’36 Like Thomas, he sees being and the body as ecstatic, although
he also acknowledges the mass, density, and impenetrability of the
body. And like Thomas, he affirms the always present possibility of the
body’s transgression: he appreciates the degree to which the body is
caught up in ‘‘the irresistible imperialism of the Same and the I’’ (TO,
). There is something rather than nothing because bodies are always
‘‘between repulsion and dissolution,’’ for ‘‘bodies run the risk of resisting one another in an impenetrable fashion, but they also run the risk
of meeting and dissolving into one another’’ (BP, ). Surely, an
insight of Trent is acknowledged here. Nancy writes, ‘‘the ab-solute is
what is detached, what is placed or set apart, what is shared out. This
sharing is itself ab-solution’’ (BP, ). Thus, the body needs to be
absolved; the lust for domination that is concupiscence is always an
ever-present possibility where there are bodies. The teaching of Trent
is acknowledged here, just not named by Nancy: and yet I cannot
believe he would balk at being Tridentine. Yet, I wonder if the philosopher who likes to ‘‘advance a Catholic theological thesis’’ now and
again would balk at being Wojtylian? Wojtyla makes the self-same
point. Speaking of the relationship between the sexual urge (sensuality)
and the will (rational appetite), he writes:
And [the will] commits this capacity, its natural and noble potentiality, to the other person concerned. It desires the absolute
good, the unlimited good, happiness for that person, and in this
way compensates and atones for the desire to have that other
person, a person of the other sex, for itself. We have here, of
course, been speaking of the sexual urge only in one particular
aspect. For the will does not merely combat the urge: it simultaneously assumes within the framework of betrothed love responsibility for the natural purpose of the instinct.
(LR, )
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Nancy corrects Lingis, who casts the body as a passivity awaiting the
inflammation of touch, and does so by identifying the ecstatic quality
of the body: ‘‘But the skin is always exhibition, exposition, and the
minutest look is a touching that brushes against it, and exposes it once
more’’ (BP, ). Exposition, exscription, the ‘‘ex’’ of exstasis is a consequence of the ‘‘absolute, separated and shared out bodies’’ (BP, ).
Echoes of psuedo-Dionysius are heard in the joy of the body, ‘‘this joy
takes place as the very ex-position of this body. This joy is its birth, its
coming into presence . . .’’ (BP, ). The body is diffusive of itself—
and the birth motif here should be noted as we will return to it in the
next chapter—and so, Nancy writes, ‘‘the sense of the body is given as
the place of sense, as its circumscription and its exscription, as its end
and its birth . . .’’ (BP, ). For Thomas, circumscription is not as
such negative, it is simply an aspect of the body. It is only negative if
circumscription is separated from exscription, which is a violence to
the other and to the self for being is normatively ecstatic, that is, simultaneously circumscription and exscription.
The normative structure of the Thomistic body is for spirit and flesh
to be interinvolved, for spirit to be suffused by flesh and for flesh to be
suffused by spirit. Spirit without flesh is missing moral knowledge just
as flesh without spirit is missing moral knowledge. Nevertheless, as will
be seen in the next chapter, there are profound metaphysical reasons
behind Thomas’s insistence that it is the rule of reason that provides
for a broader and deeper moral knowledge than sensuality. Nancy recognizes the central reason: ‘‘A body does not have a weight, it is a
weight. It weighs, it presses against other bodies, onto other bodies’’
(BP, –). The Tridentine Nancy might in the following passage
be thought to deny Thomas’s metaphysical priorities. He writes, ‘‘The
body has the same structure as spirit, but it has that structure without
presupposing itself as the reason for the structure. Consequently, it is not
self-concentration, but rather the ex-centration of existence’’ (BP, ;
emphasis is original). Nancy wants to insist here that the body is naturally ecstatic, and Thomas could not agree more. However, it is because
sensuality is naturally suited to obey reason—which is itself ecstatically
deposed and not a Plotinian self-concentration—that the body is naturally ecstatic and this despite the fact that sensuality is rooted in matter,
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the principle of individuation. Nancy himself cites Thomas’s notion of
materia signata as a correct description of the body (BP, ). In
Thomas, materia signata is, as well as a description of the principle of
individuation, a description of the concreatum: a description of matter
marked by form and ultimately, as will be seen, by Christ’s wounded
flesh; and the description of sensuality as naturally suited to obey reason is but an anthropological application of the concreatum. It is also
the basis for Thomas’s unique analysis of the politics of the flesh, the
topic of the following chapter.
The normative Thomistic body is thus circumscriptive and exscriptive (see TB, ). Nancy, seemingly condemning our culture,
speaks of our having not merely wounded the body but having turned
it ‘‘into nothing but a wound’’ (BP, ). This happens when the
absoluteness of the body—its two dimensions—is removed.37 Our culture no longer recognizes the ecstatic body and the wound is not a
wound of life but only of death, ‘‘the wound [that] closes the body’’
(BP, ). It is evident (and further discussion will follow) that I could
not disagree more with Milbank when he argues that the introduction
of Aristotelian hylomorphism into Christianity was unfortunate and
‘‘a modified form of Spinozistic materialism would be preferable,’’38
since it is only the inheritance of Aristotle’s hylomorphism that enables
us to understand the problem of the body and the passions as well as
how the body can become ecstatic. By considering the work of Gaston
Fessard in chapter  we shall see how politically disastrous it is to
ignore the Aristotelian conception of the human.
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THE POLITICS O F T HE FLESH

The Summa contra gentiles (III, c. , para. –) describes a four-part
movement of human desire. It is clear from these paragraphs that
human desire is naturally other-directed and in an increasingly ecstatic
way as one moves through this fourfold hierarchy. Thus, human desire,
eros, is, as John Paul II puts it, ‘‘a primordial sacrament,’’ a sign of
man’s ‘‘particular likeness to God’’ (TB, ). The cardinal point in
Thomas’s analysis of the ecstatic movement of desire, and thus the
body, is the claim that the ecstasy of sensuality is not found in pleasure
as such, but pleasure guided by reason. It is also upon this claim that,
as I hope to have just shown, the abiding interest of Thomas’s theory of
the body rests. This ecstatic development of desire rests upon Thomas’s
conception of inferior reason as the ostiarius, the doorkeeper who opens
sensuality to the rule of reason, the kingly rule of divine law (sicut
ostiarius ad regem [ST I–II, q. , a. ]). In this chapter, I shall discuss
in greater detail the relationship between reason and sensuality, in particular, why Thomas uses political analogies to explain their interaction, and why Thomas insists that it is only when sensuality is taken
up into a life of contemplation and reason that it exhibits generosity.
To demonstrate this last, some of Thomas’s most fundamental metaphysical commitments will be examined.
The sense powers, Thomas says, can be considered as natural powers
(quod appetitus sensitivus est virtus organi corporalis [ST I–II, q. , a.
]), operating from instinct, and in this sense they are ordered to one
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thing and have no relationship to virtue. But, in another manner, the
sense appetites of irascibility and concupiscence are rational by participation in the higher power of the soul. Unlike the nutritive power, the
sense appetites or sensuality (ST I, q. , a. ) are naturally suited to
obey (nata est obedire) the command of reason (operantur ex imperio
rationis) and thus are able to be the subject of human virtue (ST I–II,
q. , a. ; q. , a. ; ST I, q. , a. ; LR, –). For Thomas,
sensuality is a frontier within human nature that is simultaneously soul
and body, matter and form, the site of transition within the human
person between the ‘‘determinate operations’’ of impersonal nature
(ScG II, c. , para. ) and the command over self characteristic of
human freedom. These two facets stand in ‘‘mutual order’’ (ScG III,
c. , para. ; ScG IV, c. , para. ). Rather than division and opposition then, Aquinas articulates a gradation within human nature that
partakes of both constituent principles. For this reason, Thomas explains the relationship between reason and sensuality in terms of a
political community. Reason, he says, rules sensuality by a political and
royal rule, as when a governor rules over free men. Which is to say,
rational appetite as the superior has the role of commanding the lower
sensitive appetite but also the responsibility to ensure that the sensitive
appetite is able to satisfy its legitimate wants. The model of a political
community is designed to alert the reader that the human is a composite of needs that must be brought into a well-ordered community of
mutual satisfaction.
Reason does not have an absolute authority over the senses so that it
can command the senses in any manner it wishes. The intellect governs
sensuality because ‘‘the end of the intellect is the end of all human
actions’’ (ScG III, c. , para. ). This is so because the end of the
intellect is truth (‘‘the first truth, which is God’’), that is, it is the
intellect that can be made universal and able to reconcile things in
itself. Able to reconcile in itself the particular and the universal, the
intellect as a ruler does not look to its own good but to the good of the
whole. The good of the whole has priority over any of the parts,
whether that part be sensuality or the intellect. For each part of the
universe is ordered to the ‘‘good of the order of the whole universe’’
(ScG III, c. , para. ) and so ‘‘each part is found to be for the sake
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of its whole.’’ The human person as an individual substance of a rational nature is a whole of reason, sensuality, and physiology. While reason is responsible for rule in this whole, reason is a part of the whole
and is to work for the good order of ‘‘its whole.’’ Indeed, the relationship of reason to sensuality must be a relationship of justice. An order
of justice exists where there is dependence. As God created the world
ex nihilo and because God ‘‘depends on nothing, nor does He stand in
need of anything that He may receive from another,’’ God owes no
debt of justice to any creature (ScG II, c. , para. ). Rather, ‘‘He
holds perfect dominion over things produced by Himself, since to produce them He is in need neither of assistance . . . nor of the underlying
presence of matter’’ (ScG III, c. , para. ). If one depends on another
or receives something from another, then an order of justice exists
between the two: ‘‘a son is a debtor to his father, because he receives
being from him; a master to his servant, because he receives from him
the services he requires’’ (ScG II, c. , para. ). Just as reason depends
on the senses for information about the world, and ‘‘intellectual thinking’’ cannot happen without bodily organs, as is evident when these
organs tire (ScG III, c. , para. ), so reason as the ruler depends on
sensuality for the movements of its appetites and the moral knowledge
that they contain (ST I–II, q. , a. ). Reason is an example of a
limited agent (ScG II, c. , para. ), for in its operation it does not
transcend the body or the sensitive appetites. Reason does not therefore
have ‘‘perfect dominion’’ over sensuality but has a rule limited by justice. As shall be seen directly, whereas nothing ‘‘escapes’’ the rule of
God (ScG III, c. , para. ), the movements of sensuality habent ius in
aliquo contradicendi (ST I–II, q. , a. ).
Reason’s rule over sensuality must then be one of justice. Thomas
makes this clear in an extension of his political model (ST I, q. , a.
). He explains that reason rules the members of the body by a despotic
rule to which the members spontaneously respond, so long as the rule
respects nature. With sensitive appetite, however, the rule is political
because the subject of the rule is free after some fashion and has specific
movements of its own that are quite legitimate:
To the second it must be said that, just as the Philosopher says in
book one of the Politics (c. ) ‘‘in the human there is both a
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despotic and political rule.’’ The soul dominates the body by a
despotic rule, the intellect the appetites by a political and royal
rule. A despotic rule is rule over a slave who has no faculty by
which to resist the command of the one instructing because the
slave has no movement of his own. A political and royal rule is
rule of the free, who, even while they submit to the regime of the
ruler, they have a movement of their own by which they are able
to resist the command of the one instructing. Thus, the soul
dominates the body by a despotic rule because the members of
the body are unable to resist . . . The intellect, however, or reason,
is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political
rule because the sense appetite has a movement of its own and is
able to resist the command of reason.1
The obedience of the sense appetites is thus to be understood as a
problem of political persuasion and obedience (and oftentimes disobedience) and not as a metaphysical problem (ST I–II, q. , a. , ad ;
I–II, q. , a. ). Indeed, for Thomas, there is no fundamental antagonism within human nature, even after the Fall. That the sensitive appetites are said to be like free persons in contrast to the body, which is
said to be a slave, means that it cannot be Thomas’s position that the
removal of integrity necessitates the rebellion of the senses: Thomas
talks of the natural operations of the senses and intellect—as well as
the contraries in the body—being at variance with one another in some
circumstances (ScG IV, c. ). Hence, Thomas insists that it was unnatural for the body to impede reason in the original institution of human
nature (ScG II, c. ). As Thomas makes clear when criticizing the
Stoics, sensuality contains a certain degree of moral knowledge, which
may not be ignored. It is for this reason that Thomas speaks of our
sorrowing moderately or sorrowing reasonably (ST I–II, q. , a. ; q.
, a. ; q., a. ). It is the fact of this moral knowledge original to
sensuality that establishes the appropriateness of thinking of reason’s
rule over sensuality in terms of the political analogy of rulership. Sensuality is naturally ordered to reason and yet the natural involvement of
the two, and their mutual relations of dependence, is but a vehicle for
a lived relationship of moral authority and persuasion, as well as obedience and to some degree even consent.2
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It might seem too strong to speak of sensuality’s consent to the rule
of reason, and anyone who reads the last two chapters could not be
under the impression that I aim to promote a liberal conception of
Thomas; nevertheless something akin to consent is understood by
Thomas. Rule in Thomas is for the one who is superior in knowledge
and justice. Reason as a faculty is naturally more directed to the common good, more ordered to justice (LR, ), than is sensuality with
its material aspect and the particularity that comes of that. Rule of
sensuality is necessary if the human proclivity to sociality is to be realized. Rule over those who are free is to be a rule of counsel, not one of
domination (ST I, q. , a. ): the ruler dominating the city uses the
citizens as slaves (Commentary on the Politics, lecture ). When reason
turned against God at the moment of the Fall, a moment when reason
resisted its own ecstatic dynamism toward a life in imitation of God,
this rule was rejected by sensuality. Importantly, such a rejection was
appropriate since reason tried to corrupt the nature of sensuality by
removing its ecstatic dynamism and necessarily promoting a rule of
domination in refusing the natural ‘‘free’’ pronitas of ecstatic sensuality.
Law is ‘‘nothing else than an ordination of reason for the common
good’’ (ST I–II, q. , a. ) and human law only has ‘‘the quality of
law insofar as it is in accordance with right reason’’ (ST I–II, q. , a.
) and ‘‘insofar as it deviates from reason, it is called unjust law and
has the nature, not of law, but of violence’’ (ST I–II, q. , a. , ad ).
If a prince commands what is unjust, ‘‘his subjects are not bound to
obey him’’ (ST II–II, q. , a. ). Of course, the disobedience of
sensuality is one of the consequences of original sin. Thomas speaks of
the ‘‘unruly passions’’ (ScG III, c. , para. ) and of concupiscence as
a dispositive cause encouraging the will to move contrary to the judgment of reason (ST I–II, q. , a. ), but it is crucial to realize that
sometimes this unruliness is a rejection of the false rule of reason.
Thomas Merton gives a fine example of this in his autobiography.
Merton recounts a trip to Rome when he was a convinced Marxist.
Having gone to Rome to visit the ancient sites, he finds himself increasingly drawn to the churches of Rome by the art. ‘‘I was fascinated by
these Byzantine mosaics,’’ he says, ‘‘and thus without knowing anything about it I became a pilgrim. I was unconsciously and uninten-
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tionally visiting all the great shrines of Rome, and seeking out their
sanctuaries with some of the eagerness and avidity and desire of a true
pilgrim . . .’’3 Of course, original sin is an inherited condition of
disorder (ScG IV, c. , para. ) in which the right rule of reason over
sensuality is structurally impaired. Fault lies sometimes with reason (as
at the time of the Fall and in Merton’s example) and sometimes the
fault lies with sensuality. Rahner has rightly and forcibly made this
point, although as is clear from chapter , I do not agree with his
metaphysical explanations. But Rahner is quite right to refocus attention on the metaphysical order as the deeper explanation of the problem of sensuality. Wojtyla nicely brings out all that is involved here:
The practice of that virtue, rightly understood, means just this,
as Aristotle and St. Thomas point out. They both emphasize that
in relation to the sensual and emotional sphere of his inner life a
man must employ appropriate tactics, and even a certain diplomacy ( principatus politicus) . . . Indeed, every man must effectively deploy the energies latent in his sensuality and his
sentiments, so that they become allies in his striving for authentic
love, for they may, as we know, also be its foes.
(LR, )
On the one hand, Wojtyla emphasizes the role of persuasion in virtuous self-mastery, what he calls the ‘‘diplomacy’’ of reason in relationship to sensuality. At the same time, this statecraft must now be ever
aware that sensuality has an aggravated pronitas toward transgression.
Original sin is an historical manifestation of sin, but my concern here
is to examine the metaphysically problematic status of sensuality as
double in aspect (TB, ). All natural things are diffusive (ST I, q. ,
a. ): hence the ecstatic propensity of sensuality as it seeks to spread
itself abroad, pouring itself out and seeking to gladden (diffundere).
The legitimate striving of sensuality is more completely realized to the
degree of its participation in a more naturally ecstatic structure of the
person; reason, and recall, sensuality and its motions, the passions, all
have a formal constitutive participation in reason. On this account, if
reason is not itself ecstatic, as with sins of reason, the capacity of sensu-
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ality to be ecstatic can only be diminished. For sensuality as bodily is
also, and naturally so, individuated and particular in its concern (TB,
–).
While the faculty of sense is a set of particular bodily functions with
particular objects (hearing is related to sound and sight to the visible),
the sense appetites are both particular and ordered to the universal. As
physiological in part they are particular, but as related to reason they
are universal. Thomas criticizes Galen for appealing only to the material, physiological cause of the passions (‘‘temperament as a dispositive
cause’’) and ignoring their formal and rational character; that is, he
criticizes Galen for not appreciating that sensuality sits on the border
between the particular and universal or the material and ‘‘the soul as
their principal cause, and as regards that which is formal in them’’
(ScG II, c. , para. ). Milbank certainly misses Thomas’s analysis of
the passions completely. He claims that for Aquinas the passions are
‘‘fundamentally physical rather than mental’’ and ‘‘primarily physical
forces.’’4 Such an error stems from the opposition Milbank seeks to
emphasize between Aquinas and Augustine: to be fair, he insists less
upon this opposition in his later books where Milbank is far more
inclined toward Thomas. By contrast, Billot rightly notes that material
causes contribute dispositive to operations of the soul.5 Similarly, Wojtyla understands the ‘‘sexual urge’’ as having both a material and formal
character (LR, –) and so speaks of sexual desire as having ‘‘a vector
of aspiration’’ which ‘‘takes shape with the aid of the will’’ (LR, –;
TB, ).
The cardinal point in Thomas’s analysis of the ecstatic movement
of desire, and thus the body, is the claim that the ecstasy of sensuality
is not found in pleasure as such, but pleasure guided by reason. Reason
has a tripartite relationship to the body: it depends on the senses for
its operation; it rules over sensuality in its government of the passions;
and it embraces (comprehendere) the body entire through the universal
objects of its intellectual comprehension. If reason is not to rule sensuality despotically it must look to the common good of the whole. This
rule must be one of justice, since a rule of justice is required where one
party depends upon another party. Reason depends both upon the
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bodily senses for its operation and upon sensuality for important moral
knowledge. However, sensuality expressed simply as pleasure cannot
be ecstatic; that is, it cannot be moral: for the other emerges only in a
sensuality anteriorally opened by the presence of another, reason. The
demonstration of this point will be the focus of the rest of this chapter.
This demonstration relies on two central ideas. First, an account of
Thomas’s metaphysics of the body: human nature—precisely because
it is organically incarnate—has a natural propensity to moral transgression; at the same time—and again precisely because it is genuinely
incarnate—human nature is naturally ecstatic. Second, the natural ecstasy of the body is already modeled on the supernatural ecstasy of the
cross, but this point will be developed only in chapters  and .
Thomas’s claim that sensuality separated from reason cannot be ecstatic but rather can only simulate nutrition in which the object of
desire is converted into the one desiring, is based upon a metaphysical
argument. There are, however, phenomenological grounds for his
claim. Merleau-Ponty gives the example of the handshake as a demonstration of the mutuality built into the flesh itself. This example is
tremendously revealing of the structure of the flesh, though what is
revealed is contrary to that supposed by Merleau-Ponty. MerleauPonty’s idea is the following: at the very moment that I conform your
hand to mine, my hand is being conformed to yours. The example has
its appeal: we can all recall a hand offered but which somehow withers
away in our own, and the mutuality refused. Yet, it is also true that as
I exert pressure on your hand, and you on mine, a pressure that conforms you to me is being exerted, and however reciprocal the action,
my flesh exerts pressure on your flesh. If I can put it this way: there is
a resistance built into the structure of flesh which always separates me
from you and is overcome to some degree only when I exert pressure
on your flesh. To Schopenhauer, the hand itself and its capacity to
grasp was an acute place of insight into the structure of the will. Of
course, it may well be that Merleau-Ponty had Schopenhauer in mind
and sought to refute his characterization; yet, an example from Edith
Stein perhaps reveals that Schopenhauer is the more accurate. Stein
speaks of shaking hands with a dog as an example of empathy across
species, but the example also illustrates to what degree the dog is pat-
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terned on my flesh. For Stein and Merleau-Ponty both, the flesh is a
reserve of ‘‘common intentionalities,’’ and one wonders how flesh can
allow the foreign to appear?
The community that can be established through the flesh itself is
not one independent of resistance and pressure. To adapt a famous
concept of Augustine’s: the structure of the flesh is one of a ‘‘lust’’ for
domination. To put it another way, whereas Merleau-Ponty sees in the
flesh a structure of ‘‘common intentionalities’’ that are the foundation
of community life, Thomas observes that the structure of the flesh is
such that nothing really other can enter into it: either flesh resists or it
seeks to conform the other to itself. As already noted, there are good
metaphysical reasons for this, and, simultaneously, there are metaphysical resources for overcoming the inherent moral limitedness of the
flesh, albeit that these resources can be actualized only through the
Cross.
Thomas’s analysis of flesh, I have wanted to insist, begins with the
metaphysical principles of his cosmology. With these principles in
mind, it is probably as well to draw out some of the structural differences between reason and sensuality. Sensuality (or the sense appetites)
without the role played by reason would be directed toward the sense
objects presented to it. Each of the senses is focused upon a particular
sort of object (sensus autem non cognoscit esse nisi sub hic et nunc [ST I,
q. , a. ; ScG II, q. , para. ]): sight upon visible objects, hearing
upon sounds, and so on. Sense perception concerns individual species
because the species is received ‘‘in bodily organs’’ (ScG II, c. , para.
). As particularity marks the senses themselves, so sense appetites can
desire only the things of the world in their particularity, that is, sensuality cannot relate to a sense object as a particular in a community.
The metaphysical reason for the particularity of the senses and the
sense appetites is their constitutive materiality: even operations of the
intellect that rely upon an organ are particular in scope (Unde etiam
dicitur ratio particularis, cui medici assignant determinatum organum,
scilicet mediem partem capitis [ST I, q. , a. ]). Matter is the principle
of individuation and generates singularity hic et nunc: for the first formal characteristic of matter is dimensive quantity (materia signata),
which gives a material composite the place from which other material
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composites are excluded, each being per materiam contractum (In II De
anima, l. , n. ). Because of dimensions, it is not possible to have
two bodies in the same place at the same time (Quod. I, q. , a. ).
With sensuality severed from reason, the person can only relate as
particular to particular without any sense of there being a common
bond, never mind a common good, to which the person and the particular might all belong. As a frontier between the physiological and the
rational, it might be thought that sensuality contained within itself a
possibility for transcending the particularity of the body. For Thomas,
however, the interior relationship of sensuality to reason is only that
sensuality is naturally suited to obey (nata est obedire) reason: if the
body is to transcend its particularity, this natural relationship must be
lived out in a life of rational virtue. It is in this relationship that sensuality becomes more moral and reduces its original transgressivity.
Thomas argues that the intellect can relate to the world in a way
that the body or a bodily power cannot (ScG II, c. , para. ). In
Thomas’s conception it is reason (and intellect in an even more profound sense [ST I, q. , a. ]) that can comprehend all the particulars
of the senses, that is, can relate these particulars in universal conceptions and understand their order to one another. Thomas is thus fond
of Aristotle’s idea that the intellect is potentially all things (ScG II, c.
, para. ; III, c. , para. ). This is just another way to say that
the intellect as ecstatic—as what becomes like another—is unitive: the
intellect brings the lover and the loved together (ScG II, c. , para. ;
c. , para. ; LR, ). It is clear then that in the relationship of reason
to the senses, Thomas aims to synthesize the metaphysical categories
of particularity and sociality. So in the government of reason over sensuality, which is in the natural order, Thomas aims to see synthesized
in one and the same body the proper particularity of that body and its
proper relatedness to the other bodies of the world. He aims to explain
communio; indeed, the entire dynamic of the Thomistic universe is
directed toward persons as the end of the universe (ScG III, c. , para.
–) and so it ultimately aims at a communio personarum. Thus it is
that Thomas speaks of reason as reconciliation:
. . . things are contrary which exclude one another. And on this
account whatever is corrupted through itself must either have a

................. 11244$

$CH3

03-18-05 08:27:39

PS

PAGE 43



E c s t a t i c Mor a l i t y a n d Se x u a l Po l i t i c s

contrary or be composed of contraries. Yet neither the one nor
the other is true of intellectual substances; and a sign of this is
that in the intellect things even of a contrary nature cease to be
contraries. Thus, white and black are not contraries in the intellect, since they do not exclude one another; rather, they are coimplicative (consequuntur se), since by grasping the one we understand the other.
(ScG II, c. , para. ; cf. ST I, q. , a. )
Thomas argues here that it is the character of reason to reconcile the
oppositions found in nature and to overcome the exclusion found
there: thus, the intellect can hold in mind both black and white, which
no particular can do. The intellect, then, and all that is ecstatically
opened, aims at a communio in toto.6 Where opposition is found in
nature, the intellect is able to posit mutuality and inter-involvement.
If we are thinking about the relationship between reason and sensuality, then Pickstock says nicely, ‘‘one must think of knowing-a-thing as
an act of generosity, or salvific compensation for the exclusivity and
discreteness of things’’ (TA, ). Although, lest a Manichean element be
read into this, it must always be remembered that the flesh is double
in aspect, rooted in particularity but always pressing beyond it: the
‘‘salvific compensation’’ spoken of here is not required on account of
some metaphysical failure. When making this very point Blanchette
speaks more cautiously, and accurately, of ‘‘overcoming in this way
the imperfection of being only a part of the total perfection of the
universe.’’7
It is this capacity of the intellect that enables the person through
rational self-government to open up his or her body, and through the
wounding of the body to receive the other: the virtuous body is reconciled with the other in the wound of the body. Wojtyla writes:
Virtue can only come from spiritual strength. This strength derives
in the last instance from the reason, which ‘sees’ the real truth
about the values and puts the value of the person, and love, above
the values of sex and above the enjoyment associated with them.
But for this very reason chastity cannot consist in ‘blind’ selfrestraint.
(LR, )
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Reason gives, as it were, a new skin to the body. ‘‘We might speak here
of a sort of grafting of the value of the person onto the sensations
which fill the whole consciousness with an intense awareness of sexual
values’’ (LR, ). As shall be seen in some detail, rational self-government is just self-government when reason persuades sensuality that the
otherness perceived through the senses need not be an opposition. In
effect, such persuasion has as its goal a sacrifice in which the body is
removed from its rootedness in the principle of individuation. This
sacrifice is not an abandonment of the body, but quite the opposite.
Thomas understands this reconciliation as a call to a metaphysical conversion in which the body, and even matter itself, is given the ecstatic
form it desires: in this metaphysical conversion, matter becomes proximate to God.
What is the particularity of the body? This is not merely a question
for Thomas’s metaphysics or even his moral thought. This question
relates Thomas to the historical developments of Catholic theology
and thus to what degree his theology of the body can be an orthodox
contribution to Catholic doctrine today, and therewith an apologetics
of the body. It might well be thought that doctrinal developments at
the Second Vatican Council will have left Thomas behind somewhat,
yet it is the capacity of Thomas’s thought to respond to Trent that
must be addressed. In the initial chapter of this book, I stressed the
centrality of the body in what I have called Thomas’s ‘‘metaphysics of
glory.’’ Such a vision of the body needs to be squared with Trent.
In his  article on concupiscence—a notion which Rahner regards as ‘‘undoubtedly one of the most difficult in dogmatic theology’’8 —Rahner points out that at Trent, concupiscence is rendered as
something immediately given with human nature, and that we need a
special gift of God to release us from concupiscence (TC, ). Rahner
notes that at Trent concupiscence after sin is conceived, as he puts it,
as a ‘‘power oppressing man in his very depths and driving him on to
moral transgression.’’9 This is Rahner’s gloss on Denzinger , which
is reaffirmed in the John Paul II Catechism of the Catholic Church.10
Rahner also documents Pius V’s condemnation of Baius. Against Baius
the Church affirmed that integrity and immortality were gifts of God
(Denzinger, ed. ,  and ) and thus that the original Ada-
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maic condition et iustitiam interiorem cum impulsu in Deum per
amorem caritatis (Denzinger, ) was entirely through the gratuitous
gift of God. This is reaffirmed in the  Catechism which runs: ‘‘The
harmony in which they had found themselves, thanks to original justice, is now destroyed: the control of the soul’s spiritual faculties over
the body is shattered; the union of man and woman becomes subject
to tensions, their relations henceforth marked by lust and domination.’’11 In the later discussion of sexual ethics, we shall return to discuss the centrality of this last biblical notion (Genesis :–) that after
the Fall concupiscence marks relationships between man and woman
with ‘‘lust and domination’’ (see TB, ). But now it is important to
ask: what is the basis of this potential transgressive power within
human nature itself ? If Trent teaches that the original humans were
elevated supernaturally such that their gifted integrity excluded that
their relationship be marked by ‘‘lust and domination,’’ what about
their nature might have such ‘‘lust and domination’’ as a consequence?
If the modern subject is riven by metaphysical violence, has not Trent
moved Catholic doctrine in this direction?
If one understands Trent in light of Thomas’s distinctions, one sees
that Trent does not assume metaphysical violence. However, Thomas’s
texts are subtle and even a treatment of his theory after Trent by someone as subtle as Suarez edges ever closer to a metaphysical violence. In
chapter , I show that many Catholic thinkers failed to stay close
enough to Thomas’s distinctions and in this conformed to an ‘‘ontology of violence’’ which one finds among a host of non-Catholic thinkers; later in this chapter I will discuss Suarez.
For Thomas, concupiscence is an inordinate desire for the ‘‘beloved.’’ Amor concupiscentiae is a propensity within human desire. The
first term amor is a movement of desire in which the lover tends toward
another, but with the second term concupiscentia a certain limitation
and inordinateness is introduced: such a love does not tend in a deep
sense beyond the lover (non exit simpliciter extra se); and for this very
reason an identity is aimed at in which the other is reduced to the lover
(amor concupiscentiae quaererit amatum perfecte habere, quasi ad intima
illius perveniens [ST I–II, q. , a. ]); the ‘‘lover’’ seeks to have the
good of the ‘‘beloved’’ redound upon himself (ST I–II, q. , a. ; LR,
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–). This natural propensity—always potentially moderated by the
fact that sensuality is naturally suited to obey reason—was intensified
historically in the disorder brought about through original sin. Thomas
makes a crucial distinction, therefore, which he expresses in a subtle
change of terminology as pronitas becomes inclinatio. In De Malo (q.
, a. , ad ), Thomas speaks of concupiscence as a pronitas, a movement of the concupiscible appetite to that which is pleasurable which
is not perfectly under the direction of reason. Because this pronitas is a
condition of desire apart from the gift of original justice (Quaest. de
anima, VIII, ad. ), Thomas says that such a pronitas—materially
speaking—is original sin (et hoc modo peccatum originale materialiter
loquendo est habitualis concupiscentia). As Suarez puts it, Thomas here
shows that God is in some fashion the cause of original sin in the
material sense (posse Deum aliquo modo esse causam quoad materiale),12
and original justice prevented the appetites from being procliviores ad
sua objecta.13 The ever-present pronitas of concupiscence (‘‘a latent inclination of human beings to invert the objective order of values’’ [LR,
]) is an unavoidable consequence of the human being a rational
animal with sense appetites, or sensuality. What sensuality finds pleasurable will not always be compatible with what reason understands to
be the good for a person at some particular moment, and that human
nature is prone to this disjunction is necessary on account of matter
(ex necessitate materiae provenit [Quaest. de anima, VIII, ad ; cf. ST
I–II, q. , a. , ad ]). Crucially, however, even this pronitas on the
part of sensuality should not be understood as metaphysically constitutive of sensuality. In Thomas’s terms, the pronitas of sensuality non
est concupiscentia actualis, sed habitualis. That is, the most primordial,
constitutive movement of sensuality is toward ecstasy (LR, )
wrought through the natural law as a participation in the eternal law
of God’s self-diffusion. Being is always already ecstatically open and
thus sensuality also. In other words, if the body has a double aspect,
one of these aspects is more primordial (TB, ). Of course, after sin
it is not merely that the secondary aspect of the body is now articulated,
the pronitas of sensuality toward transgression (TB, ; ), but such
transgression is now an inclinatio: a habit that has become a form of
transgression, well justifying Pascal’s remark that concupiscence has
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become a ‘‘second nature.’’14 Thus it is that Trent and the  Catechism speak of concupiscence in the sense of inclinante ad (Denzinger
) and Pius V’s condemnation of Baius, in which original justice as
a gift superadded to human nature was affirmed, speaks of concupiscence as pronitas ad (Denzinger, ). ‘‘It is not a matter of summarily
‘annihilating’ the value ‘body and sex’ in the conscious mind by pushing reactions to them down into the subconscious,’’ writes Wojtyla,
‘‘but of sustained long term integration; the value ‘body and sex’ must
be grounded and implanted in the value of the person’’ (LR, ).
Following Aquinas and Trent, Wojtyla makes a distinction between
sensuality and concupiscence. Sensuality is, among other things, naturally oriented toward sexual values. These values ‘‘impinge upon the
subject.’’ Concupiscence, however, ‘‘actively seeks the value in question’’ (LR, ) and yet, even it ‘‘is not yet the desire to possess, but
has a marked tendency to develop into it’’ (LR, ). That is, there is
a natural pronitas in sensuality to transgression, and yet there is no
determinism here: there is, as it were, no inclinatio prior to original
sin. This pronitas has as its object ‘‘the body and sex’’ but only as ‘‘a
possible object of enjoyment’’ (LR, ) while a rationally ordered (LR,
) sensuality has as its object ‘‘the body and sex’’ integrated with,
and subordinate to, the personal value of the other (LR, ). Within
the history of sin, concupiscence is ‘‘a consistent tendency to see persons of the other sex through the prism of sexuality alone’’ (LR, ).
It changes the natural nuptial character of the body so that ‘‘the body
becomes almost a ‘ground’ of appropriation of the other person’’ (TB,
): and it does so in contradicting interior ecstasy, there now being
‘‘an interior separation from the nuptial meaning of the body’’ (TB,
). To ensure that integration happens requires ‘‘the profound realism of virtue’’ (LR, ): Wojtyla refers at some length to Thomas’s
account of the virtues (LR –) which, though mentioned, are not
detailed in his Theology of the Body (; ; ).
Concupiscence as now disordered expresses itself in a division between reason as ruler and sensuality as ruled. With this division, sensuality now functions quasi-independently of reason; such a sensuality is
termed libido, by Thomas (ST II–II, q. , a. , ad ; I–II, q. , a. ,
ad ). In so doing, sensuality is left to act as it is metaphysically capable,
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that is, with little ecstatic structure. Near-severed from reason, sensuality can no longer imitate the divine artistry of spreading wisdom
abroad (ScG II, c. , para. ; c. , para. ) and so cannot be diffusive
of goodness; hence John Paul II’s quite accurate description of lust as
a ‘‘coercion of the body’’ (TB, ). We have already seen that there
are phenomenological grounds for the claim that flesh excludes the
other (ScG II, c. , para. ), but in Thomas this exclusion is underwritten by the metaphysical principle that matter is the principle of
individuation:15 the body is always individuated (ScG II, c. , para.
) and what has individual matter cannot become one with another
(ScG II, c. , para. ). Libido, in Thomas’s sense, is just the name for
the metaphysical and non-ecstatic structure of sensuality severed from
its natural connection with reason and now determined secundum diversitatem naturalis complexionem (ST I–II, q. , a. , ad ). Indeed, libido
can be related to Augustine’s idea of the lust for domination, for in
Thomas’s conception, if human desire is not ecstatic it is consuming,
it seeks to convert the other into itself on the model of nutrition. If the
natural structure of desire is toward ecstasy, and if sensuality as libido
is the desire of an individuated body only, then there is a sense in
which the body has as part of its nature, and now materialiter loquendo,
a ‘‘power oppressing man in his very depths and driving him on to
moral transgression’’ (Rahner).
Here, Thomas and Trent meet, among others, Giraud and his claim
that biblical desire is as such transgressive.16 Against Giraud, however,
it is crucial to remember two things: libido is an always-present possible
form of bodily desire (and not simply social as Giraud seems to suggest)
and it is only one manner of human bodily desire alongside ecstatic
bodily desire (LR, ). Suarez is, I think, quite close to seeing the full
significance of Thomas’s theory but ultimately misses it because he
(like a contemporary commentator on Thomas) fails to see that a
‘‘bodily giving of self ’’ is possible.17 Suarez recognizes that Thomas
advocates a ‘‘double aspect’’ theory, but he presumes the double aspect
concerns human appetite as such and not two aspects of sensuality.
Thus, he says that according to Thomas after the privation of original
justice ‘‘there remain two positive propensities in man, which in some
fashion are contraries, namely a propensity to sensible objects and one
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to noble objects’’ (ut in homine manerent duae propensiones positivae,
quodammodo contrariae, scilicet ad sensibilia, et ad honesta).18 The position Suarez advocates as an antidote to the pessimism of Thomas and
Augustine—as he identifies it—is, in my opinion, Thomas’s position.
About certain unnamed writers, Suarez says:
. . . with Thomas and Augustine they say that the concupiscible
and generative power, and the sense of touch, were especially
wounded [with original sin]. I reply that these powers by nature
had a greater proclivity to their objects, or were more sure to
excite and move man [apart from original justice] and so would
be better said to have been hurt [by original sin] than wounded,
because original justice restrained a more intense movement of
these powers.19
Although I think that Jesuits have often tended to an advocacy of an
‘‘ontology of violence’’ (Milbank), Suarez appears to have avoided this
by staying close to Thomas. Although few details are added, de Lubac,
like Suarez, understands Thomas to have what I am calling a ‘‘double
aspect’’ theory. On the one hand, de Lubac finds in Thomas that ‘‘our
first natural love is for him almost a beginning of charity’’ (emphasis
added) citing ST I, q. , a. : ‘‘If [man or angel] by nature loved
himself more than he does God, it would follow that natural love be
perverse and that it be not perfected by charity but destroyed.’’20 On
the other hand, grace, says de Lubac, is,
some kind of intrusion into nature to effect a ‘‘passive purification.’’ This would lead us to discern in finite beings two opposing
tendencies, both equally natural and basic, so that the passage to
the supernatural order, even for an innocent and healthy nature,
could never take place without some kind of death.21
In support of this last point, de Lubac gives quotations from Augustine, Cajetan, Blondel, and Claudel.22 De Lubac understands that
Thomas’s metaphysical order is more subtle than someone like Milbank thinks. Milbank argues that Christianity rejects a metaphysics of
violence and denies that there is a natural foundation for a violent
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political order; but he acknowledges that a patina of violence has spread
abroad.23 Thomas agrees that there is a primordial peaceful order obscured by violence but also argues that part of the natural order includes an ever-present potential to transgression. The point of
Thomas’s double aspect theory of sensuality is to find a way to indulge
the legitimate appetites of care for the self but to avoid the transgressive
self-absorption of these same appetites. A small note of caution must
be sounded, however. Suarez separates the human into two basic propensities, one ordered to the noble and the other to the ignoble; and
de Lubac repeats Suarez when he says that ‘‘both [are] equally natural
and basic’’ but in conflict. Thomas does not exactly posit two propensities as though they were powers, which Suarez appears to all but do, but
two possible ways for sensuality to be, ecstatic or otherwise.
If libido as a propensity toward moral transgression is a function of
sensuality’s rootedness in the body as individuated, how is the body
made ecstatic and open to the other? As has been noted, the intellect
contributes to the goodness of the other and imitates God (ScG II, c.
, para. ) since the exercise of wisdom is to be concerned with the
mutual proportion (a definition of justice) among parts (ScG II, c. ,
para. ). Thomas describes reason as the agent of the intellect in its
concern for the body and the public good. A person’s sensuality taken
up into the life of reason can contribute to the goodness of the other,
yet, for this to happen the body must become a wounded body. If love
is a tending into the person of the other; then the human body that is
rooted in its particularity must be opened to the body of the other. It
is in precisely these terms that Thomas describes love. Love, says
Thomas, is a passion that wounds the lover (passio laesiva amantis).
Thomas means this quite literally; love is accompanied by an excessive
corporeal or bodily change, by a liquefaction (liquefactio) of the body.
It is this liquefaction, a wound in the body, which opens the body
and makes it ecstatic. Things that are congealed, says Thomas, are
constrained within themselves, but in the liquefaction of the body the
lover invites the loved to enter the lover’s body through the wounds in
the flesh.24 As Merleau-Ponty had sought moral community through
the ‘‘common intentionalities’’ of the body, so Aquinas bases the realization of moral community in the liquefied body, a body rent asunder
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so that the other can enter into a divided, wounded body that in love
has forgone some of its integrity and particularity that had excluded
the other. Elsewhere, I have argued that Merleau-Ponty’s ethics are
never really established because he has such a weakened concept of
individuation.25 Thomas begins with the individuated body, a necessity if the other is to appear at all, and then introduces the other into
the individuated body through the wound. If the body is the principle
of individuation, the body cannot be morally neutral, or even negative,
but is constitutive of the possibility of morality itself.
In Thomas, the constitutive role of matter in individuation goes
very deep indeed. If, as Evangelium Vitae insists, the central question
of ethics is ‘‘Am I my brother’s keeper?’’ then, since in Thomas the
body has a foundational role in constituting personhood (diversity
among souls), I and my brother appear only because of the body (LR,
, n. ). Because, as Thomas famously put it, ‘‘I am not my soul’’
(In I Ad Cor. XV, lect. ; ST I–II, q. , a. , ad ), human personhood
exists in ‘‘the commensuration of souls to bodies.’’ The following passage is well known. Speaking of the diversity of souls, Thomas writes:
This diversity, nevertheless, does not result from a diversity in
the essential principles of the soul itself, nor from otherness in
respect of the intelligible essence of the soul, but from diversity
in the commensuration of souls to bodies, since this soul is
adapted to this and not to that body, and that soul to another
body . . . And such adaptabilities remain in souls even after the
bodies have perished . . .
(ScG II, c. , para. )
Still, in the very moment that matter makes morality possible, it establishes a propensity toward singularity and opposition.26 And yet, this is
not a complete description either: for the ecstatic structure of desire
ensures that matter and the body always have a potential to become
less particular, converted toward a greater imitation of God. Nevertheless, it is clear that moral life is not accomplished by a turning away
from the body. Aquinas is not the Plato of the Symposium: he rather
inverts Plato’s logic. A moral relationship is not based upon a fleeing
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of singularity for universality but in reason turning towards the body
and cultivating sociality (rapport social [Levinas]) in the body: a moral
body is a singular made common through the wound. Through thinking of the normative body as the wounded body, Aquinas avoids both
the Platonic flight to universality and Merleau-Ponty’s resistance to
allowing the body to appear in its singularity at all.
The ‘‘commensuration of souls to bodies’’ is a relationship of mutual desire. Just as matter desires form, in the case of the human, matter
desires the soul, so the soul has a natural desire for the body (ScG II,
c. , para. ). Importantly, it is the soul’s desire for the body that
brings out the interior ecstatic character of Thomistic desire. Thomas
tells us that ‘‘the union of the soul to the body is not brought about in
response to the desire of the soul, but, rather, of the body’’ (ScG II, c.
, para. ). That is, the soul responds to the desire of the body for
union with the soul, for union with a principle that can make it yet
more ecstatic through participation in the order of reason. The human
soul, which does not count on the body for its act of being, responds
in care of the body, in an act of generosity. Thomas writes:
Now, it pertains to the human soul distinctively, in contrast to
other forms, to be subsisting in its being, and to communicate to
the body the being proper to itself. The human soul therefore
enjoys, through itself, a mode of production beyond that of other
forms . . .
(ScG II, c. , para. ; II, c. , para. )
The soul’s desire for the body is not a desire that issues from some lack
or poverty but is an ecstatic natural desire issuing from a plenitude of
existence: in imitation of God the soul’s natural desire for the body is
a diffusing of the soul throughout the body and unto prime matter. As
Thomas puts it, ‘‘the soul is the form of the whole body in such fashion
as to be also the form of each part’’ (ScG II, c. , para. ). It is because
the soul is diffusive of itself and communicates its being to matter, in
a mode of production unique to the created order of the soul, that
humans are said to be imago dei. It is quite crucial, I think, to appreciate that the most human dynamism, the manner in which the human
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is most in imitation of God, is in the diffusion of the soul’s act of
existence throughout the human body. To recognize this point is of
no small importance. Indeed, contemporary Catholic thought, under
sustained intellectual pressure from the Culture of Death, is especially
confused by what it might mean for the human to be made in the
image of God. This is no more evident, nor is the intellectual concession to the culture of death more pronounced, than in how Christians
understand the role reason plays in establishing human dignity.
In his questions on homicide, Aquinas says that a man diminishes
his dignity to the degree he departs from ‘‘the order of reason’’ (ST
I–II, q. , a. )—and the passage concerns the man who kills the
innocent—which is quite different from saying that one is not human
if not rational. The ‘‘order of reason’’ is not most fundamentally the
exercising of reason but participation in the divine reason of the Eternal Law; the ordo rationis is a participation in good spreading itself
abroad: finis praecepti est caritas (I Tim. ,  as cited by Thomas [Quod.
V, q. , a. ]).
Thus, Pickstock speaks far too loosely when she writes: ‘‘Hence the
human animal need not ‘think,’ but only when it does so is it human,
and the more it exercises intellect the more it is human’’ (TA, ).
Pickstock thinks that we have ‘‘our capacity for thought . . . as a partial
receiving of divine intellection,’’ and ‘‘so also we only exist humanly,
that is, according to a higher kind of life, exercising our intellects, by
participating in Knowledge’’ (TA, ). Pickstock thinks that because
Aquinas speaks of the intellect as a power of the soul that is not yet
the essence of the soul (ST I, q. , a. ), that therefore the soul is
‘‘fundamentally an animal soul’’ to which the intellect is only a proper
accident. That is, a first act of the animal soul gives to the human its
subsistence, but ‘‘beyond the first act of subsistence’’ there is the intellect as a proper accident that makes us ‘‘exist humanly’’: and so ‘‘a
seemingly semi-accidental second act can rise beyond its essence, in a
super-essential way’’ (TA, ). She concludes: ‘‘Thus it seems what is
extra to us most defines us; here one must observe that intellection is
akin to grace, because the most important part of us is, in fact, not
part of our animal essence at all, but is superadded to us, properly and
yet accidentally’’ (TA, ). All this is amazing and frightening27 when
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offered up to us as orthodox thinking, and even—and this is now just
sad—as an interpretation of Aquinas on the soul.
The intellect, in this view, is the ‘‘most important part of us,’’ but
it is not part of our ‘‘animal essence.’’28 Whether Pickstock knows this
or not, she here propounds as Aquinas’s thought the theory Aquinas
ascribes to Averroes, and which he rejects: and offers us a theory which
ignores the ecstatic double character of the intellectual substance that
is our soul: that it reaches out to God and at the same moment reaches
down into the very depths of our being, material and otherwise.
The problem begins when Pickstock misunderstands Aquinas’s theory of the soul. In the Summa contra gentiles, Thomas repeats again
and again that the soul is an intellectual substance, a form of a body
directly ordering that body through to prime matter and without any
other mediating forms or powers at all. Thomas does say (ST I, q. ,
a. , ad ) that the human soul is sometimes called ‘intellectus’ as if it
were named after its most principal power (quasi a principaliori sua
virtute), the operation of the intellect, although I think the quasi is
important here. It is not that the soul is merely said to be an intellectual
substance on account of its intellectual operation ‘‘participating in
Knowledge’’ (TA, ), that is, divine intellection. It is rather that the
soul has the power for intellectual acts on account of the dignity of its
act of being, that is, on account of its dignity as immaterial. The
human soul is able to think because the soul is immaterial. Thomas
says (ST I, q. , a. , ad ), ‘‘it must be said that the immateriality
itself of the created intellectual substance is not its intellect; but from
immateriality it has the power for intellectual acts’’ (dicendum, quod
ipsa immaterialitas substantiae intelligentis creatae non est ejus intellectus;
sed ex immaterialitate habet virtutem ad intelligendum). Acts of intellect
are possible because they are acts of an immaterial soul (ScG II, c. ,
para.  & ; c. , para. ). Thus acts of intellect are not ‘‘extra to us,’’
making our ‘‘animal essence’’ ‘‘exist(s) humanly’’; it is, to the contrary,
that we think because of what is most essential and interior to us, a
‘‘first act of subsistence,’’ an act of being possessing a metaphysical
dignity of immateriality. As Wojtyla puts it, the human person ‘‘has a
rational nature only because of a spiritual soul, which is the substantial
form of the body’’ (PC, ). Without such an act of being, nothing,
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not even God, could make us into rational natures able to think. Wojtyla notes Thomas’s dictum mensura modum praefigit and points out
that all the relationships that a being holds with others flows from the
‘‘internal measurement’’ of form and its act of being (PC, ). It is
because we ‘‘exist humanly’’ through an act of being immaterial in
dignity that we have the power of intellectual acts, and so it is that
Thomas, while denying that intellect is the substance of the soul, can
write: ‘‘Therefore this principle by which we first understand, whether
it is called ‘intellect,’ or ‘intellective soul,’ is the form of the body’’
(Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatus intellectus, sive
anima intellectiva, est forma corporis [ST I, q. , a. ]).
The second chapter of Truth in Aquinas written by Milbank repeats
Pickstock’s discussion. Speaking of thought as a proper accident of the
soul, Milbank writes, ‘‘This non-essential, mere thinking tool owned
by an animal is nonetheless the superadded descending palladium that
renders us superessentially as we are, more than we are’’ (TA, ). In
his formulation, the neo-Platonic participation of the human in
Knowledge (‘‘the superadded descending palladium’’) makes us ‘‘as we
are,’’ and, crucially, this is ‘‘more than we are’’ through our Aristotelian
nature: or, one could as well say Boethian nature (individua substantia
rationalis naturae). Aquinas is said, in this view, to have fused Aristotelian naturalism with neo-Platonic participation, with the emphasis
heavily on the latter: hence, the ‘‘properly accidental emanation of this
power [that is, thought], is nonetheless what most defines the human
animal’’ (TA, ). In this view, one is compelled to say that the actualization of a proper accident—intellect as a power of the soul participating in Knowledge—is the form of the human body. One is certainly
committed to this, since Thomas says, ‘‘It is necessary to say that intellect, which is the principle of intellectual operation, is the form of the
human body’’ (quod necesse est dicere, quod intellectus, qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma [ST I, q. , a. ]).
What Thomas means by this, according to Milbank and Pickstock, is
that a proper accident is the form of the body, and the body is really a
human body only when the proper accident is ‘‘participating in Knowledge,’’ for ‘‘we only exist humanly . . . exercising our intellects.’’ This
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view seems to envision the human body morphing in and out of being
a human body to the degree that we are or are not thinking. While it
is true that Thomas’s distinction between actus humani and actus hominis is based upon rational self-mastery it still remains the case that the
act of a human is the act of a human body, and perhaps only just that
rather than a human act. Nonetheless, the body is human because
actualized by a human soul, by an act of being which organizes the
body through to prime matter and which yet is separated from the
body in its act of being (ScG II, c. , para. ). It is, of course, because
the human soul is an anima intellectiva and its act separated from any
dependence on matter while being in matter (anima humana, est
quidem separata, sed tamen in materia [ST I, q. , a. , ad ]), that it
is immortal. Again, the human has this manner of being, an immortal
bodily existence—which is never lost, not even at death (ScG II, c. ,
para. )—on account of the dignity of its act of being. It is on account
of its ecstatic Aristotelian nature, if you will, that the human soul is, in
its very interior, an embodied rational nature, an imago dei on the
horizon of the corporeal and incorporeal.
Besides the paucity of texts advanced to promote the PickstockMilbank view and the weakness of the texts adduced and besides some
of its peculiar implications—that the form of the body is a proper
accident,29 say, or that the human could never be the object of amor
amicitiae30 —this view ignores the utter centrality of Thomas’s theory
of appetite. There are human intellectual acts because the human has
intellectual appetite, one of the kinds of human appetite that make the
human diffusive of the goodness of its nature. Hence Thomas writes
in one of his most famous passages (ScG II, c. , para. ):
We have, therefore, to consider the existence of something supreme in the genus of bodies, namely, the human body harmoniously tempered, which is in contact with the lowest rank in the
genus of intellectual substances, as can be seen from its mode of
understanding; so that the intellectual soul is said to be on the
horizon and confines of things corporeal and incorporeal, in that
it is an incorporeal substance and yet the form of the body. Nor
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is a thing composed of an intellectual substance and corporal
matter less one than a thing made up of the form of fire and its
matter, but perhaps it is more one; because the greater the
mastery of form over matter, the greater is the unity of that
which is made from it and matter (emphasis in bold added).
The order of the technical words in this passage should be noted. The
human soul is first identified as incorporeal and then intellectual. Despite being on the cusp of the immaterial and material, the human
composite of form and matter is perhaps a more complete unity than
a form and matter composite in the mere material order. The possibility of this greater unity arises from the distinctive mode of production
peculiar to the human soul. In the diffusion of its own existence it gives
being to the body. Though God is not transferred into the beloved
that is the creature, in a second manner (sed secundo modo) God is in a
creature insofar as God communicates His goodness to the creature
(inquantum bonitatem suam ei communicat), which is what Dionysius
means when he says that quod ipse Deus est per amorem extasim passus
(III Sent., d. , q. , a. , ad ). This imitation of the act of the divine
gift of being provides to the soul a ‘‘mastery of form over matter,’’ that
is, an intimation of the perfect dominion of God over creation. It was
seen earlier in this chapter that the creature’s imitation of God remains
just that, a finite participation in the divine ‘‘mode of production’’ and
a finite participation in divine providence. The relationship of the soul
and the body is cemented through ‘‘the effusion of a mutual love’’
(Dionysius) with the matter and form of the human concreatum each
desiring the other. The body aspires to the soul and the soul inclines
in the generosity of service to the body: Thomas tells us that the soul
responds to the desire of the body for union with the soul (ScG II, c.
, para. ). Certainly, Thomas has adopted from ‘‘la vision dionysienne’’ an ‘‘extase ontologique.’’31 It is important to note that Thomas
insists that the soul has a ‘‘natural desire’’ for the body (ScG II, c. ,
para. ), and so interior to the principles of the human is the rational
generosity of the natural law. Prior to any articulation of our freedom
as persons, the very principles of our animality are already knotted in
generosity and service: we are essentially creatures ordered to service.
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This is what Thomas means by the ‘‘order of reason,’’ and it is this
essential deposition in which our dignity consists. The full significance
of this point will be drawn out in chapters  and  where the convergence between Thomas and Levinas is discussed.
Unsurprisingly, Thomas’s treatment of the Incarnation brings together these themes of his philosophy of the body. The Incarnation is
most fundamentally a relationship between God and human nature in
the persons of Christ and Mary. Thomas describes Mary’s conformity
to Christ—and therewith ours—as the desire of Mary attracted to the
Form of the Word (ScG IV, c. , para.  and ). While matter desires
to be conformed to Christ, the Word desires to be united to matter, as
Thomas puts it, out of ‘‘unmeasured love.’’ The Word’s desire for
Mary (and us) is a desire of generosity and service, a parallel to the
desire of the soul for the body in the human concreatum. Crucially,
Mary desires Christ as the Word so as to conform her body to Wisdom
(ScG IV, c. , para. ; ScG IV, c. , para. ). I presume this is the
source for Annunciation paintings that show Mary reading and also
for the tradition of Mary as Queen of the liberal arts. This shows
that to realize sensuality reasonably—which relationship always already
exists naturally since Thomas insists that ‘‘the sensitive soul is possessed
of intellective power over and above the sensitive nature’’ (ScG II, c.
, para. )—is to participate in an order of reason: that of the ostiarius
of the Holy Law of the love that wounds the lover. As will be shown
in chapter , Mary, ecstatic flesh loved by ecstatic Wisdom, is an exemplar of reason tutored by faith: a concreatum in which the poverty of
desire recalls to the plenitude of reason the needful deposition of the
love that wounds the lover. For matter conformed is also configured
by that form (ScG II, c. , para. ). Hence, Thomas quotes Paul that
to the extent we conform our bodies to the marked and opened body
of generosity that is Christ’s body, we glorify our bodies. And, of
course, this is also why the resurrected body is a glorified body; for as
the Book of Revelation makes clear, only those marked on their foreheads with the sign of the cross are saved. The glory of the flesh is the
ecstatic-moral structure of the flesh (ScG IV, c. , para.  & ).
Recognizing that this is so helps to better understand Thomas’s theory
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of natural law. Before discussing in chapter  Thomas’s theory of the
natural law as the glory of the flesh, it is first necessary to confirm John
Courtney Murray’s clever quip regarding natural law: ‘‘Those who dislike the doctrine, for one reason or another, seem forever to be at work,
as it were, burying the wrong corpse.’’32
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Chapter Four

THE LAW OF THE FLESH

For ultimately the priority of the mystery of Christ over the mystery of the
Antichrist is the real inner meaning of all things.
—E. Przywara, SJ1
The Crucified Christ reveals the authentic meaning of freedom; he lives it
fully in the total gift of himself and calls his disciples to share in his freedom.
—VS, para. 

It has been a source of some concern for a long while now how exactly
to ground Thomas’s natural law theory most effectively.2 It is commonly thought that once Thomas’s biological teleology, inherited from
Aristotle, became nothing short of an embarrassment, his natural law
theory became unmoored and fatally weakened. That Thomas barely
ever spoke of biology seems to have been missed by many. Thomas,
unlike his teacher Albert or other thirteenth-century scholastics, never
wrote any commentaries on Aristotle’s biological works, and although
he does on occasion note the need to find some natural reason for a
phenomenon—the rebellion of the penis, for example—such explanations are always secondary to the philosophical and theological. Thomists were quick to point out, of course, that Thomas’s theory was
independent from (whatever might have been) his biology; it really
relies upon either a rationally derived description of moral norms that
do not depend upon any anthropology, or on a specification of human
ends that does include an anthropology but transcends biology. The
first approach has been attacked for its Kantianism, and thus for being
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anachronistic, or, for some, polluted by simply being drawn too close
to Kant; the second approach is questioned for surreptitiously relying
on a biologism. That is, if evolution is true, the human ends described
by Aquinas in the thirteenth century and those still identifiable today
may well—indeed, likely as not will—change, or so it is argued. Some
of those who make this latter critique do not wish to abandon natural
law but do want to point out that Aquinas synthesizing with Darwin
might not be what every Christian wants to accept.3
In this chapter, I will begin to defend something of a synthesis of
the two typical interpretations of Aquinas—that his natural law relies
on a specification of human ends based upon an anthropology that is
itself an expression of an ‘‘autonomous morality’’ (Mayo)—and I want
to do this by linking Thomas’s natural law and his metaphysics of the
body. The argument is begun in this chapter that flesh is structured by
a law of diffusion, an ecstasy which is normative for sexual politics—a
metaphysics which, I think, will not change no matter what evolutionary advances, regressions, or technological transformations might come
about, but certainly assuming that we remain animals with bodies.
What is proposed is something akin (though more explicitly theological) to MacIntyre’s retrieval of an ethics linked to a ‘‘metaphysical
biology.’’ In chapter , I will argue that at least one effort to diminish
the sense in which this last is still true—Donna Haraway’s celebration
of our putative cybernetic status—does not help us to move beyond
our central problematic: how to think of the body without a constitutive violence.
Basic objections to natural law come from within theology and philosophy. These will be addressed in turn. The theological critique
amounts to nothing less than a rejection of natural law and has a long
lineage, although Milbank is perhaps its most recent promoter. Despite
all protestations to the contrary, Milbank is a liberal theologian and
this appears quite clearly in his scattered comments on ethics. Against
Thomas (but also against Augustine) he writes: ‘‘It is the whole desiring
person who sins or does right, and the measure of right desire is not
the rule of reason over the body, but the external relation of person to
person in the community of peace, under God.’’4 Thomas never argues
that the measure of right desire is the rule of reason over the body,
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only the rule of persuasive reason over sensuality (which is not the
body). But, of course, Thomas’s ethics is act based and does not collapse into ideas of social sin and social justice. This approach remains
basic in papal teaching. It is important to note that while Evangelium
Vitae, for example, speaks of ‘‘a veritable structure of sin’’ (emphasis
original), thereby acknowledging the lure of the culture of death, the
emphasis is on sin and not on the social, which is not mentioned.
Indeed, it is after speaking of the social conditions that can ‘‘mitigate’’
the subjective responsibility of those who unjustly kill, that the idea of
the culture of death as a structure luring to personal sin is introduced
(EV, –). It is made abundantly clear later that the ‘‘enormous and
dramatic clash between good and evil, death and life’’ (EV, ) is a
struggle among persons who act as the proxies of the God of life and
the ‘‘great red dragon,’’ Satan, ‘‘a murderer from the beginning,’’ being
‘‘the personal power of evil’’ (EV, ; ). Hence, our personal responsibility before the objective moral law of homicide is rigorously reaffirmed (EV, –; see ST I–II, q. ). It surely would be no advance
to reduce—to use Thomas’s expressions—human action (actus humanus) to an action done by a human being (actus hominis). I suspect
Milbank’s claim here owes a good deal to Hauerwas (to what degree
Hauerwas’s thought escapes liberalism makes for an interesting question).
Hauerwas thinks that a sexual ethics based on natural law is an
‘‘abstracting’’ of sex ‘‘from those institutions that are necessary to make
any ethic of sex intelligible.’’ Rather, Hauerwas insists, sexual ethics is
rooted in a ‘‘political claim’’ about marriage which ‘‘makes sense only
in terms of the Church’s understanding of its mission. Therefore a
Christian ethic of sex cannot be an ethic for all people.’’5 That ethics
is fundamentally related to the community of the Church (Hauerwas),
which at bottom is an historicist claim about reason,6 is the same claim
made later by Milbank when reducing the measure of right and wrong
desire (and not acts) to ‘‘the external relation of person to person in
the community of peace, under God’’ (Milbank). As will be seen
shortly, natural law in the understanding of Thomas and John Paul
II is Christological and so is not understood apart from the spousal
relationship of the Church and Christ. However, this relationship has
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an objective theological and moral structure: the love that wounds the
lover. Thus, John Paul II writes,
Contemplation of Jesus Crucified is thus the highroad which the
Church must tread every day if she wishes to understand the full
meaning of freedom: the gift of self in service to God and one’s
brethren. Communion with the Crucified and Risen Lord is the
never-ending source from which the Church draws unceasingly
in order to live in freedom to give of herself and to serve . . . The
Church, and each of her members, is thus called to share in the
munus regale of the Crucified Christ . . .
(VS, para. )
At root, the Hauerwas-Milbank rejection of natural law relies upon a
Barthian equating of natural law with positive law contained in the
Word of God. Thomas, of course, does not deny for a second that
natural law is a participation in eternal law, but it is precisely this
participation that vouchsafes the perduring universality and rationality
of the natural law. Klein puts it nicely: the natural law tradition conceives of ‘‘nature as providing a home for reason.’’7 Through a conflation of natural law and positive divine law, Milbank repeats Barth:
‘‘And so,’’ as Balthasar says in his commentary on Barth, ‘‘culture, and
by implication nature and law, remain bonded to a Beyond they can
never know and yet establishes their very being . . .’’8 The in-principle
historicist character of reason depends radically, in Milbank’s conception, on the self-understanding of a church of word and spirit that is
no respecter of the rule of law. This is of a piece with a tyrannical
sensibility in which justice must be done regardless of law:9 indeed, as
Letwin has pointed out, it is nothing short of a rebel repudiation of
law.10 In Milbank’s updated version of Barth, language ‘‘constitutes
ideas and ‘expresses’ things in their disclosure of truth for us.’’ Human
language (a participation in the Ars Patris or Word) is always ‘‘particular and traditioned’’11 and so natural law can be useful intraepistemically, that is, as binding upon the way of thinking of a faith
community. But it certainly does not function as has been thought: it
is not an objective structure of truth and goodness, binding across
space and time.
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To think this, Milbank says, is already to have secularized the natural law: it is to emphasize reason separated from revelation. Of course,
John Paul II has rejected any such construal of the natural law as promoting ‘‘a complete sovereignty of reason’’ (VS, para. ). The eternal
law can be known by reason (natural law VS, para. ), but ‘‘in an
integral and perfect way’’ it is known through ‘‘supernatural Revelation’’ (divine law). This secularization of the law, Milbank claims
(wrongly),12 was introduced by the Jesuit, Suarez, ‘‘with the notion
that one can ‘read off ’ from the given world the permanently divinewilled formal conditions of true human behavior.’’13 Such a conception
is to be rejected because it reduces revelation to ‘‘a supplementary legal
system of essentially practical injunctions.’’ The secular error of law lies
in the fact that modernity ‘‘perpetuates the post-Suarezian severing of
natural law from Aristotelian practical reasoning’’ (emphasis original).
Thus, not natural law,14 but an Aristotelian prudence will help us to
understand revelation (!) as we, ‘‘keep our attention upon the very
particular sorts of goods that are actually realized by human beings in
specific kinds of social existence.’’15 Sounding like John Rawls,16 here
Milbank advocates a Scotistic theory of the law: ‘‘God sets the law
aside and declares a normally illicit act licit for this person and in these
circumstances.’’17 Scotus reacted early to Thomas’s perceived separation of natural law from revelation. At the heart of Scotistic ethics is
the separation of the will’s liberty from natural inclination; the will,
for Scotus, is not a nature. The rule of the will is the affectio iustitiae,
which is not a natural inclination in the will but a rule of moral goodness obedient to God Himself. In such a conception, natural inclinations are morally neutral. Scotus writes, ‘‘No act is good in its genus
from its object alone, except to love God . . . Therefore every other
act, in relation to another object, is indifferent, and can become good
or evil through circumstances.’’18 As Pryzwara has trenchantly said, one
finds in Scotus a ‘‘mutation in the forms of truth.’’19 It is well known
that this conception allowed Scotus to argue that, while the first table
of the Decalogue constituted natural law binding across space and
time, the second table became positive law. Milbank reaffirms the position of Scotus, for law is now in principle revelation, or divine positive
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law sensitive to ‘‘the very particular sorts of goods that are actually
realized by human beings in specific kinds of social existence.’’20 And,
of course, despite all of his pronouncements to the contrary, Milbank’s
politics is a liberal politics since at the core of liberalism is the separation of law from nature. This is not surprising: Scheler long ago
pointed out the relationship between Scotist ethics and those of Kant.21
An alternative strain to this argument is to claim that in Aquinas the
first precepts of the natural law are the beginnings of habit, the ‘‘mere
nurseries of virtue.’’ The argument continues that Aquinas holds that
moral virtues cannot be had in significant measure without theological
virtue, without grace through the New Law, and that action according
to the precepts of the natural law ‘‘is largely unimaginable’’ without
such grace.22 This variant of Milbank’s Reformation theology is found
in Jean Nabert when he argues against natural law, highlighting central
religious phenomena such as forgiveness and sacrifice which are of another order entirely to that of norms or universal moral rules.23
The conception of Scotus, Nabert, and their contemporary exponents assumes a radical division between God and the world as well as
mind and nature. Thomas, of course, would reject such a construal.24
The power of the Scotus objection (and its modern variant) is seriously
diminished once it is appreciated that Thomas’s natural law is a description of ecstatic being in another register. As such, natural law is a
participation in God according to Psuedo-Dionysius’s dictum bonum
diffusivum sui est. The fecund character of the natural law is well captured by Wojtyla. He writes:
I call a norm that which in some way generates moral values and
is found to some extent directly with the birth of values, or at
any rate makes the emergence of values possible in the human
being as a person.
(PC, ; emphasis added)
In other words, for Thomas, the natural law of ecstatic being is a
revelation of God. Again, Wojtyla:
According to St. Thomas, the normative order presupposes an
ordo causae exemplaris. God as subsistent existence is the fullness
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of good and thus the supreme model for all beings as goods, and
in a particular sense for human beings as beings and goods. The
whole exemplary order branches out, so to speak, and differentiates
according to the various species of beings.
(PC, ; emphasis added)
Wojtyla is perhaps thinking of Thomas when the latter writes: ‘‘God,
Who is most perfect in goodness and Who diffuses His goodness in the
broadest way, must be in His diffusion the archetype for all diffusers of
goodness’’ (ScG III, c. , para. ). For this reason, Thomists can be
quite confident that the derivations they make from Thomas’s description of the natural law at ST I–II, q. , a.  do justice to divine
revelation in being (ScG III, c. , para. – and III, c. , para. –).25
More, I think Thomists can insist on the Christological character of
the precepts of the law at ST I–II, q. , a.  (re-stated at VS, para. ).
Living the precepts, ‘‘our acts build up the true communion of persons
and, by God’s grace, practise charity, ‘which binds everything together
in perfect harmony’ ’’ (Col. :). That is, Veritatis Splendor argues that
the tradition’s claim that the natural law is a participation in the eternal
law (VS, para. ) always was the claim of the law’s participation in
the living God. I will argue that the natural law is interiorly structured
by the love that wounds the lover and thus by the exemplar of Christ’s
love on the Cross. Veritatis Splendor has, I think, made this point already (VS, para. , ). ‘‘We love, because he first loved us’’ (I John
: : VS, para. ) and baptism ‘‘radically conforms’’ the faithful to
the Paschal Mystery (VS, para. ). ‘‘For we have become not only
Christians, but Christ’’ (Augustine) and what is true of the faithful is
also true for every human being, in that human freedom is double in
aspect:
It is at once inalienable self-possession and openness to all that
exists, in passing beyond self to knowledge and love of the other.
Freedom then is rooted in the truth about man, and it is ultimately directed toward communion.
(VS, para. )
If the theological critiques of natural law are not ultimately convincing, what of the philosophical critiques? Kolnai helps to show why
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natural law is not a naturalism (and in chapter  Wojtyla’s efforts to
show the same are discussed at length) and how it escapes the ‘‘naturalistic fallacy.’’ Kolnai argues that Moore’s argument works wherever
moral theory is reduced to a naturalism or wherever a biologism is
active. However, natural law is the argument that an objective moral
law structures nature.26 Thomas’s ecstatic morality builds on a moral
datum that the good is diffusive (Dionysius) and that it seeks to make
itself known (Cicero). The natural law is ‘‘an ethical anti-naturalism’’
because it expresses ‘‘intuitive and consensual moral experience,’’27 as
is most plainly evident in the ius gentium.28 Natural law stands as a
corrective to ‘‘Moore’s exsanguinated, un-real concept of Good,’’29
being a set of values which are found expressed in ‘‘prevalent tendencies of nature or appetitive facts recognized as sovereign principles.’’30
A somewhat more convincing objection to the view presented here
comes from Deleuze. He advocates a Spinozism, which he casts as a
philosophy of expressionism. Expressionism is derived from, but quite
contrary to, developments within the history of ideas concerning emanation. Deleuze dismisses emanation because it assumes some degree
or other of transcendence and, with that, a hierarchy of participation.
It will be argued later (chapters  and ) why hostility to hierarchy and
privilege is utopian and totalitarian in temper. And so, crucially,
against the sameness of Deleuze’s ethics, natural law posits a hierarchical participation in the order of the good as diffusivum sui. Famously,
Thomas describes a set of basic inclinations as constitutive of human
flourishing (ST I–II, q. , a. ). These inclinations correspond to the
four-part model of desire at ScG III, c. , a passage that links desire
and virtue. Both law and virtue are ordered as a hierarchy of everincreasing ecstatic openness. Corresponding to the desire for God (q.
, a. ), desire for knowledge of the truth is perfected in the first place
by the intellectual virtues (c. , para. ). Prudence perfects the desire
‘‘to manage lower things’’ and helps establish justice in the will, a
rational appetite. The ostiarius of the Holy Law of the Cross perfects
the natural law inclination toward sociality, the appetitus socialis (Grotius). This desire has for its end ‘‘that the entire life of man may be
arranged in accord with reason, for this is to live in accord with virtue’’
(c. , para. ). Prudence helps make the will a perfected rational appe-
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tite so that the goods of civic life can be affirmed in an ordinate fashion.
Thus, justice is the order of desire for a high position of honor, popular
renown and wealth—in a word, privilege—and justice helps the appetitus socialis avoid pride, vainglory, and illiberal and unjust conduct in
relationship to wealth (c. , para. –). Regarding the inclination to
procreation and care of the young, temperance moderates the desire
for pleasure and leads a person away from a voluptuous, intemperate
and incontinent life (c. , para. ). Linked to this inclination, but also
to another, fortitude perfects the desire ‘‘common to all things by
which they desire their own preservation.’’ Immoderation in this desire
makes people ‘‘fearful and excessively chary of work that is hard for
them’’ (c. , para. ). Thus, John Paul II writes: ‘‘The acting subject
personally assimilates the truth contained in the law. He appropriates
this truth of his being and makes it his own by his acts and the corresponding virtues’’ (VS, para. ).
Deleuze finds in the naturalism and immanentism of Spinoza’s expressionism a rejection of Thomas’s hierarchy of inclination and virtue,
and its attending privileges. At the end of a fine summary of the development of expressionism from emanation theory, Deleuze tells us that
at the core of expressionism is the conception that substance ‘‘expresses
itself in itself ’’ and ‘‘expresses itself for itself.’’31 Deleuze is quite clear
about what this entails: ‘‘God produces things within the same attributes that constitute his essence, and thinks all he produces within the
same idea that comprises his essence’’ (EP: emphasis added).32 The cost
of equality, the only possible justice for Deleuze, is that creation is
never an act of love in which the good of another is affirmed. Another
never emerges, there is only the same closed within itself. The full
implications of these affirmations of sameness and equality will be seen
in chapters  and  but, for now, it is unsurprising that in his account
of Spinoza’s ethical and political thought, individuals ‘‘encounter’’ one
another seeking (in the state of nature) to destroy the other or (in
civil society) individuals ‘‘strive in their existence to make their own
encounters correspond to relations that are compatible with theirs’’
(EP, : emphasis original). Just as creation is never an act of love out
of which another emerges, so ‘‘human’’ encounters are only correspondences between compatible individuals. It appears that the sameness
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pervading creation repeats itself in the ‘‘ethical’’ from which equality
has banished love.33 Here the stranger either does not appear at all or
is in principle immoral. I leave it to the scholars most concerned to
judge whether Spinoza is presented in Deleuze’s pages, but I take Deleuze’s Spinoza to be but a further demonstration of the hold which
‘‘violent ontology’’ (Milbank) has upon so much contemporary thinking about the body. For the body in Deleuze is but an expression of
the general metaphysical (and ethical) axiom: ‘‘There are increases in
our power of action, reductions in our power of action’’ (EP, ). Of
course, quite apart from the totalitarian temper of Deleuze’s Spinozism, his theory is clearly a naturalism that falls foul of the ‘‘naturalistic
fallacy,’’ ignoring as it plainly does ‘‘autonomous morality’’ (Mayo).
Levinas has identified the properly ethical as a rapport social in which
the same does not reduce the other to itself. Peperzak has pointed out
that Levinas knew very little about the philosophical ideas of the Middle Ages and this is surely an important reason for Levinas’s incapacity
to see the natural law as an instance of ‘‘an involuntary election’’
wrought ‘‘by the Good’’ (OTB, p. ). As I hope to show, the natural
law rightly understood is very much like the rapport social which Levinas sought. Thomas would certainly agree with Levinas’s critique of
the liberal concept of freedom (TO, ), since he sees natural law as a
primordial command prior to any act of personal freedom (EI, ).34
Far from being a rationalistic determination of the law, Thomas’s natural law is a theory of appetites understood on the model of the wounds
of the Cross. The wound of love is the order of nature: hence, Thomas
is fond of citing I Tim (, ) finis praecepti est caritas (Quod. V, q. ,
a. ). The ‘‘deposition of sovereignty’’ through ‘‘being-for-the-other’’
(EI, ) is the role of natural law understood by Thomas on the model
of the Deposition. Natural law is a participation in the charity that is
God and ecstatic being and by which a person cares less for his own
good and rather more for the good of the other. ‘‘A person is placed
outside himself,’’ writes Thomas, ‘‘when he does not care for the things
which are his own, but comes to care for the goods of others; and this
is charity (I Cor., XIII, v. ): ‘Love does not insist on its own’ ’’ (In II
Cor., c. , lect. , n. ).35 Natural law, as Thomas conceives it, is
that which has always already accomplished a ‘‘rupture of the isolation
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of being,’’ making the person always ‘‘the-one-for-the-other’’ (OTB,
). Through the idea of the individual substance as concreatum, as
ecstatic in its very being, Thomas can well claim that essence is not, as
such, violent but diffusive of itself (TB, ). The diffusion of being,
existence, leaves essence always already in the abandonment of the Deposition: that is, Thomistic being is never ‘‘totality’’ but always being
abandoned to glory.36 This, of course, is the significance of the Jesuit
perinde ac cadaver or the lover ‘‘giving to the point of losing himself ’’
(LR, , n. ). The appeal of Thomistic appetite is akin to the appeal
of the Levinasian infinite: ‘‘The infinite does not stop me like a force
blocking my force; it puts into question the naı̈ve right of my
powers . . .’’ (TO, ). It is not a matter, as Levinas might put it, of
reducing the Other to the Same (TO, ) but in the wound seeing the
Other and the Same in acute proximity (mutua inhaesio [ST I–II, q.
, a. ]). Were either to be reduced, the one to the other, the wound
would vanish. As will be seen, Thomas argues that the split tissue of
Christ’s resurrected body scars as glory, and does not heal as new flesh:
Christ’s flesh does not ‘‘resume and recover itself ’’ (Levinas). Hence,
John Paul II speaks of Christ’s resurrection as ‘‘a reality ingrafted in
the man of this world’’ (TB, ) and for this reason also says that ‘‘the
glory of God is the common good of all that exists’’ (Letter to Families,
para. ).37
Levinas and Thomas also agree in thinking of flesh as double in
aspect, though a subtle difference will emerge. Being exhibits ‘‘an invincible persistence in essence,’’ eradicating the interval so crucial to
proximity or the ethical relationship. Thus, being is always interesse
(OTB, ). Levinas and Thomas both agree about the transgressive propensity of essence. Thomas would be as happy as Levinas to quote
Pascal: ‘‘ ‘That is my place in the sun.’ That is how the usurpation of
the whole world began.’’38 In Thomas, this propensity is natural to the
body but is perpetually moderated by the ecstatic dynamism that is
natural to the body and its appetites. For this reason, Thomas would
never endorse the remarkable formulation of Levinas: ‘‘By being, by
persisting in being, do I not kill? . . . Do I not kill by being?’’ (EI,
) Nevertheless, Thomas could agree with Levinas when he argues
that subjectivity is ‘‘a breakthrough that occurs in being’’ (EI, ), a
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‘‘null-site,’’ a mark of ‘‘the otherwise than being’’ and nothing less than
‘‘the explosion of the human in being’’ (EI, ). While essence ever
ventures conquest, its conatus essendi is also vulnerability. Vulnerability
is ‘‘an inversion of the conatus of esse’’ (OTB, ), ‘‘going countercurrent to a conatus’’ (OTB, ). Giving these comments a Thomistic
sign, reason’s prudent and persuasive management of sensuality goes
countercurrent to one aspect of the conatus essendi. Thus, Thomas can
agree with Levinas when he writes, ‘‘The incarnation of human subjectivity guarantees its spirituality’’ (EI, ): which means the ‘‘human,’’
a ‘‘subjectivity’’ or ‘‘spirit’’ knotted with sensibility is always an essence
characterized by the ‘‘otherwise than being’’ of ethical responsibility. It
is incarnation that ‘‘guarantees’’ this responsibility: Levinas telling us
that angels cannot give help to one another (EI, ). Incarnation ‘‘guarantees’’ responsibility because it establishes vulnerability, an inescapable second aspect of essence: ‘‘Arising at the apex of essence, goodness
is other than being’’ (OTB, ). Sensibility marks the person as ‘‘onein-the-place-of-another’’ (OTB, ) and in Thomas sensibility is natural inclination, a participation in the eternal law of God’s own diffusivum sui,39 ultimately nothing short of the charity of the Cross. Hence,
in the Catholic tradition, ‘‘God himself is charity’’ (St. Leo the Great)
and ‘‘it is Christ, the last Adam, who fully discloses man to himself ’’
(GS, para. ). Meditating on these citations, John Paul II says of the
person: ‘‘He must, so to speak, enter him [Christ] with all his own self;
he must ‘appropriate’ and assimilate the whole of the reality of the
Incarnation and Redemption in order to find himself. If this profound
process takes place within him, he then bears fruit . . .’’ (Veritatis Splendor, para. , , and ). Thomas explains that the created order is
fecund only because it participates in the Goodness (sed hoc solum quod
se inferioribus ingerit propter suae bonitatis participationem [De Div.
Nom., q. , a. , n. ]) and Being of God.40 For Thomas, Levinas,
and John Paul II then, it is the love that wounds the lover that shows
forth ‘‘the glory of God’’ (EI, ). Thus Levinas writes: ‘‘The other
calls upon that sensibility with a vocation that wounds . . .’’ (OTB,
), that is, calls to martyrdom (OTB, ).
There is a difference between the two, however. Levinas does not
think that the ‘‘dimension of the infinite’’ is the other side of being, as
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though all of nature had a face—this is explicitly denied (TO, ). It
is the ‘‘human’’ which is ‘‘a breakthrough that occurs in being’’ (EI,
). Thomas does see nature as such as ecstatic. The human body is
ecstatic in the same way as the most rudimentary existences, and as
animals, though to be sure, structured by other ecstatic appetites as
well. Nature, because being is diffusive of itself, always possesses at least
a vestige of ‘‘the dimension of the infinite.’’ And the human person,
body and soul, ‘‘bears within itself the interior desire for glory, that is,
the tendency and the capacity to become ‘glorious’ in the image of the
risen Christ’’ (TB, ). According to Thomas, the universe is governed
by ‘‘divine reason’’ and ‘‘the pattern itself of things, which exists in the
divine mind . . . has the nature of law’’ (ST I–II, q. , a. ). Insofar as
creatures exist at all, their propensities are structured by divine reason
as law: ‘‘All things participate somewhat in the eternal law, insofar as
from its impression they receive inclinations to appropriate acts or
ends’’ (ST I–II, q. , a. ). Norris Clarke has made the Thomistic
point nicely: ‘‘We should describe every created being as possessing its
own existence from another, in itself, and oriented toward others—a
triadic rather than just a dyadic structure.’’41 Of course, Thomas would
not accept that he thereby departs from the clear division laid out in
Genesis between human persons and the natural world and would stand
at one with Levinas on this point.
Now it is time to show that the glory of God shows forth in the
natural law as an ordering of the bodily giving of self to the love that
wounds the lover.
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Non evacuata sit crux: And not to preach in terms of philosophy in which
the crucifixion of Christ cannot be expressed.
—I Cor. , 1
Et ideo amans quodammodo penetrat in amatum, et secundum hoc
amor dicitur acutus . . . Et similiter amatum penetrat amantem . . . Et
propter hoc dicitur quod amor vulnerat, et quod transfigit jecur.
—Sent. III, d. , q. , a. , ad 

In previous chapters, Thomas’s conception of the other-directedness of
desire has been described. I have shown that this conception allows
Thomas to build a philosophical anthropology in which the desires of
the human can be placed in a moral hierarchy. That is, we saw how
the metaphysical concerns of the Summa contra gentiles (III, c. , para.
–) track Thomas’s natural law theory. Summa contra gentiles (III, c.
, para. –) describes a four-part movement of human desire. It is
clear from these paragraphs that human desire is naturally otherdirected—and in an increasing manner—as one moves through this
fourfold hierarchy. As was seen in the previous chapter, this four-part
movement of desire also parallels the movement of desire and the
goods to be pursued in Thomas’s discussion of the precepts of the
natural law (ST I–II, q. , a. ). The natural law of the body, rooted
as it is in divine law, the expression of God’s wisdom and love (VS,
para.  & ), is directed toward an increasing ecstasy in imitation of
God’s own nature (divinus amor facit extasim inquantum scilicet facit


................. 11244$

$CH5

03-18-05 08:28:01

PS

PAGE 74

The B ody as C ross 

appetitum hominis tendere in res amatas [ST II–II, q. , a. ]). The
dynamic precepts of the natural law make the human body ecstatic,
satisfying psuedo-Dionysius’s dictum bonum diffusivum sui est: the dynamic precepts of the moral law, says John Paul II, ‘‘safeguard the good
of the person, the image of God’’ (VS, para. ). As Thomas’s argument
unfolds in this chapter it will become more and more apparent that
the normative structure of the human body, its appetites and those of
the whole person, is Christ’s wounded body on the Cross. That is, in
this chapter, I will argue that Thomistic natural law is Christological.
Human nature has two possibilities: either sensuality is obedient to
reason and the person lives ecstatically in service of the other, or sensuality is unresponsive to reason and the person is reduced to selfconcern. I now want to show that the first possibility relies upon
Thomas’s notion that love involves a wounding of the lover. This notion is at the very foundation of Thomas’s thoughts about a lover
whose body is truly taken up in an act of love, a lover whose sensuality
is lived ecstatically. The wound allows the other into one’s body in a
manner wholly different from the non-ecstatic body. In chapter , we
saw that the other is converted into the nonecstatic ‘‘lover’’ after the
fashion of nutrition, a fundamental transformation of the other into
the particularity of the ‘‘lover’s’’ own body. Thus the appropriateness
of Thomas’s account of amor concupiscentiae as an inordinate desire to
reach into the innermost and secret (ad intima) being of the one
‘‘loved’’ but only so as to use the good of that person to promote
one’s own good. With the liquefaction of the body, however, the other
literally lives in the wound, the space opened up in the lover’s flesh for
the one loved. It is not without significance that there is a remarkable
use of the same imagery in Father Malebranche’s  Treatise on Ethics. Bizarrely, however, here the woundedness of the body is a consequence of immorality and the goal of moral life is to seal the wounds.
The full significance of this departure from Thomas will be explored
in the next chapter.
The model in Thomas’s mind for the wounded body is the
wounded body of the Cross (ST I–II, q. , a. ). The love of Christ is
to be seen in the blood and water leaving His body: the love that
wounds usque ad sanguinem. Again, it is worth recalling Merleau-
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Ponty. He gave us the image of the handshake, but Thomas surely has
in mind the figure of Doubting Thomas being invited to insert his
hand into the wound of the man-God.2 It is, of course, the invitation
we all receive at the Mass. Thomas reminds us that Christ still bears
His wounds after the resurrection and it is this liquefaction of Jesus’s
body that is the anterior condition of the Eucharist, and the community founded therein. The sacraments have their power from the passion of Christ, with baptism and Eucharist being the most potent; for
they were instituted by the flowing of water and blood from the side
of Christ hanging on the cross (ST III, q. , a. ).3 Dante speaks of
the heavenly host as the bride gained through Christ’s blood, marriage
then conceived as a consequence of the wound of love (Paradiso,
XXXI, ) and the Church as Bride ‘‘whom lance and nails had won’’
(XXXII, ). The power of the sacraments to reconcile us with God
(justificatio) is attributed by Thomas to the resurrection as the terminus
ad quem but to the passion as the terminus a quo (ST III, q. , a. ,
ad ). That is, reconciliation with God begins with a wound, a wound
that is glorified in the resurrection and which generates a novitas vitae
per gratiam.
Union with God who is charity (VS, para. ) is accomplished
through Eucharist, a conversion to liquefaction and participation in
Christ and his wounds. Hence Bellarmine says the Church ‘‘confers
no sacrament without the Cross.’’4 The breaking of the bread in the
consecration is a sign of the broken body of the Passion (IV Sent., d.
, q. , a. , qc. , ad ) and the conversion it causes is a movement of
spiritual perfection, that is, a movement toward increased ecstasy and
virtue. Thomas writes:
. . . it is proper to charity to transform the loved into the beloved,
because it is charity herself which makes ecstasy, as Dionysius
says. And because the growth of virtue in this sacrament [Eucharist] happens through the conversion of the one eating into spiritual food, so the growth of charity rather than the growth of the
other virtues is attributed to this sacrament.5
It is a perfection of charity on account of the plenitude of grace that
comes through the Eucharist but, given the connection among the
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virtues, this cannot but lead to an increase of virtue generally (IV Sent.,
d. , q. , a. , qc. , s. c. ; ST I–II, q. , a. ). From the ecstasy of
charity received in the Eucharist, prudence is, as it were, made more
eloquent, and the ostiarius is made better able to realize the ecstatic,
moral body. The action of the Eucharist here is modeled upon the role
of reason in making Christ’s own sensuality ecstatic. We are all familiar
with the story of the Garden of Gethsemane and Jesus’s sense appetites
recoiling from the cross of Good Friday. Sensuality recoils from being
wounded as is quite proper for it to do, but once integrated with the
rational acts of a person (ScG II, c. , para. )—and such acts ultimately have their root in divine intellect and wisdom (VS, para. )—
sensuality is able to undergo the passion that wounds the lover. In
the case of Jesus, His understanding of reconciliation as the mutual
proportion between the parts led Him to obedience of the Father’s will
and, on the basis of His reason, a self-control that made it possible for
the body of Jesus to become a wounded, ecstatic body (see the discussion of oratio in the following chapter). Thus, through reason as ostiarius the body is taken beyond what it would otherwise pursue.
In Christ we are made into spiritual food (per conversionem manducantis in spiritualem cibum); we become Eucharist to another in the
ecstatic opening of our now wounded, loving body, and our works are
rededicated to the need of the other (inclinatur per amorem ad operandum secundum exigentiam amati [III Sent., d. , q. , a. ]). Thus,
when Levinas looks for a desire that does not consume the other (‘‘Desire is unquenchable . . . because it does not call for food’’) he would
have done well to look to Thomas’s idea of the ecstatic body whose
appetite is already always food, ‘‘a having been offered without any
holding back’’ (OTB, ): always vulnerable, always offered, and always in hope that bonum diffusivum sui est. For is not Levinas also
talking about the eucharistic wound of love when he writes: ‘‘The true
Desire is that which the Desired does not satisfy, but hollows out. It is
goodness.’’6
Nothing cheap is intended by this comment. I do not suggest that
the two thinkers are identical but just that, as substantial similarities
between the thought of Levinas and Thomas were pointed out in chapters  and , so Levinas is perhaps the thinker who has thought most
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about ethics and the wound. Levinas speaks of the ethical moment as
a change in desire: ‘‘It reverts from the activity of being a hunter . . .
from being aim to being wound’’ (OTB, ). Thomas writes of love as
a wound that transfixes the passions of the lover and the beloved. The
following few sentences need close scrutiny. Thomas writes:
And so the lover in some manner passes into the beloved and on
account of this love is said to be a piercing. To reach the interior
of a thing by separating is characteristic of piercing. And similarly
the beloved reaches the interior of the lover. On account of this
it is said that love wounds, that it transfixes the passions.7
At first glance, the Thomistic ethical moment might appear quite different from that of Levinas. Levinas emphasizes the passivity of the
wound; the ethical relationship is a matter of vulnerability. Does not
Thomas emphasize the active wounding wrought by the lover? The
difference between the two positions diminishes, however, when it is
recalled that the natural law always already makes the lover and the
beloved vulnerable, has always already transfixed the one with the other
in having ordered their appetites as service for each other. Nevertheless,
there is a wounding, and not merely vulnerability. To fulfill the law of
transfixion will inevitably require the wounding of the body because of
its double aspect. The transfixed body is precisely an ecstatic body: it
is a body that has forsaken the principles of its bodily individuation so
that there might be a ‘‘bodily giving of self ’’ (Gallagher). The lover is
able to pass into the beloved only because of the ecstatic opening, an
opening already prepared in the inmost depths of the beloved by the
participation of the natural appetites in divine law (VS, para. ). As
Thomas recounts, Paul lives for the other, his body given in service to
the other:
Therefore the Apostle’s concern for self was deposed through the
cross of Christ, he said that he was dead to his self concern, saying
with Christ I am nailed to the Cross, that is, that the cross of Christ
has separated me from my private self concern.8
It is, of course, because love has transfixed (transfixum) Paul’s passions
that Paul is able to say confixus sum.
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That Eucharist cultivates the virtues and intensifies the ecstasy of
the body is simply a continuation of the power of the Passion, and
ultimately the Word as an exemplary cause of self-diffusion. Thomas
provides an important clarification about the wounded Christ as exemplar in response to an objection. The objector argues that the sacraments vivify the soul and that Augustine points out that such
vivification is on account of the Word, and not the flesh of Christ. The
objector concludes that the soul lives because of the Word, not on
account of what happened in the flesh of Christ at the time of the
Passion.9 Thomas grants that the Word is the principal agent, but then
adds, ‘‘His flesh, however, and the mysteries accomplished in his flesh,
operate instrumentally to the life of the soul; and to the life of the body
not only instrumentally but also through a certain exemplariness.’’10 To
explain the meaning of per quamdam exemplaritatem, Thomas himself
directs us to an earlier discussion on the resurrection. There (ST III, q.
, a. , ad ) Thomas argues likewise that the general resurrection is
accomplished by divine power and has its primordial cause in divine
justice (primordialis causa resurrectionis humanae est divine justitia),
while the resurrected humanity of Christ is after some fashion an instrument of the divinity itself (humanitatis Christi, secundum quam resurrexit, est quodammodo instrumentum divinitatis ipsius). Once more,
Christ’s body acts as a cause subtended by the more primordial divine
action of the Word. It is this ‘‘primordial love’’ (VS, para. ) that
resurrects the good and the evil, but it is Christ’s resurrected body
acting as an exemplar cause that prompts the good to conform themselves to Christ (exemplaritas tamen ejus se extendit proprie solum ad
bonos, qui sunt facti conformes filiationis ipsius). Similarly then, the
wounded body of Christ is an exemplar cause for the bodies of the
good who would love as Christ loved: ‘‘The service of Christ begins
with the Cross,’’ says Bellarmine.11 Thus, Thomas comments that the
effect of baptism by blood is greater than the other sorts of baptism.
For while baptism by water is a certain figural representation, baptism
by blood is through an imitation of the work (per imitationem operis)
of the passion of Christ (ST III, q. , a. ).
To speak of the wounded body of Christ as an exemplar returns us
to Thomas’s metaphysics of exemplarity and the ecstatic structure of
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Being. In Thomas’s mind, Christ’s diffusion of himself on the cross is
paradigmatic of the ecstatic structure of Being. When natural law is
understood as a set of increasingly ecstatic appetites structured as the
love that wounds the lover, the Christological foundation of natural
law emerges. Explaining the suitability of the crucifixion to salvation
(ST III, q. , a. ), indeed, that it was conventissimum that Christ
suffer on a cross, Thomas cites Augustine that such a death cultivated
the various virtues. But more, citing Gregory of Nyssa, Thomas argues
that the figure of the cross unites all the extremes of creation and
signifies that the power and providence of Him who hung on the cross
was everywhere diffused (significat virtutem et providentiam ejus qui in
ea pependit, ubique diffusam). And so Thomas tells us that the earth
itself felt the benefits of the Cross being purified by the blood spilling
from the side of Christ (a recurring theme in Fra Angelico’s art at San
Marco, Florence). If a link is made between this passage and Thomas’s
discussion of Christ’s wounded flesh per quamdam exemplaritatem,
Thomas’s Christological perspective comes into view. Wojtyla has emphasized the extent and power of exemplary causality in Thomas: and
ScG III, c. , para. – leaves no room for doubt on this point (see
my chapter ). Acknowledging this demands that the Cross be raised
to a metaphysical significance. John Paul II does so in Veritatis Splendor. By way of discussing the immutability of the moral law, and censuring those who doubt ‘‘the permanent structural elements of man
which are connected with his own bodily dimension,’’ John Paul II
writes (VS, para. ):
This is the reason why ‘‘the Church affirms that underlying so
many changes there are some things which do not change and
are ultimately founded upon Christ, who is the same yesterday and
today and for ever.’’ (Gaudium et Spes, ) Christ is the ‘‘Beginning’’ who, having taken on human nature, definitively illumines
it in its constitutive elements and in its dynamism of charity
towards God and neighbour.
(see St. Thomas Aquinas, ST I–II, q. , a. )
In this short passage, John Paul II identifies Christ as the foundation
of the natural law understood as a dynamism of charity and the One
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who ‘‘definitively illumines’’ the law of our nature as ordered to the
love that wounds the lover. Thus, when discussing forms of pornography, John Paul II writes,
In the last analysis, they take place when those deep governing
rules of the gift and of mutual donation, which are inscribed in
this femininity and masculinity through the whole structure of
the human being, are violated. This deep inscription—or rather
incision—decides the nuptial meaning of the human body, that
is, of the fundamental call it receives to form the ‘‘communion
of persons’’ and take part in it (TB, ; emphasis added).
Lest there be any doubt as to his meaning, speaking elsewhere about
the relationship between Christ and the natural law, John Paul II writes
(VS, para. ): ‘‘Following Christ is not an outward imitation, since it
touches man at the very depths of his being. Being a follower of Christ
means becoming conformed to him who became a servant even to giving
himself on the Cross (cf. Phil :–).’’ The biblical legitimacy for the
idea plenitudo legis in Christo est (St. Ambrose [VS, para. ]) comes
from Colossians :– where Paul describes Christ as one who ‘‘is
before all things, and in him all things hold together’’ and even
‘‘through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in
heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross.’’ Balthasar has repeated
Thomas’s view when he conceives of the City of God as ‘‘married’’ to
Christ, the one who ‘‘is already always the one who has bled, ‘the Lamb
slain before the foundation of the world’ (Apoc. , ) in an ‘eternal
redemption’ (Heb. , ).’’12 In arguing that the Cross is the eternal
law ordering the natural law, I am well aware that I propose that the
end of nature and the end of charity are one and the same. I do not
accept Suarez’s re-statement of Cajetan’s duplex ordo when he argues
that original sin severed our relationship with God as the ultimate end
of grace but did not sever our relationship to God as an ultimate end
of nature. This last relationship, he argues, was perpetuated through
the natural law. Suarez here13 appears to reject Thomas’s position that
original sin diminished our natural perfection (ST I–II, q. , a. ). At
the same time, this disagreement with this formulation in Suarez’s
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thought ought not to be taken as agreement with de Lubac’s The Mystery of the Supernatural. The full implications for the relationship between nature and grace of the Thomistic-Wojtyla view suggested here
requires a book-length study, but I am absolutely convinced that any
adequate treatment of this relationship will require a return to analyses
found in Baroque scholasticism:14 that is, the duplex ordo is true to
Thomas’s thought once it is understood as a statement about Thomas’s
double-aspect theory of the body.
It is important to remember that the ecstatic opening of the body,
the wound of love, is not in a complete sense against nature. It is not as
such a violence. One of the propensities of the body is the love that
wounds, being a body articulated in justice and charity, and such love
is connatural. Thus, the love that wounds the lover perfects and betters
the lover, for love is a coaptatio of the appetitive power to the good.15
Hence it is that Thomas makes an analogy between fire and love: ‘‘And
just as fire is unable to be restrained from a motion that happens to it
on account of its form, except through violence; so neither the one
loving who acts on account of love.’’16 Thomas helps us to see his point
here by arguing that love has two aspects, a formal and a material. The
formal aspect of love is the lover’s desire to be perfected, but the material aspect is a change in the body’s integrity (quod amor sit laesivus
propter excessum immutationis): a sacrificial lesion of the body’s particularity so that the body might become a place of a new community, a
community predicated, ultimately, upon the new covenant of the
Cross. The new covenant is interiorly structured by the Cross whose
marks never leave the resurrected.17 Indeed, Thomas tells us that the
resurrection of the members conforms to the resurrection of the head
(IV Sent., d. , q. , a. , qc. , ad ). Amor vulnerat, et quod transfigit
iecur: love wounds the lover and pierces through the liver. The reference to the liver here relates to a commonplace of Galenic physiology.
The liver was said to be the seat of passion and important in the production of blood (ST I–II, q. , a. , ad ). Both connotations were
probably important to Thomas. But as Thomas is clear that love has a
material manifestation, that it leads to physiological change, Thomas
is probably especially interested in the connotation connected with the
production of blood: the piercing through of the liver connotes the
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spilling of blood from a wound. The physiological emphasis can be
found throughout Thomas’s analysis of love. He notes that ‘‘love is
ecstatic because what boils steams, boils over, and spills out of itself ’’
(dicitur amor exstasim facere et fevere, quia quod fervet extra se ebullit et
exhalat [III Sent., d. , q. , a. , ad ]). The language used here is
thoroughly physiological, words such as ebullio appearing frequently in
Aristotle’s De respiratione, for example.
The physiological image returns us to the central metaphysical
claim: if a love is good it is diffusive of itself. This point is made by
Thomas with regard to the union of lover and beloved. Love is a vis
transformativa by which the lover is transferred into the beloved in
some fashion (quodammodo). The definition of love as such a transformation is also a definition of perfect charity. In perfect charity, one
totaliter in Deum per amorem transformatur, and this state can be found
inside marriage, as is clear from the life of Abraham, says Thomas
(Quod. III, q. , a. ). Love is a transformatio, that is, a change in
form through which one enters into profound union with another. The
transformation is a change in form for ‘‘love makes the beloved be the
form of the lover’’ (quia amor facit amatum esse formam amantis) and,
crucially for Thomas’s understanding of the union of lovers in marriage, he adds that beyond union there is a growing together of the
lover and the beloved (et ideo supra unionem addidit concretionem).
Concretio is a word replete with connotations of organic growth, the
formation of milk and seed, matters common in the texts of medieval
embryology. Thomas’s emphasis is always on a union that is more than
a union, a union that becomes fecund. Such a gravid union, we are
told, is not the superficial touching one finds in a congregatum which
only makes something one secundum quid (III Sent., d. , q. , a. ,
ad ). The union that becomes fecund, the new creation rendered by
ecstasy, is a union unum simpliciter in which the concreta grow together; congealing and becoming gravid, the concretum gives way to a
new concreatum, the new flesh of their union. A Thomistic union of
lovers is always—precisely because articulated through the wound—a
union of the same and the other in which the one inheres in the other
without reduction the one to the other: it is mutua inhaesio. It is also a
liquefaction that gives place to a congealing, a new concreatum that is
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a child. Hence, Thomas can agree with Levinas and his emphasis on
maternity as a defining of the ethical moment: ‘‘I am bound to others
before being tied to my body’’ (OTB, ). The significance of this
point to John Paul II’s sexual ethics will be discussed in chapter .
A union of the same and the other is possible only on account of an
ecstatic movement which separates the lover from the conditions of
the lover’s particularity, the liquefactio that is the basis of Levinas’s
‘‘deposition’’ and ‘‘maternity.’’ Thomas writes:
But nothing is able to be transformed into another except insofar
as it recedes in some fashion from its form, because form makes
something one, and so preceding the division of penetration [that
is, the lover’s penetration of the beloved] is another division by
which the lover is separated from himself tending thereby into
the beloved.18
This separation of the lover from himself is accomplished in extasim,
says Thomas, and after what fashion is made clear as the passage continues:
Because nothing recedes from itself unless dissolved from what
holds it inside itself, just as a natural thing is not detached from
its form unless the dispositions are dissolved by which the form
is retained in the matter, so it must be that the lover is removed
from the boundaries inside of which the lover is held and on
account of this love is said to liquefy the heart, because a liquid is
not contained by its boundaries19
The love that wounds the lover dissolves the body and therewith the
conditions of material individuation. This is what Thomas calls ‘‘being
placed outside one’s proper order,’’ although, of course, it is also coming into proper order, a life lived according to the ecstatic norm of
divine law. For this reason, Thomas can insist that the ecstasy that
places one outside one’s proper order is not violence (ST II–II, q. ,
a. , ad ).
Although Thomas’s texts are explicit on the wound of love, it might
be well to note before going further—lest such talk of wounds sounds
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ill to the (contemporary?) Christian ear—that such talk is found in a
systematic or theoretical way in such Thomists as St. Catherine of
Siena and St. John of the Cross. Both are Doctors of the Church and
it is the role of the Doctors of the Church to relate ‘‘the truth of the
Word made flesh’’ (VS, para. ). Before considering their appropriation of Thomas’s theory of the love that wounds the lover, it is as well
to note that even someone as enigmatically Catholic20 as Nancy recalls,
with seeming nostalgia, the spirituality of the wounds of Christ. In
Thomas, it is prudence, the ostiarius that forms the interior ecstatic
opening of sensuality to the law; it is reason’s acknowledgement of the
law, the law of love, which wounds and which gives life to the other.
Thus, prudence is called the genitrix virtutum (III Sent., d. , q. , a.
) and, thus, justice. As the virtue that helps realize the eternal law,
both within the person and thereby between persons (justice), prudentia is noted by Thomas and Wojtyla to stem from providentia (ST
II–II, q. , a. , ad ; LR, ). A rather similar claim can be found in
Nancy, ‘‘a gram of thought: trace of this pebble, of this calculus, engraving, tiny incision, notch, cut, hard point of a tip, engraver’s stylus,
body of the first cut, breached body, body separated;’’21 although, from
Thomas’s perspective, a misstep is made, since Nancy thinks, ‘‘There
is violence and pain in this thought.’’ It is unclear quite why he would
think this, since he also clearly thinks that ecstasy is a reduction in the
violence of the body, it is its ‘‘ab-solution.’’22
Roland Barthes, a Protestant by upbringing who tells us that he
nevertheless drank deeply from the well of Catholic sensibility, develops his central reflection on photography in terms of the wound of
love. He separates two principles from our experience of photographs
that together reveal a metaphysical (CL, ) cum religious order (CL,
): the studium and punctum. The studium is a ‘‘sovereign consciousness’’ over a perception, a control of the field of experience, while a
punctum ‘‘shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces,’’ and the
‘‘wound’’ removes ‘‘sovereign consciousness.’’23 This wound in sovereign consciousness is a mark of love (CL, ) in which one becomes
exposed, indeed more: we are told, ‘‘to give examples of the punctum
is, in a fashion, to give myself up’’ (CL, ). The punctum operates like
the ecstasy of the love that wounds in Thomas, for without it one
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cannot escape the operation of the studium as it reduces all to its sovereignty. Or, as Thomas puts it (ST I–II, q. , a. ),
But if man’s will is intent upon a good which exceeds what is
proportionate to it, whether this be as far as all mankind is concerned, such as the divine good, which transcends the limits of
human nature, or as far as the individual is concerned, such as the
good of one’s neighbour, then the will needs virtue. Therefore the
virtues which order the love of man to God or to his neighbour, such
as charity, justice and the like, are in the will as in a subject (emphasis is mine).
Rooted in particularity, the virtues of charity and justice order the love
of man, and through them man is able to help realize ‘‘the good of
one’s neighbour,’’ an object of the will which, without the virtues,
‘‘exceeds what is proportionate to’’ the particularity of the individual’s
will. Though able to be ‘‘productive of good works,’’ without charity
(ST I–II, q. , a. ), it is not possible ‘‘never to sin mortally’’ unless
one has grace (ST I–II, q. , a. ). Thus, Thomas and Barthes agree
about the central role of ‘‘the grace of the punctum’’ (CL, ) which
has ‘‘launched desire beyond’’ the studium. Indeed, the punctum that
launches my desire beyond my particularity is, as Barthes puts it later,
the ‘‘stigmatum’’ (CL, ), and the photograph emerges at a time
‘‘contemporary with the withdrawal of rites’’ (CL, ) to recall nothing
less than resurrection (CL, ).
I find the continuity between thinkers like Nancy and Barthes and
Aquinas remarkable—more remarkable than that with the biblical Levinas—but the influence of Thomas’s theory of love has a long history.
Both Catherine of Siena and John of the Cross make the wound a
structural principle of their theories of love. Of course, the mystical
theology of St. Bonaventure is famously so structured,24 but the authors to be noted here are identified as Thomists. The structural role
of the wound of love is quite evident from perhaps the most famous
passage in Catherine, who, as it happens, is one of the patron saints of
John Paul II’s pontificate. Catherine waits for Niccolò di Toldo at his
place of execution and, as his spiritual advisor, holds Niccolò’s head,
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stretching his neck out, we are told, for the executioner’s blade. Receiving his head into her hands, ‘‘while my eyes were locked on the divine
goodness’’ she saw,
. . . the God-man . . . He stood ready to receive [Niccolò’s] blood
into his own; and the fire of holy desire . . . was now received
into the fire of his own divine charity. After he received the blood
and the desire, he received the soul also, and plunged it into the
store-house of his open side brimming with mercy. . . . How
unspeakably moving it was to see God’s goodness; to see with
what gentleness and love he awaited that soul—gazing at it with
eyes of mercy—as it left the body and entered into his open side,
bathed in its own blood which now had value through the blood
of God’s son.25
Here Catherine sees the divine goodness as an ‘‘open side brimming
with mercy,’’ and explains the movement of desire for union with
Christ as desire leaving through the wound of Niccolò and entering
into Christ through His ‘‘open side,’’ ‘‘received into the fire of his own
divine charity.’’ The Thomistic foundation for this view is on display
in her analysis of prayer. In prayer, Catherine tells us, ‘‘she rises above
herself . . . above the gross impulses of the senses, and with angelic
mind is united with God in intense love. By the light of her
intellect . . .’’ (PT, ). As with Thomas, Catherine argues that only
when she articulates herself as intellect can she reach out to another:
otherwise, she is confined by her material conditions of individuation,
‘‘the gross impulses of the senses.’’ Catherine can transform the particularity of her sensuality through prayerful persuasion based on the operation of her intellect: ‘‘by the light of her intellect she sees and
knows.’’ (PT, ) Her intellect knowing and loving God, and with her
sensuality persuaded by prayer, Catherine ‘‘abides with her bridegroom
at the table of crucified desire.’’ Her love for God has wounded Catherine, it has ‘‘crucified desire,’’ and the prayerful union of her sensuality
and intellect has made her ecstatic. In this ecstasy she is made fecund.
‘‘Bathe and drown yourself in the gentle blood of your bridegroom,’’
Catherine tells us and, by abiding in the fecundity of the bridegroom,

................. 11244$

$CH5

03-18-05 08:28:04

PS

PAGE 87



Ecstatic Morality and S exual P olitics

‘‘this prayer is surely a mother who by the love of God conceives virtues, and who brings them to birth in love of neighbour’’ (PT, ). A
prayerful articulation of her sensuous particularity, which Catherine
accomplishes when ‘‘she clothes herself with truth,’’ transforms Catherine’s sensuality into a nuptial body: just how close this is to Thomas’s
conception of prayer will be seen in chapter . Through the fecundity
of her bridegroom, Christ, she conceives virtues, and her self drowned
‘‘in the gentle blood,’’ her bridegroom helps her to give birth to her
love of her neighbor. Catherine compresses into a single paragraph
Thomas’s theory of ecstatic morality and also captures a conception of
the nuptial body that will reemerge with John Paul II. Indeed, this
paragraph nicely captures what he means by the ‘‘Marion’’posture to
which all—men and women—are called. The elicited nature of the
ecstasy of the ‘‘Marion,’’ or nuptial, body is nicely put by Catherine.
Speaking of the Annunciation, she writes, ‘‘He waited at the door of
your will/for you to open to him/for he wanted to come into you.’’
(PT, ) She also describes Christ as the ostiarius, ‘‘without this key
and this doorman, my Truth, no one can enter’’ (PT, ). Thus, the
overcoming of a metaphysics of violence that one finds in Catherine’s
Thomism is not anything like Milbank’s interest in seeing ‘‘the ontological priority of non-violence.’’26 It is, rather, the ontological priority
of charity, the love that wounds the lover.27
With the authority of St. Catherine’s vision noted, it might be well
to discuss ST III, q. , a. . Here, Thomas discusses Doubting
Thomas. The language used to describe the marks of the crucifixion is,
for the most part, cicatrix. A cicatrix can be a scar, a mark of incision,
a patch or even a wound. Thomas is answering objectors who deny
that it would be suitable for Christ to be resurrected with any mark of
the crucifixion. Perhaps the objection to be met here is whether the
wound of love, as an opening of the body to the life and body of
another, remains; or, put otherwise, how can the wound be a condition
for loving union if Christ heals? After all, as the resurrection is an
overcoming of death itself, it must surely be a healing of all wounds.
Christianity, after all, is not the glorification of wounds but the glorification of healing and the exultation of peace. The second objection
argues that the opening of the wound is contrary to the integrity of the
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body (sed aperturae vulnerum contriantur integritati corporis, quia per
eas discontinuatur corpus). In the sed contra to this article, Thomas simply quotes John : . In the Vulgate, the language is unambiguous,
Christ saying to Thomas, ‘‘Bring your hand and send it into my side’’
(et affer manum tuam, et mitte in latus meum). As to the second objection, Thomas says, ‘‘it must be said that although the opening of a
wound is a certain breaking up of continuity, the whole is compensated
for by the greater adornment of glory, so that the body is not less
complete, but rather complete in a perfect way. Thomas not only saw,
but also touched the wounds. . . .’’28 Thomas is clear that the openings
of the wounds remain; after all, Thomas touches them (which is not
explicitly stated in Scripture), he says. They are, however, transformed
and the body perfected thereby: for now the wounds are adorned, furnished, with glory. Where once there was flesh, now there is glory,
the glory of the love that wounds the lover.29 The Merleau-Pontian
handshake, with its mutuality, equality, symmetry, horizontality, and
sameness is here replaced by the invitation to send your hand into the
open body of the other. Mutuality becomes gift, equality becomes the
gift which forgives that one is not equal; symmetry becomes the asymmetry of service; horizontality the verticality of adoration or the humility of not being adored; and not sameness but the ‘‘philosopher’s
stone,’’ same and other transfixed.
St. John of the Cross continues St. Catherine’s Thomism. In the
Dark Night,30 he relates that ‘‘the soul in the midst of these dark conflicts feels vividly and keenly that it is being wounded by a strong
divine love’’ (DN II, c. , ; ; LFL I, ) and ‘‘this love finds that the
soul is equipped to receive the wound and union in the measure that
all its appetites are brought into subjection, alienated, incapacitated,
and unable to be satisfied’’ apart from God (DN II, c. , ). Union
with God is rendered through a wound wrought by divine love, for,
‘‘among lovers, the wound of one is a wound for both, and the two
have but one feeling’’ (SC XIII, ). The soul is able to receive this
wound only to the degree that its appetites have been alienated and
incapacitated, that is, unmoored from an exclusive focus upon the person. Thus, the love of the Bridegroom ‘‘wounds her [the soul]’’ but
‘‘through this love she went out from all creatures and from herself ’’
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(SC, I, ; VII, ). The wound marks the ecstasy of the soul, for through
it the soul ‘‘went out . . . from herself.’’ The love of God is a ‘‘loving
wound’’ (DN II, c. , ) and a purgation: ‘‘The wounded soul rises
up at night, in this purgative darkness’’ (DN II, c. , ).
The liquefaction caused by the love that wounds the lover is wonderfully captured by St. John when, speaking of Mary Magdalene, he
comments: ‘‘She did not consider the propriety of weeping and shedding tears in the presence of our Lord’s guests. Her only concern was
to reach him for whom her soul was already wounded and on fire’’
(DN, II, c. , ). Such liquefaction is constitutive of the ‘‘wound of
love,’’ for the flame of divine life ‘‘wounds and stirs it [the soul] so
deeply as to make it dissolve in love’’ (LFL I, ). Thus, speaking of the
‘‘wound effected by the cautery of love,’’ he writes,
. . . for the very cautery that causes it, cures it, and by curing it,
causes it. As often as the cautery of love touches the wound of
love, it causes a deeper wound of love, and thus the more it
wounds, the more it cures and heals. The more wounded the
lover, the healthier the lover is, and the cure caused by love is to
wound and inflict wound upon wound, to such an extent that
the entire soul is dissolved into a wound of love. And now all
cauterized and made one wound of love, it is completely healthy
in love, for it is transformed in love.
(LFL II, )
It is also evident from this passage that the wound of love is a transforming of an always present possibility of transgression. For St. John
speaks of divine love as a ‘‘sweet cautery’’ (LFL II, ) which makes the
lover of God healthier. That the body needs to be transformed, that is,
that one of its dimensions needs to be concretized rather than the other
dimension of its double aspect, must be assumed, if ‘‘the cure caused
by love is to wound and inflict wound upon wound’’ (emphasis
added). St. John relies, I suspect, on a passage like the following, where
Thomas writes that if a stronger power transforms a weaker power so
that ‘‘it changes the contrary inclination into its own inclination, there
will be no longer repugnance or violence . . . such is the result only
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when the contrary inclination of the appetite remains.’’ In other words,
healing is accomplished when the inclinatio ad peccatum reverts to a
pronitas ad peccatum.
When Thomas talks of liquefaction, he has in mind, of course, the
sort of spiritual dissolving of the soul that St. John speaks of here.
However, Thomas also speaks of liquefaction as having physiological
effects. Likewise, St. John relates Mary Magdalene’s tears to her
woundedness, but he also explicitly addresses the bodily effects of a
dissolving soul. As a general principle, he notes: ‘‘Thus the greater the
delight and strength of love the wound produces in the soul, so much
greater is that produced by the wound outside on the body, and when
there is an increase in one there is an increase in the other’’ (LFL II,
). Thus he quotes (LFL II, ) St. Paul, ‘‘I bear the wounds of the
Lord Jesus in my body’’ (Gal. :) and comments that ‘‘sometimes’’
God permits ‘‘the wound and sore [to] appear outwardly’’and ‘‘in the
fashion in which it existed interiorly,’’ and this is what happened
‘‘when the seraph wounded St. Francis’’ (LFL II, ).
St. John draws his use of the ‘‘wound of love’’ from the language of
the Song of Songs (SC I, –), a text that is important to John Paul II,
as will be seen. Commenting on Sg. :, St John tells us that when
God ‘‘visits’’ the soul his ‘‘touches of love’’ ‘‘pierce and wound it like
fiery arrows . . . And these wounds, mentioned here, are properly called
wounds of love’’ (SC I, : emphasis added). The fire of God’s love in
the wound makes the soul ‘‘go out of itself ’’ (SC I, ; ), and so,
Spouse, in that touch and wound of your love you have not only
drawn my soul away from all things, but have also made it go
out from self—indeed, it even seems that you draw it out of the
body—and you have raised it up to yourself while it was calling
after you, now totally detached so as to be attached to you.
(SC I, )
It seems as though one is drawn from the very body itself during these
‘‘visits,’’ for such a ‘‘visit’’ ‘‘so disjoins the bones and endangers human
nature’’ (SC XIII, ). There are three kinds of wound corresponding
to three kinds of knowledge one can have of God: a knowledge of God
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from creatures is a ‘‘wound’’; a knowledge of the Incarnation and the
mysteries of the faith create in the soul ‘‘a sore wound and cuts more
deeply into the soul than the simple wound’’; a third knowledge, obtaining from ‘‘a touch of supreme knowledge of the divinity’’ issues in
‘‘a festered wound’’ (SC VII, –). As with Thomas, the wounds of
love are interiorly related to a knowledge or understanding of God (SC
VII, ).
For the applications of John Paul II’s ecstatic morality that will be
discussed in the second part, it is important to recall here that in Crossing the Threshold of Hope each of the texts used above in regard to the
role of the ‘‘wounds of love’’ in St. John of the Cross are cited by John
Paul II. Of course, Wojtyla also wrote his doctorate in Rome on St.
John of the Cross with an acknowledged expert, the famous—if now
utterly disparaged31—Garrigou-Lagrange. If it is also acknowledged, as
I think it must be, that the ‘‘wounds of love’’ are a structural part of
St. John’s thought—and remembering that this conception of love echoes both that of Thomas and Catherine of Siena—then I think we can
expect John Paul II’s version of ecstatic morality to rely upon ‘‘the
wounds of love.’’ This is surely to be expected when John Paul II tells
us that he began to study Spanish so that he could read John of the
Cross in the original and that his reading of John belonged to ‘‘a very
important stage in my life.’’32 John Paul II, as has already been noted,
speaks very highly of Levinas and in his work one reads about the
ethical as ‘‘the haemorrhage of the for-the-other’’ (OTB, ). The ethical relationship, ‘‘the non-initiative of sensibility’’ (OTB, ), is ‘‘having-the-other-in-one’s-skin’’ (OTB, ), just as the natural inclinations
of the human animal structured by participation in the eternal law
order the person to being diffusivum sui accomplished in the ecstasy of
the love that wounds the lover. As de Finance puts it, ‘‘Le thomisme
est une métaphysique du rapport,’’33 the ‘‘social charity’’ of Pius XI.
Significant to Levinas’s understanding of the rapport social are the epigrams from Ezekiel with which Otherwise Than Being opens. Ezekiel
:– speaks of two destinies: those persons marked on their foreheads
who are saved from slaughter, and all those others, whether young or
old, women, men, or children, who are to be slain. The Vulgate, unlike
modern Bibles, speaks of the signa thau super frontes (Ez , ) and so
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informs us about the kind of mark. The tau is the last letter of the
Hebrew alphabet and resembles an X.34 A signum is a mark inscribed
or cut into the body in order to adorn it. In the Apocalypse (, –)
the saved are similarly marked. Dante, of course, has those in Purgatory
marked with Ps (peccata) on their foreheads. Those marked by the
glory of the Cross are saved and those marked by their sins are yet
pilgrims.
In this chapter, I hope to have deepened the argument that the
natural law in Aquinas has a Christological foundation. That is, the
natural law establishes a dynamism in the body that calls the person to
participation in the eternal law of God’s wisdom and love. This is a
call to ecstasy. God’s wisdom and love is diffusive of itself in the act of
Creation and the act of the salvation of the world, Christ on the Cross,
ubique diffusam. Christ, ‘‘who is the same yesterday and today and for
ever,’’ is an exemplar of liquefactio, the gift of one’s self to another:
made possible only through the ecstatic opening of one’s body in service to the other; made possible only through the natural law and its
dynamism that calls out to us plenitudo legis in Christo est; made possible only through a wound of love that transforms sensuality from an
inclinatio ad peccatum to a pronitas ad peccatum; made possible only
through a wound that cures the world of its violence. In contrast to
the mutua inhaesio of love stands the Leviathan: at Job () cohaesio is
used to describe the beast’s compact, impenetrable skin.35 In the next
chapter, I will show that just as the world ‘‘knew him not,’’ so philosophy, ‘‘Christian’’ and secular, has taught the closing of the wound.
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T H E PO L I T I C S O F T H E
FLESH REVISITED

Sometime around , the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Toletus wrote his
commentary, Enarratio in summam theologiae Sancti Thomae Aquinatis.1 In , the American feminist Donna Haraway wrote Simians,
Cyborgs, and Women.2 Oddly, both works contain fundamentally the
same thesis about the body. This claim might seem outlandish: indeed,
the claim might appear to fall into the absurd. After all, Haraway’s
work on ‘‘cyborg feminism’’ is regarded as one of the most theoretical,
and radical, feminist critiques of the Western tradition. Her dialectical
Marxist critique was published by Free Association Books, a progressive and liberal press whose motto runs ‘‘an association in which the
free development of each is the condition for the free development of
all.’’ Toletus’s Enarratio, by contrast, was written by a cardinal, a professor at the Collegio Romano, and a onetime visitor to Leuven: where,
in  as an Apostolic Nuncio sent by Pope Gregory XIII, he examined certain propositions from the texts of Leuven theologian Michael
Baius, later condemned by Pius V. The Enarratio was published by the
Congregation for the Propaganda of the Faith at the Vatican in ,
the year in which Papal infallibility was declared. Yet, however outlandish the comparison, it is true that the two books contain fundamentally
the same thesis about the body.
The stated goal of Haraway’s ‘‘cyborg feminism’’ is to liberate sensuality from violence. Yet, in examining her book alongside that of
Toletus, it becomes clear that both Jesuit and feminist agree that sensu
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ality is a place of metaphysical violence. By way of demonstrating that
Toletus and Haraway share a theory of sensuality, a number of different
points will be made: it will be shown that Toletus’s commentary on
Aquinas is hardly accurate; this fact will help justify the claim that the
Jesuit tradition includes a rather particular theory of sensuality; that
the origin of the theory is perhaps Giles of Rome; that this theory is
shared by many other Catholic and non-Catholic thinkers alike; and,
finally, the argument is made that Gaston Fessard, arguably the finest
Jesuit mind of the twentieth century, came to rediscover Aquinas’s own
theory of sensuality through a thoroughgoing critique of Hegelian and
Marxist dialectic. The chapter will show that Jesuits and feminists
alike, as well as anyone who wants to affirm the flesh without violence,
will have to return to Thomas and his Christological theory of the love
that wounds the lover.
In the third volume of his four-volume commentary on Aquinas’s
Summa theologica, Toletus (–) discusses sensuality in the context
of the question: An in Christo fuerit fomes peccati? (III, q. , a. ).
Uncontroversially, he says that the human has two broad categories of
appetite, the rational and the sensitive, and that, ideally, the rational
appetite is to govern sensuality, the inferior appetite. Toletus goes on
to say that rational appetite and sensuality are in discord (in homine
discordes sunt) and that they are fighting one another.3 Crucially, Toletus tells us, with the creation of man and woman, God, through his
gift of original justice, miraculously pacified sensuality so that the inferior would always be obedient to the superior (quodam suo dono . . . ita
mirifice pacificavit, ut inferior semper esset obediens superiori [EN, b]).
As a miracle is needed to pacify sensuality, it is clearly Toletus’s conception of human nature that interior to its very constitution is a violence,
a violence in which each of its two principal parts fights the other to
determine the goods that will be sought. Moreover, that Toletus conceives of the violence of sensuality as metaphysical is confirmed by his
response to a later question, An in Christo sit voluntas sensualis? (III, q.
, a. ). Here, Toletus explicitly identifies sensuality with the fomes
peccati, and thus casts sensuality as an incitement to sin (incitamentum
ad peccatum[EN, a]).
Toletus’s commentary departs at this point quite substantially from
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Thomas’s text. For example, Toletus denies what Thomas affirms: in
Christo fuit sensualis appetitus sive sensualitas. Perhaps this is not so
surprising, given that Toletus has just identified sensuality with the
fomes peccati. Yet, why has he made this identification? In Thomas, the
fomes points to a disorder within sensuality and not to an actual part
of human nature. Hence, when Thomas wants to speak of a rationally
ordered sensuality he uses the term voluntas sensualitatis (ST III, q. ,
a. ), whereas Toletus speaks of a voluntas sensualis.4 It may well be that
this change in terminology—which points to a fundamental difference
in the way both conceive the relationship between nature and grace,
and less broadly, the relationship between reason, virtue, and sensuality—is a consequence of Trent. Some confusion exists among historians as to whether Toletus himself was a theologian at Trent. However
that may be, his treatment of sensuality clearly has an eye to the Council’s teaching. It is Trent’s teaching—reaffirmed in the Catechism of the
Catholic Church, recently issued by Pope John Paul II—that concupiscence is an inordinate desire that belongs to human nature: this position must be held if the Church’s teaching on the gratuity of grace is
to be secure.5 I have discussed the subtleties of Church doctrine concerning concupiscence in chapter  and showed there how Aquinas’s
analysis of sensuality shaped this doctrine from the time of Trent up to
the John Paul II  Catechism of the Catholic Church. It is clear that
Toletus defends Trent by making the violence of sensuality metaphysical.
To some it might seem that Toletus is just confused. After all, does
not Augustine’s The City of God make it perfectly clear that Christians
are committed to a metaphysics of peace? Toletus is trying to explain
the Church’s doctrine that freedom from concupiscence was a gift of
original justice. His account, in fact, though not as subtle as Thomas’s,
is certainly more subtle than some other recent attempts. Some theologians6 have tried to use Freud to show that moral evil is a necessary
part of human nature—a consequence of psychological development
where the violent drives of the id are only gradually brought under the
control of the superego.7 Such a view posits a metaphysical violence
rightly acknowledging that the Freudian view of desire is agonistic, as
was seen in chapter . As was pointed out there, Freudian desire is
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a restatement of Averroes’s understanding of desire: Thomas rejected
Averroan desire as metaphysically agonistic, denying as it does any ultimate relationship between desire and its object. Another variety of such
a metaphysical approach—one that is patently heretical—belongs to
theologians who have adopted evolutionary explanations of original
sin. In this view, concupiscence is a consequence of ‘‘the contradiction
between what human beings are and what they are called to become in
Christ’’ (emphasis added) and so original sin is only a ‘‘code word’’
for the ‘‘involuntary existential condition that is natural to humans as
disordered and incomplete.’’ And more:
Human evil, therefore, must be grasped as underdevelopment by
reference to a future goal and as statistical necessity in an evolving
universe. It is difficult to imagine a world created for development and the becoming of freedom where evil is not a structural
component.8
Such a view was declared anathema at Trent, for it denies that original
sin issued from a free act of a person9 —the only stance that saves us
from a determinism of evil—and that concupiscence is now an inclinatio to sin. In the limpid formula of Trent, concupiscence now ex
peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat (Denz. : see the  Catechism of
the Catholic Church, para. ). The suggested alternative would have
it that moral evil is a ‘‘statistical necessity’’ and ‘‘a structural component’’ of the metaphysical order. The violent view promoted here is
one found in the work of the Jesuit de Chardin,10 but other versions of
a metaphysics of violence as an explanation of the inevitability of
human sin can be found in Barth (‘‘the first man was immediately the
first sinner’’) and Tillich (‘‘man has left the ground [of divine being]
. . . to be actually what he essentially is’’).11 It is crucial to note that
Toletus never made the mistake of these twentieth-century writers. The
metaphysical conflict in human nature is not sin actualiter but only
materialiter. He is fully aware of Thomas’s distinctions in De Malo
and so, without giving a metaphysical explanation of moral evil, he
nevertheless does develop a metaphysical conception of violence.12 His
interpretation blunts the subtlety of Thomas—and, as was seen in
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chapter , so does even that of Suarez—but it falls well short of being
heretical, unlike the ‘‘theological’’ evolutionary theories of original sin.
Much can be learned about the approach favored by Toletus from
his answer to the question, An in Christo fuerit fomes peccati? There, he
writes: ‘‘Greater was the fortitude and temperance of Christ, which
totally cast out the inordinate appetite; than all of the Saints, for
though they conquered, they did not eradicate, that appetite.’’13 Implied in the operation of grace that strengthens the rule of reason in
such a way that it can conquer and eradicate is a violent confrontation
with, and a violent control of, a natural power. This leaves one uneasy;
for there appears to be a profound incongruity in the position that
grace cooperates with, and strengthens, a violent self-control. In fact,
Jacob Lainez, a Spanish Jesuit theologian at Trent, and the second
general of the Order after Ignatius’s death, not only directly confronts
this incongruity, but accepts it and even radicalizes it: Lainez replaces
Thomas’s dictum that grace perfects nature (ST I, q. , a. , ad ) with
his own, ‘‘Grace vanquishes nature’’ (gratia etiam naturam vincit).14
Yet, such a theory of grace, self-mastery, and nature becomes necessary
if one excludes, and Toletus appears to do so, Thomas’s oft-repeated
claim that sensuality is naturally suited to obey reason.15 If there is no
natural connection between reason and sensuality, it would seem to
follow that sensuality would obey reason only when it was compelled
to do so. Such a view seems to have been common in the seventeenth
century. One finds this view in Bérulle with his spirituality of the ‘‘vow
of servitude’’ and the annihilation of human nature,16 as well as in
Pascal’s ‘‘war’’ between reason and sensuality,17 a consequence of the
soul and the body being ‘‘two different kinds of opposing natures.’’18
Despite the similarities that I have drawn out between Thomas and St.
John of the Cross, there is, I think, something of a departure in the
way they conceive of the interaction between nature and grace. John
of the Cross speaks of contraries—‘‘those of the soul against those of
God that assail it’’—at war. He writes: ‘‘They war within the soul,
striving to expel one another in order to reign. That is: The virtues
and properties of God, extremely perfect, war against the habits and
properties of the soul, extremely imperfect . . .’’ (LFL I, ). Blondel
perhaps thinks likewise when he writes, ‘‘For no will is good unless it
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has come out of itself to leave room for a total invasion of God’s will.’’
And certainly, Blondel’s friend von Hugel agreed with St. John: ‘‘It
takes away all [Christianity’s] power . . . even for an instant to picture
the relations between nature and grace as peaceful accord.’’19
In contrast to Toletus’s description of Christ’s plenitude of grace
vanquishing and eradicating the disorderliness of sensuality, Aquinas
speaks only of Christ’s virtue as restraining the flesh (per ejus virtutem
totaliter caro comprimatur).20 The verb Thomas chooses here, comprimere, can mean to compel/crush/suppress, but it can also mean to control/hold back, and even to embrace or hug, including in a sexual sense.
Of these two possible meanings, Toletus assumes that Thomas intends
the former, but Thomas must intend the latter. For, elsewhere,
Thomas is clear that the perfection of moral virtue consists in the right
ordering of sensuality, not the eliminating of sensuality (perfecta virtus
moralis non totaliter tollitur passiones, sed ordinat eas [ST I, q. , a. ,
ad ; ST I–II, q. , a. ; a. , ad ]). Moreover, whereas Toletus stresses
the thoroughgoing domination of grace in Christ, Aquinas argues that
the entirety of Christ, in both His divine nature and all of the parts of
His human nature, willingly suffered crucifixion for the salvation of
humankind secundum ordinem naturae suae (ST III, q. , a. ). In
Thomas’s view, Christ consents to His crucifixion with His entire
human nature because Christ has cultivated this nature and perfected it
through grace. Thus, discussing Christ’s famous words at Gethsemane,
‘‘Allow this cup to pass me by, but not as I wish, but as you wish,’’
Thomas argues that this prayer (oratio) was a prayer of sensuality. This
prayer expressed in words and translated (exprimere) what was felt in
sensuality (indeed, exprimere can also mean to promote the growth of
something), and acted like an advocate for sensuality in light of the
coming crucifixion.21 The very words of the prayer show a willingness
on the part of Christ’s sensuality to follow the movement of His rational appetite in consenting to the crucifixion. The example itself shows
that, for Thomas, speech, oratory, and persuasion are a favored model
for the rule of reason over sensuality.
This rather different account of Thomas’s is based upon his view
(discussed in detail in chapter ) that sensuality is a frontier within
human nature that is simultaneously soul and body, matter and form.
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Rather than division and opposition,22 Aquinas articulates a gradation
within human nature that partakes of both constituent principles.23
Thus, he insists again and again that sensuality is naturally suited to
obey reason. On account of this metaphysical continuity, Thomas explains the relationship between reason and sensuality in terms of a
political community. Reason does not have an absolute authority over
the senses so that it can command the senses in any manner it wishes;24
rather, the obedience of sensuality is to be understood as a problem of
political persuasion and obedience (and oftentimes disobedience), and
not as a metaphysical problem.25 To put it succinctly, the command of
reason over sensuality is a political question in Thomas, not a military
question. Such an interpretation finds confirmation in Thomas’s conviction that natural law instructs and teaches (praecipio) and that law
induces (inducere) right action (ST I–II, q. , a. ; q. , a. ), as does
prudence (ST II–II, q. , a. ).
Thomas Hibbs has spoken quite appropriately of Thomas’s ‘‘rhetoric of actions.’’26 Aquinas stands in one of the Classical traditions of
how to manage the passions. I do not doubt that Thomas is an example
of a general historical shift in which ‘‘the care of the self,’’ as Foucault
puts it, becomes paramount (CS, –).27 Indeed, Foucault himself
seems to acknowledge that there is something inevitable about this:
‘‘Sexual ethics requires, still and always, that the individual conform to
a certain art of living which defines the aesthetic and ethical criteria of
existence’’ (CS, ). Foucault identifies this shift again and again with
a ‘‘severe’’ teaching about pleasure that arose in later Classical thinking
(but internal to non-Christian philosophy and medicine), a shift that
sets a precedent that will be intensified in a dramatic way in modernity
(CS, ). We have already seen that a reduction in violence, a putative
goal in Foucault, is rendered metaphysically impossible by his own
commitments (HS, –). In the Thomas-Wojtyla double-aspect theory of the body, ‘‘a certain severity’’ in ‘‘cultivation of the self ’’ (Foucault) is necessary, as John Paul II remarks on a number of occasions
(for example, TB, ). Of course, what is ‘‘severe’’ need not, and does
not in Thomas or Wojtyla, mean violence. Nor did it necessarily mean
so in the Classical world. Foucault himself is aware of this, for he notes
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that one of the strategies of self-control is persuasion, and typically
with support from a like-minded community (CS, –). Not all who
have sought to cultivate ‘‘the care of the self ’’ since the Classical world
have followed this model. Kant clearly develops the alternative Classical model, the autocratic model of Seneca whose ‘‘ethics of control’’
rest upon a ‘‘juridical model of possession’’ in which ‘‘one is sui juris;
one exercises over oneself an authority that nothing limits or threatens;
one holds the potestas sui’’ (CS, ). Foucault points out that this model
of control, which assumed violence between parts of the soul, was near
pervasive, supported in part by medicine as a violent regimen of control
(CS, ). Foucault comments: ‘‘But in this game of violence, excess,
rebellion, and combat, the accent is placed more and more readily on
the weakness of the individual, on his frailty, on his need to flee, to
escape, to protect and shelter himself ’’ (CS, ).
It is quite fitting, I think, to speak of Toletus as part of the Jesuit
tradition on sensuality in that one finds Toletus’s theory repeated in
the twentieth century by Karl Rahner28 and Gaston Fessard. The distant origin of the Jesuit theory of sensuality is perhaps Giles of Rome,
who rejected Thomas’s theory and replaced it by a military model.
Having been both Aquinas’s student at Paris and then a holder of
the Augustinian chair of theology at the University of Paris,29 Giles is
identified by Gilson as the source of the early Thomist School.30 At
any rate, he is a prominent source for the theories contained in the
Jesuit Coimbra commentaries. Giles of Rome studiously avoided the
Aristotelian-Thomistic political model in his theory of sensuality.31
Whereas Thomas conceives of the internal relationship between the
parts of the soul as a rule evoking cooperation between free persons
(albeit with different degrees of freedom), with a fundamental assumption of continuity and peace, Giles conceives the same relationship as
one of division and violence: indeed, at times, his model of the relationship within the soul is frankly militaristic. For Giles, sensuality as
such is contrary to reason (secundum se contrariatur rationi) and unless
the bridle of reason dominates or conquers (dominari et vincere)32 the
movements of sensuality, the sense appetites will not obey reason.33
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Defending his theory, Giles addresses the objection that sensuality does
naturally move according to impetus. Why reason must use violent
means to control the movements of sensuality becomes clear in the
following passage:
To the fifth it must be said that all people are born with the
nature of the sons of anger but this is not according to justified
nature, but corrupted nature. That we have the nature of the sons
of anger ought to be said to be against nature rather than according to nature, or this is not according to the nature of form,
which is principally said to be nature, but according to the nature
of matter, which is not nature unless through an analogy with
form.34
Humans have the nature of the sons of anger, not as a consequence of
the Fall, as might be thought, but due to our nature as composite
substances, partially made up of matter: there is a violence inherent to
sensuality insofar as it has part of its character from its matter.35 Thus,
because of an antagonism within human nature, reason even in the
state of innocence had to exercise coercive rule over sensuality. The
need for violence on the part of reason is necessitated by the violence
internal to the movements of sensuality: at the heart of the material
composite that is human nature, there is a fight,36 which because it is
natural37 baptism cannot remove.38 Fascinatingly, however—and this
to preserve the sense of peace, serenity and lack of want characteristic
of the state of innocence—this fight was not felt on account of the
divine gift of original justice.39 As the first humans did not feel the war
internal to their nature, reason, because of the victory it had over the
lower powers (ratio in statu innocentiae propter victoriam quam habedat
super vires inferiores),40 was able to remain steadfast in rectitude, although unable to advance in merit (productus est homo in sua institutione cum originali iustitia, qua habita non sentiret pugnam, per quam non
sentiendo posset stare, sed non proficere).41 Adam, Giles says, was defended from experiencing the conflict within his nature by the supernatural gift of original justice (defendebatur Adam per donum
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supernaturale);42 and so well defended that original justice completely
destroyed the rebellion of sensuality and subjected it to the rule of
reason (quia illa iustitia omnino tollebat rebellionem sensualitatis et omnino subijciebat sensualitatem rationi).43 In contrast, of course, Adam is
cast by Giles as a soldier who allowed the castle of his king to fall, thus
depriving his people of the protection of the castle.44
Of course, Giles’s un-Thomistic theory of the flesh is quite common
to thinkers of the Counter-Reformation beyond the Jesuits. One of the
most significant thinkers of the period, and another Spanish philosopher, Francisco de Vitoria, a Dominican, argues in one of his commentaries on Aquinas that sensuality from its very nature (ex specie et natura
sua) is a power that draws and tends towards evil (trahere et tendere ad
malum);45 and not surprisingly, he also thinks that the parts of the
human need to be held together through the exercise of coercive
power.46 Such a theory of sensuality can readily be found outside Catholic circles: one finds it in Plato, Hobbes, Kant, and, as will shortly be
seen, Haraway. ‘‘Flesh is the extravagance within us set up by eroticism
against the law of decency. Flesh is the born enemy of people haunted
by Christian taboos’’ (Bataille).47 While it is clear by now that Thomas
does not share such a Christian horror of flesh or the erotic, flesh has
been identified as problematic ever since Plato. In the Phaedrus, Plato
famously discusses sensuality through the analogy of the chariot. He
speaks of ‘‘wanton’’ desire as a horse that is ‘‘deaf to reason’’ and which
obeys the commands of reason only once its mouth is made bloody
through the chaffing of the bridle, the instrument of the charioteer’s
authority.48 Descartes tells us that the soul commands the movements
of the animal spirits in the body once armed with its ‘‘proper weapons,’’ clear and distinct judgments. With weapons to hand, the soul
can so completely control the movements of the animal spirits as to
arrive at an ‘‘absolutely mastery’’ of the movements of the body.49 In a
similar vein, Kant talks of the ‘‘sovereign authority’’ of reason which
must ‘‘force,’’ ‘‘compel,’’ and ‘‘stamp out’’ the ‘‘rabble’’ and ‘‘mob’’ of
sensibility.50 Philosophers have typically agreed, then, that sensuality,
those movements of the body that might oppose the authority of reason, needs to be governed by violent coercive means. In all these cases,
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violence is necessary because the human is cast as a composite of disparate natures. This is the metaphysical origin of Giles’s own theory,
and his analysis is found in vivid fashion among modern thinkers,
and especially early modern Catholic thinkers. The inevitability of this
conclusion is nowhere more dramatic than in the works of Early Modern philosopher-priests, Frs. Pierre Gassendi51 and Nicholas Malebranche.
As an atomist, Gassendi intensified the internal composition of the
human and animal body. Gassendi’s popularizer in England, Walter
Charleton, at one time the physician to King Charles I of England,
provides a nice example: the smallest of animals, the handworm, he
tells us, contains many thousands of atoms in one of its toes.52 With
this image in mind, consider what an atom is for Gassendi: in his
Syntagma Philosophicum of , each atom is a res, a simple substance,
and as a substance each atom is a power of resistance (vis resistendi).53
The metaphysical character of atoms explains why flesh differs from
blood—Gassendi’s example54 —and for this reason, material composites are aggregata.55 Confronted with such an intensity of composition,
and given his conception of an atom as a center of resistance, Gassendi
militarizes the material composite in order to explain its unity. He tells
us that the most noble and actualized atom is like an emperor who
arranges his troops into squadrons, unified and cohering, presumably
through military discipline.56 There is a calculus here, one not lost on
Giles of Rome: as the intensity of composition increases, so does the
metaphysical violence necessary for an explanation as to why composites cohere at all.
Malebranche assumes from the outset that the soul and body are
two entirely different kinds of substances. The body is a machine and
the soul is thought (TE, ). With this starting point, recognized by
Malebranche to be anti-Thomistic (TE, ), one rapidly moves away
from the Thomasitic understanding of ‘‘a bodily giving of self ’’ (Gallagher). In Thomas, the virtue of prudence perfects the inferior reason
whose role is the management of the body in accordance with eternal
law. In his  Treatise on Ethics, Malebranche rejects any such idea
completely. ‘‘God made the mind only for Himself. He did not make
it to occupy itself with sensible objects, or to conserve and guide by
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reason the body it informs.’’57 The brain is ‘‘wounded’’ (TE, )
through ‘‘the force of the blow’’ of the sensible object and those who
would live their lives for God can expect to fight ‘‘an infinite number
of battles’’ (TE, ). The choice is stark. The mind ‘‘can only derive
perfection from its immediate and direct union with God. On the
other hand, its union with the body fills it with shadows and throws it
into disorder because at present that union cannot be augmented without diminishing the other union which is opposed to it’’ (TE, ).
Bizarrely, the Incarnation occurred, according to Malebranche, so
Christ could ‘‘draw us away from’’ the body (TE, ) so that ‘‘man
may no longer hear the body, that he may go back into himself, contemplate the true ideas of things, and silence the senses, imagination
and passions’’ (TE, ).
The battleground is the imagination, and a ‘‘governed imagination’’
is able to prevent the passions from having ‘‘broken or penetrated any
fiber of the brain’s principal part’’ (TE, ). The ‘‘glitter and charms’’
of the passions ‘‘uniquely depend on the way they are made to appear
by the fermentation of the humors and the blood’’ (TE, ). For this
reason, we are ‘‘constantly obeying the shameful law of the flesh and
of blood’’ (TE, ) and thus the imagination is ‘‘polluted’’ by a brain
‘‘whose fibers have been either bent or broken by the violence of the
spirits they set into motion’’ (TE, ). How is this defense of the
imagination to be accomplished? There are numerous strategies, but
one includes cultivating the mind’s ‘‘revulsion’’ for sensible objects.
Nor is such revulsion now necessary on account of sin. Adam employed this technique of revulsion for sensible objects before the Fall
(TE, ). Of course, some such technique would have been necessary,
for the problem of the relationship between these two alien substances
of mind and body, as conceived by Malebranche, is metaphysical.
An alternative technique to govern the imagination is mortification.
With the mortification of the sense, one ‘‘attacks the union of mind
and body at its principle’’ (TE, ). God’s grace cannot deliver us
from the wounds inflicted upon our brain on account of our fraternization with sensible objects ‘‘unless by strength of combat and resisting
we should naturally make the spirits take another route so that our
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wounds would be healed and closed’’ (TE, ; emphasis added). The
point of ‘‘defending ourselves against passion’s forces’’ is
The wounds which the brain has received by the action of objects
upon it and by the movement of the spirits, are not easily healed.
Since the animal spirits naturally pass through the most open or
exposed places in the brain along their route, it is impossible that
the imagination’s wounds could be healed unless we constantly
detour from their route the spirits which renew those wounds. It
is impossible to close a wound if we keep breaking it open with
the dagger which made it, or with something else which renews
and aggravates it.
(TE, )
Instead of the love that wounds the lover and participation in the Cross
of the natural law, Malebranche speaks of ‘‘those who are crucified
with Jesus Christ, and in whose eyes the world is crucified, in a word,
those who are pure in heart, whose imagination is not polluted, are in
a condition to contemplate truth’’ (TE, ). If one is aghast at a
Catholic philosopher-priest advocating such views, one might take it
as a perfect example of what happens to Catholic thinking when it
abandons Aquinas and conforms itself to the world.
Though the language might change, I want to show now that Toletus’s analysis finds favor, however unlikely and however unknown to
the author, in the Socialist, cybernetic feminism of Donna Haraway.
‘‘Cyborg feminism’’ is an attempt to move beyond the typical dualisms
that have reputedly structured Western thought. Cyborgs are boundary
phenomena, we are told, in that they ‘‘populate worlds ambiguously
natural and crafted’’ (CM, )58 and in this, as has been seen, they
live at the same boundary as a rationally lived sensuality. When Haraway speaks of the cyborg reworking nature and culture to such a degree
that, ‘‘the one can no longer be the resource for appropriation or incorporation by the other’’ (CM, ), it is clear that she could be describing
a Thomistic sensuality. For does not Thomas favor, as she puts it, ‘‘an
intimate experience of boundaries’’ (CM, )? Actually, there could be
no better definition for Thomistic sensuality than Haraway’s manifesto
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for the cyborg: ‘‘an argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction’’ (CM, ). Indeed,
the similarity in language and conception is uncanny: the cyborg can
be a platform for a politics of nature and culture, ‘‘on the basis of
conscious coalition, of affinity, of political kinship’’ (CM, ).
Thus it is that Haraway is interested in the very classical theme of
self-regulation (BPB, ).59 However, she is very Jesuit in thinking
that bodies are recrafted and regulated by coercion. She reframes the
rule of rationality over sensuality in terms of an ‘‘informatics of domination’’ (CM, ; ): ‘‘Communications technologies and biotechnologies are the crucial tools recrafting our bodies. These tools embody
and enforce new social relations . . . [they are] instruments for enforcing meanings’’ (CM, ; ). Both cyborg and Jesuit sensuality reject
dualism, for each is simultaneously nature and culture, reason and sensuality, self and other, but they do so only in that each is locked the
one with the other in a ‘‘border war’’ (CM, ). The background to
‘‘cyborg feminism’’is a world riven by violence, where the need ‘‘to
resist world-wide intensification of domination has never been more
acute’’ (CM, ). Indeed, the cyborg itself is, at its origin, a military
invention (CM, –;  ; BPB, ). Nevertheless, Haraway thinks
it can be reclaimed from its origin and become an emblem of liberation
for life rather than death,60 although never so claimed as to become
innocent (CM, ).
If we were to replace Toletus’s language of the movements of sensuality against reason with cyborg movements against a freedom for life,
we might say that the cyborg stands in need of sanctification, in Haraway’s eyes. She states that, ‘‘the cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our
politics’’ (CM, ). Indeed, the promise of the cyborg is that it ‘‘might
lead to subversion of its teleology as star wars’’ (CM, ). This subversive possibility (CM, ) and its promotion of ‘‘the utopian dream’’
(CM, ) cannot happen if the cyborg in its very ontology is structured by violence. Unfortunately, for cyborg sanctification to be possible, it must be the case that the cyborg, to use scholastic language, is
not structured by military violence actualiter but only habitualiter: just
as Mary’s flesh would have been unable to receive Christ—for Christ
would have been driven onto sin, necessarily—if sensuality as such had
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movements toward sin and was actualiter in conflict with the movements of reason. It is precisely here, however, that Haraway herself
identifies a certain problem. Oscillating between Thomistic sensuality
and Jesuit sensuality, she says that the cyborg, ‘‘is oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence’’ (CM, ). It might at first
be thought that the strange logic of the utopian and oppositional is
just one more undercutting of Western dualism but, in fact, Haraway
expresses herself as interested in seeing a diminishment of domination
in the world (I, –) and, at times, as interested in a utopia.61 Like St.
Augustine, she too sees her own City of God as a stranger to the violence of the city of man, for she goes on to comment: ‘‘The main
trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state
socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to
their origins’’ (CM, ). What resources then are contained in the
cyborg for this surpassing of its own origin in the ‘‘orgy of war’’ (CM,
) ?
Haraway, as an advocate of a socialist-feminism, is fond of the dialectic of Marxist humanism (PPD, –) and perhaps it is to this dialectic that she looks for the cyborg’s sanctification. With Gaston
Fessard, however, we meet a Jesuit theorist who elucidates what is so
problematic in Haraway’s account. Gaston Fessard (–) was
regarded by Kojève as the most brilliant Hegel student to attend his
(now mythic) – lectures. At his death in , he was regarded
as France’s foremost scholar of Hegel and Marx.62 In his  article,
Par-delà le fascisme et le communisme,63 Fessard posed a question to
Marx and Hegel: Through what means can the violence of the masterslave dialectic give birth to the peace of a society without violent divisions (FC )? Haraway herself notes that ‘‘dialectic must not be made
into a dynamic of growing domination’’ (PPD, ), yet, can violence
be avoided in any politics that is both ‘‘potent’’ in ‘‘resistance’’ (CM,
) and centered on a structure of sensuality that has no claim to
innocence because rooted in an ‘‘orgy of war’’? If ‘‘mind, body, and
tool are on very intimate terms’’ (CM, ), then how exactly does
this sensuality escape violence if the ‘‘interruption’’ of the enforcing
communication and biotechnologies (CM, ) can make no claim to

................. 11244$

$CH6

03-18-05 08:28:10

PS

PAGE 108

The P olitics of t he Flesh Revisited 

innocence? Has Haraway come any distance at all from the violent
Jesuit control of sensuality when she writes: ‘‘Cyborg writing is about
the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on
the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as
other’’ (CM, ) ? And lest there be any doubt, what Haraway means
here is gaining ‘‘mastery of the conqueror’s language’’ and then ‘‘violating’’ this language (CM, –). It is a question then of ‘‘violent moral
action’’ (CM, ) . Indeed, Haraway adds, unlike Christianity, whose
narrative begins with original innocence and ends with a return to a
new innocent wholeness, war is a permanent condition of ‘‘Cyborg
feminism’’ (CM, ). Haraway’s ‘‘Cyborg feminism’’ appears to suffer
the same sort of internal contradiction that Fessard identified in Marxism and Fascism when he noted that those mystiques, ‘‘wish to conquer
the world by an irreconcilable conflict’’ (voudront conquérir le monde,
à une lutte irréconciliable [FC ]). His point is surely well taken: there
is something odd in the idea that a violent overturning of the violence
of the master-slave dialectic can diminish the violence in the world, or,
as is sometimes hoped for by Haraway, lead to the peace of a society
without violence at all.
Of course, Fessard’s point here is as telling against Toletus as it is
against Haraway, for little progress would appear to have been made if
the violence of sensuality is replaced by the violence of grace. Fessard
clearly wishes to be more Thomistic than Toletus and Lainez, and
thinks his way behind the Jesuit (Aegidian?) interpretation of sensuality
by using Blondel. There is an undoubted difference between Aquinas
and Fessard in that the transformation of sensuality is not initially
dependent upon grace, since a part of a human person does escape
violence, which is absent in Fessard. In true Blondelian fashion, Fessard sees the difficulty in using violence to diminish violence as compelling even the unbeliever to accept the role of the supernatural. If
there is to be reconciliation within the human, and given that humans
and their relationships are marked by violence, an otherworldly agent
of change who is not similarly marked by violence must intervene. If
peace is the goal of our politics, then grace will have to be acknowledged as the only reconciler. At the same time, and turning to his own
Jesuit tradition, if grace is not to suppress human nature, there must
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be the possibility of continuity between nature and grace.64 Granted
that human relationships are marked by the master-slave dialectic, Fessard nevertheless argues that this structure of domination and servitude
can be converted from violence to sacrifice by natural structures of
ecstasy.
Evoking Thomas’s dictum that grace perfects nature, Fessard argues
that grace conserves and fulfils human reason (conservait, bien plus accomplissait la raison humaine [FC ]) and that—and here he parts
company with Toletus—the human is ‘‘the animal who tends towards
reason’’ (FC ). And yet, with these claims we see the peculiar problem that faces Fessard. In his conception the rational and irrational
stand in opposition to one another, and so now the question of nature
and grace must be recast: how can grace cooperate with a sensuality
rooted in ‘‘irrational forces’’? Fessard assumes that the human is a community of appetites needing satisfaction—a very Thomistic point.
And, in a manner somewhat like Thomas, he posits the task of the
person (and political order) as the attempt to find a unity that will
pacify the struggles, interior and exterior, that beset the human (d’une
unité qui apaise nos querelles intérieures et extérieures [FC  & ]).
However, he also claims that one of the struggles interior to the human
is a structural one: the community of appetites is divided into the
rational and the irrational (les forces irrationalles de l’homme [FC  &
]); a very Jesuit point. And lest there be doubt as to the violence
interior to the human in the ‘‘irrational forces’’ of human sensuality,
Fessard notes that Hegel is quite correct (Hegel voyait juste, car il est
vrai) that human desire is restrained (réfréner ses désirs) only through
fear of death at the hands of the master (FC ). Fessard clearly states
that the violence of murder and slavery marks all human relationships,
at least at their inception (un rapport de l’homme à l’homme, qui, au
début, est toujours lutte à mort et esclavage [FC ]). Moreover, he describes this conflict as a manifestation of a radical inhumanity present
at the core of each human (lutte où se manifeste la radicale inhumanité
présente au plus intime de chaque être humain[FC ]). Thus, given the
opposition between the rational and the irrational, it becomes unclear
how grace might overcome the limitations of nature, but in a fashion
whereby nature is cultivated and integrated into the life of grace.
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Fessard contrasts the force attached to the particularity of sensuality
with the universality of reason, which overcomes division and struggle.65 Examples of such force are the appetites for family and for nation
(FC ), as it is the very particularity of these phenomena that makes
them potentially transgressive. However, the particularity of the family
has its origin in a dynamism which has a propensity toward a more
universal good.66 Thus, interior and anterior to the structure of the
family is the dialectic of Man and Woman: to the degree their bodies
become spousal, their violence is reduced (l’appétit de jouissance que
l’homme peut réfréner, non abolir [FC ]).67 Spousal flesh diminishes
the phenomenon of possession (and so property) within the sexual act
and the resulting child calls upon the parents to relate to the child as
mother and father and less as masters.68 That is, the child appeals to
the parents to restrain their violent appetites focused on their own
particularity and appeals to them to open themselves toward greater
universality and reason; in so doing, of course, the relationship between
man and woman is itself reconstituted at a further distance from violence.69 Thus, notes Fessard, the ‘‘irrational forces,’’ while certainly
given to domination, also include the possibility of sacrifice. It is this
sacrifice that makes these appetites tend toward the universality of reason and therewith gives grace a foothold in the irrational forces.
Non-parents need not despair, however. This possibility of sacrifice
is itself at a deeper level made possible by the Eucharist:70 for Fessard,
the Eucharist (and any sacrament generally) is an exhortation ‘‘no less
amorous than imperious’’ (non moins amoureux qu’impérieux )71 to sensuality in which an appeal is made to the person to sacrifice particularity, and therewith to surpass the violence of sensuality.72 As has been
seen, human nature does not stand in total opposition to the life of
grace. Nevertheless, Fessard makes clear in his astonishing threevolume commentary on Saint Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises that even an
ecstatic human nature is not intimately linked to grace. In a few rich
sentences of his The Dialectic of the Spiritual Exercises, Fessard describes
the passage of the human from a body of sin to a body of grace through
the Eucharistic body. The Eucharistic body transforms a person by
promoting a transubstantiation of the human. Describing this eucharistic conversion, Fessard writes:
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Before this conversion, grace, the principle of subjective freedom,
was only an accident, fallen from the sky, into a Me whose entire
substance, whose act, was first directed towards Non-being.
After, it is the inverse: in the new man, body and soul are the
creation of grace and it is the objective existence of sin that becomes an accident. The appeal to freedom goes from the outside
in; the response from the inside out.73
In arguing that it is through the eucharistic body that the human
becomes a body of grace, animated from the inside by grace, though
not before this conversion, Fessard clearly wants to avoid the ontotheological error (suffered by Rahner’s supernatural existential theory
of nature and grace) and therewith to preserve the sacraments from any
hint of a diminishment in their efficacy. At the same time, Fessard
avoids any Pelagian temptation, without yet becoming as dark as Calvin: the spousal body at the foundation of the family is already an
ecstatic movement toward the body of grace, though the ecstasy diminishing violence in human relationships can only be sustained by, and
must always be further intensified through, grace.
Fessard comes close to, but yet remains distant from, John Paul II’s
conception of conjugal love. In the dialectic of Man-Woman in which
a conjugal bond is created, ‘‘one says to the body of the other ‘this is
my body’ ’’ (disant du corps de l’autre: ‘‘Ceci est mon corps’’), but within
the natural order this remains a lutte amoureuse (SSD, ). It is only
once the eucharistic sacrifice becomes interior to this conjugal bond,
once the bond participates in the spousal relationship between the
Church and Christ, that struggle gives way to reconciliation. This participation in the sacramentum magnum puts the body as cross at the
centre of marriage. The sacrament ‘‘penetrates into that which men
and women are’’ (TB, ) and intensifies the original dignity, ‘‘the
sacrum of the person,’’ of man and woman. John Paul II points out that
‘‘sacramentum originally meant the military oath taken by the Roman
legionaries.’’ The aspects of ‘‘initiation to a new form of life,’’ ‘‘commitment without reserve,’’ ‘‘faithful service even at the risk of death
can be distinguished in it’’ (TB, , n. ). The conjugal bond transformed into sacramental marriage, a marriage rooted in the ‘‘wounds
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of love,’’ is no longer a lutte amoureuse, and certainly not the mort
violente of the Master-Slave dialectic, but a Mort volontaire (SSD, ):
that is, a reciprocal sacrifice of man and God issuing in reconciliation,
a life renewed (Vie rénovée) and, above all, in a life become supernatural
(en tout cas sur-naturelle). Put differently, in the natural order, the conjugal bond can go so far as to say to the body of the other Ceci est mon
corps but not yet Hoc est corpus meum (SSD, ). In Thomas, the
Eucharist, the corpus verum, acts, in part—as do all the sacraments—as
a memorial of the fullest expression of the body. The sacraments are a
counsel both to reason and sensuality (ScG III, c. , para. ) to realize
the ecstatic life of Christ. The sacraments are dedicated to the incorporation of the faithful into Christ (ScG IV, c. , para. ). One recalls
here the practice among Mother Theresa’s nuns of frequent adoration
of the Blessed Sacrament as a counsel to perfect their lives in service,
to pour out their lives and their bodies in care of the poor, sick, and
dying. Given what we have already seen of Malebranche, it is not surprising to learn that ‘‘the Sacraments should leave the body as they
found it, and fortify only the inner man’’ (TE, ). By contrast in
Thomas, the Eucharist being the very substance of Christ (and not
merely the power of Christ as in the sacrament of baptism) delivers up
for us the sacrament of Christ’s body (nobis traditur sacramentum corporis ejus). John Paul II points out that the original meaning of sacramentum included the blood spilled in military sacrifice and Thomas leaves
us in no doubt that the Eucharist is in continuity with the idea of
service usque ad sanguinem: Christ’s passion per quam ejus sanguis a
carne separatus est (ScG IV, c. , para. ). This liquefaction is the root
of Christ’s presence in the Church, a model for the sacrament of marriage (ScG IV, c. , para. ), and is at the core of John Paul II’s
understanding of sexual ethics.
Against Toletus and Haraway, for whom the relationship between
the natural and the crafted is always structured by violence, Fessard,
reverting both to Thomas’s theory of grace and his theory of the natural structures of ecstasy within human appetite, describes this same
relationship in terms of persuasion and exhortation: in particular, it is
the life of the Church, her doctrine, sacraments and liturgy, which
persuade, albeit in a fashion ‘‘no less amorous than imperious.’’ As
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shall now be seen, Humanae Vitae claims the Thomistic heritage far
more completely than Fessard, and certainly far more than the Jesuit
tradition. As has already been demonstrated, the Thomistic tradition,
without being naı̈ve about the body and its pronitas for transgression,
nevertheless affirms an ecstatic metaphysics in which the ever-present
potential violence of the body is always already moderated by the
body’s movement toward diffusion, its lesions offered in service of the
other. I shall now show that traditional Catholic sexual ethics, most
prominently defended by Popes Paul VI and John Paul II, is a direct
heir of this tradition and, as such, goes further than the Jesuit and
liberal traditions in escaping violence. We shall follow Aquinas and
applications of his theory of the body to issues in sexual politics
through three levels, the personal, social, and political. The following
chapter will defend Humanae Vitae and its critique of artifical birth
control as just another chapter in the history of the violence against
the flesh.
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IS CONTRACEPTION
A HU MA N RIG HT?
He who abides in me, and I in him, he it is that bears much fruit.
—Jn. : 
Christ . . . fully reveals man to man himself . . . As an innocent lamb He
merited for us life by the free shedding of His own blood. In Him God
reconciled us to Himself and among ourselves.
—Gaudium et Spes, para. 

According to Martha Nussbaum, any religious leader who uses religious speech in public to criticize contraception, ‘‘should be strongly
criticized as a subverter of the constitution.’’1 I am no religious leader,
and given the kind of world Martha Nussbaum is trying to create, it is
just as well.2 I want to argue against another claim she has made: ‘‘It
seems plausible that unimpeded access to contraception is a basic
human right of women.’’3 I could not find Nussbaum’s argument to
support this claim but it is probably an argument from equality. She
states that, in America at least, abortion is necessary for the sake of
women’s equality. No further argument than this is given for abortion,
and I imagine we are asked to accept the same regarding contraception.
Quite apart from reservations I will express later about a politics of
human rights, as well as arguments from equality, I take exception to
Nussbaum’s claim because a human right that would itself be a principle of violence can be no human right. The arguments that show why
contraception is violence are also arguments that defend Humanae
Vitae. Thus () Humanae Vitae’s analysis of artificial birth control as
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just another chapter in the history of violence against the flesh is defended. And () the argument of Humanae Vitae—that sex must be
ordered to procreation—is made afresh. Specifically, I defend the encyclical by arguing that marriage is an institution4 of the ecstatic body
(MD, para. ), and that domination cannot be escaped unless the sex
inside marriage is characterized by the love that wounds the lover;5 that
is, the ecstatic flesh of procreation that is a welcoming of the (unborn)
stranger.
This then is the first of three chapters in which I apply Thomas’s
theory of the ecstatic body to sexuality. In this chapter I will show that
ecstatic flesh is the foundation for the norms governing sex acts (see
TB, ). In the final two chapters, Thomas’s theory of the body is
used to address a variety of issues in sexual politics. Each chapter assumes that underlying human sexuality is a Christoform natural law
which orders persons to an ecstatic generosity that moderates domination and promotes life. This ordo exstasis includes a relationship to self
as well as a relationship to one’s spouse, children, friends, the social
and political orders, and God. The basic argument throughout the
applications discussed is that failure to live the ordo exstasis leaves unaffected the violence toward self and others. The applications help justify, I hope, the Church’s critique of the culture of death, which John
Paul II casts as the disregard of the moral obligation to welcome the
stranger. Parts of this critique, to many, are stupendous: what goes on
in the bedroom, as it were, has profound ramifications for what goes
on in culture at large, and, of course, the converse holds true. I will
demonstrate that a culture’s ability to welcome the stranger, an obligation that belongs to the ius gentium, is linked to the moral character of
sex acts. It is argued that the ecstatic flesh of procreation as a deposing
of the body’s inclinatio ad peccatum has the character of hospitality.
Sexual acts with this character shape marriage and the family as a
Christoform politics6 running counter to the city of man’s lust for
domination.7 The specific theses defended in each of these chapters are
united in the thesis that Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae re-asserts classical
Catholic political theory. This theory is originally Augustine’s, but it
had a long history subsequently, and certainly up until More and Vitoria. The encyclical is thoroughly political as well as theological, seeking
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a way to moderate domination found in sex (TB, ). The Catholic
tradition of a politics that seeks to moderate power is antitotalitarian.
As an expression of this tradition, Humanae Vitae’s significance has not
been fully appreciated even within the recent tradition of Catholic social
teaching. The broader implications of Humanae Vitae for sexual politics, its critique of a right to gay marriage, for instance, actually stands
at cross-purposes with the trend within Catholic social thought toward
a political philosophy of rights. The antitotalitarian character of classical Catholic political philosophy is safeguarded by a politics of privilege
and a privilege originaliter attaches, argues Humanae Vitae, to sex acts
ordered to procreation. Upon this foundation, a larger politics of privilege can be built: such is the argument of the next three chapters.
At the end of the last chapter, Gaston Fessard’s ultimate failure to
affirm that natural structures of ecstasy are imitative of divine ecstasy
was discussed. Michel Sales has hinted at Fessard’s opposition to the
 papal encyclical Humanae Vitae.8 Certainly, the encyclical rests
on the continuity between natural structures of ecstasy and divine ecstasy. A Fessard text from  seems to agree with the encyclical’s
teaching, however. Inside the sacramentum magnum, says Fessard, the
conjugal bond (l’alliance conjugale) ‘‘rediscovers itself in the crossing of
parental love and conjugal love, which is the foundation of the movement, the movement between the rational and the supernatural . . .’’9
Fessard would appear to accept here that the norms of Catholic sexual
ethics begin in the recognition that divine and human love are not
isolated, but more, linked through the Cross. And just as Dante begins
the Divine Comedy with a very human love suffused by divine love
(Beatrice sent to Dante by Mary), so John Paul II speaks of the ethical
love of one person for another, or God, as erotic (TB, –; LR, ;
). Each one of these various formulations is congruent with doctrinal definition. Centuries ago, Pius V condemned Baius for proposing that if there is any carnal concupiscence in love (aliquid
concupiscentiae carnalis in deligente est), then one fails to live according
to the precept to love your God with your whole heart and soul (Denz.
). Against Baius (LR, ), a Christian theory of sexuality can
affirm as one starting point that ‘‘the human body is an authentic part
of the truth about man, just as its sensual and sexual aspects are an
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authentic part of the truth about human love’’ (LR, ). Going far
beyond an affirmation of the body and sensuality (TB, ), however,
John Paul II has argued that an ecstatically lived sexuality is a moment
when the human becomes ‘‘God by participation’’ (St. John of the
Cross) (TB, ). As one commentator has recently put it, according
to John Paul II, ‘‘the self-giving of sexual communion is an icon of the
interior life of God.’’10 This conception is clearly deeply congruent
with the Thomistic theory of the ecstatic body developed in previous
chapters; it can be taken as yet one more starting point for a Christian
theory of sex. Besides these two starting points, I would add a third,
one implicit in Humanae Vitae, I think. This third contrasts rather
with the other two principles although it might be expected from
everything learned so far about Thomas’s theory of the body as double
in aspect. Alongside the simple affirmation of the body and the far
more profound affirmation of the ecstatic body as participating in the
life of God, I would add the principle that sex is violent. In explaining
this, I demonstrate why Humanae Vitae is a profound explanation of
human sexuality: applying the theory of the natural law as the Cross
(developed in my chapters  and ), I argue that only a Christoformly
opened flesh diminishes the violence of sex; and only sexual acts ordered to procreation are Christoform, as only they depose the flesh.11
As is probably obvious from these opening remarks, I shall be making extensive use of Wojtyla’s work on sexuality throughout this chapter. This is quite appropriate. I have shown throughout this book that
Wojtyla is a Thomist and I want to provide a Thomistic theory of sex.
I also want to defend Humanae Vitae. Both before and after Humanae
Vitae, Wojtyla published works on human sexuality, and, of course, we
now know that Wojtyla was a significant influence upon Paul VI’s
thinking on sexuality.12 He remains, moreover, one of a few philosophers in the history of Western thought who has devoted a lot of time
to thinking about sex. With all that said, I would still not claim that
the theory of sexuality I advance here as a defense of Humanae Vitae is
a straightforward interpretation of Wojtyla’s thought. I know of no
passage where he explicitly speaks of sex as violence, just as I know of
no place where he explicitly adopts Thomas’s idea of love as the love
that wounds the lover. I am fairly sure, however, that both are implicit
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in his thinking and in the traditional Catholic teaching on the norms
of sexuality. Let me put matters this way: I will defend Humanae Vitae
and the traditional Catholic teaching on marriage through a Thomistic
theory of sex with the aid of Wojtyla’s thinking about sexuality.
The widest context in which to place the Catholic teaching on sexual ethics is provided by Wojtyla in the following statement:
The task of ethics is to justify norms, which are themselves something—one could say—for they are connected with really existing
people and societies. The source of norms is found in natural
law, which is not a written law. The believer finds the source of
ethical norms in revelation, which to a significant degree confirms natural law. Revelation, moreover, is a written source.
(PC, ).
Written in , when Wojtyla was a university professor of ethics, this
statement makes clear that a central part of moral philosophy is to
provide the justificatory reasoning for moral positions or authorities.
John Paul II’s Theology of the Body is such a justification of Paul VI’s
encyclical Humanae Vitae. His Theology of the Body,13 as befits the chosen name of this pope, is largely structured through an exegesis of the
Gospel of John and the Letters of Paul. It differs from his  treatment of sexuality in Love and Responsibility in that the biblical frame is
not solely Christian scripture (LR, ) but begins with a lengthy and
crucial discussion of the opening verses of Genesis. While Christian
scripture informs his Thomistic personalism of , the Theology of
the Body is offered quite explicitly as biblical exegesis linking Hebrew
and Christian biblical texts. Of course, the same Thomistic, personalist, and natural law emphases are found throughout his later work, but
the setting is noticeably different. In using his texts to help build the
justificatory reasoning for Humanae Vitae, I share Wojtyla’s insistence
that the Scriptural warrant does not relativize Catholic teaching (LR,
; TB, ). Emerging from scripture are teachings connected with
universal physical features, the human body as man and woman, for
example, and confirmations of the teachings of scripture are found in
Thomistic metaphysics, phenomenological description, and natural
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law reasoning (FR, para. –). Thus ‘‘unbelievers’’ can recognize the
Gospel as ‘‘the affirmation of the highest good’’ (LR, ).14 After all, the
common wisdom of scripture, the encyclical, and Ecstatic Thomism, is
found in Plato as well: eros needs norms.15
With the justificatory reasoning in place, the norms of Catholic
sexual morality will rest upon ‘‘a basis as definitive as possible, relying
on the most elementary and incontrovertible moral truths’’ (LR, ).
It is the hope then of this chapter to demonstrate the universal quality
of these norms, their ‘‘human and Christian vision’’ (HV, ), and for
this reason why contraception cannot be a human right. Through the
preceding chapters, I showed how elaborate and powerful Thomas’s
theory of the body is, as well as how Thomistic is Wojtyla’s own theory
of the body. From the fact that these arguments are sometimes shared
by thinkers like Levinas, Barthes, and Nancy, and from the fact that
these arguments avoid the ‘‘ontology of violence’’ of so many other
thinkers, like Merleau-Ponty and Foucault, I hope the appeal of the
Thomistic ecstatic understanding of the body is now evident. If in this
chapter it is demonstrated to what degree Humanae Vitae develops its
arguments for the norms of Catholic sexual ethics from Ecstatic Thomism, it will have to be conceded that these ethical norms are based
‘‘on the most elementary and incontrovertible moral truths.’’ To speak
more colloquially, those who go around fascinated by Levinas and
Barthes will have to acknowledge the Thomistic resonances in their
theories and the implications for sexual ethics. More bluntly yet, nonCatholics will not be able to dismiss those norms as parochial and
wrong-headed, and Catholics will have to take another closer look at
Humanae Vitae. Crucially, in the following chapter, it is demonstrated
why all those concerned with developing an antitotalitarian politics
should affirm the conclusions of Humanae Vitae.
The position defended in Humanae Vitae is not, contrary to the old
canard, a biologism. Commenting on the reaction to Humanae Vitae
in , Wojtyla is shocked to find defenders of the encyclical claiming
that natural law is a matter of ‘‘biological regularity.’’ Such people
foisted on Paul VI and the Magisterium a conception of natural law
that ‘‘in no way corresponds to the Church’s understanding of it’’ (PC,
).16 The natural law is, rather, ‘‘a norm for the person’’ (PC, ), a
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person who is ‘‘the unity of soul and body,’’ a unity of ‘‘spiritual and
biological inclinations’’ (VS, para. ). Natural law is a norm for the
person because the person is called to be diffusivum sui and ‘‘the order
of nature is above all that of existence and procreation’’ (LR, ).
The person, body and soul inextricably linked, is ecstatic. This is what
Wojtyla means by the ‘‘existential-axiological dimension’’ of sexual desire when he writes:
The accusation of ‘‘biologism’’can be made only if we assume in
advance that the sexual urge in man has only a biological sense,
that it is a purely natural fact. This assumption, however, made
in a purely dogmatic way, begins by depriving the sexual urge of
its existential-axiological dimension, reducing it to its biological
significance, so as to make possible the accusation.
(LR, , n. )
The human person deposed by the natural law that is an imitatio
Christi is, in this sense, existential. Sexual desire is then part of a Christoform metaphysical order of ecstatic being. Sexual desire has ‘‘an existential significance’’17 (LR, —Wojtyla playing on the verbal form
exsistere of exstasis—being diffusive of itself—LR, –). Sexual desire
thus has a formality of procreatio (HV, para. ),18 which is to say, as
John Paul II puts it, ‘‘the body is organically connected with the freedom of the gift of the person’’ (TB, ). Given the formal character
of sexual desire as that which is diffusive of itself, as a good that desires
to share out its life of goodness, ‘‘an outright conflict’’ with sexual
desire’s formality of procreatio will ‘‘perturb and undermine love between persons’’ (LR, ; cf. HV, para. ). That is, a violence against
sexual desire will be introduced by artificial birth control before any
act of ‘‘love’’ has even begun, limiting and distorting ‘‘the body’s objective way of existing’’ (TB, ). If the good of sex is contradicted and
severed from the ecstatically deposed body (TB, –; , n. ), the
bodily desiring person can but ‘‘curve’’ back into himself (Bonaventure).19
Here is Wojtyla’s formulation of Thomas’s double-aspect theory of
the body (LR, ; cf. LR, –). Contrasting the instinct of selfpreservation with the sexual urge, he writes:
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In characterizing it [the instinct of self-preservation] we can say
that it is egocentric in so far as it is centred on the existence of
the ‘‘I’’ itself . . . the ‘‘I’’ is inseparable from individuality. This
is what makes the instinct of self-preservation fundamentally different from the sexual urge. For if it follows its natural course the
sexual urge always transcends the limits of the ‘‘I,’’ and has as its
immediate object some being of the other sex within the same
species. Such is the objective purpose of the sexual urge, in the
nature of which there is—and this is where it differs from the
instinct of self-preservation—something that might be called
‘‘altero-centrism.’’ This it is that creates the basis for love.
In other words, the practice of artificial contraception is just another
episode in the history of violence against ecstatic flesh (LR, ; TB,
–), which we examined in detail in chapter . Paul VI puts this
trenchantly: ‘‘Man has made stupendous progress in the domination
and rational organization of the forces of nature, such that he tends to
extend this domination to his own total being’’ (HV, para. ). For with
the ecstasy of the flesh eradicated, and the wound closed, the ‘‘alterocentrism’’ of desire itself is eradicated (LR, ). Vulnerability, paradigmatic of the ethical for Thomas, Levinas, and Wojtyla, is at an end.
With vulnerability at an end, so too is freedom; for freedom ‘‘is acquired in love, that is, in the gift of self ’’ (VS, para. ). Hence, artificial
birth control cannot participate in the great drama of Christianity:
‘‘His crucified flesh fully reveals the unbreakable bond between freedom and truth, just as his Resurrection from the dead is the supreme
exaltation of the fruitfulness and saving power of a freedom lived out
in truth’’ (VS, para. ). It is only an ecstatically opened sensuality20
that can participate in the crucified flesh of Christ; it is only a love
that wounds the lover that can reduce the pronitas of sensuality to
transgression, that can resurrect the flesh from death; and the death
and resurrection of the flesh is inescapably for flesh to participate in
‘‘fruitfulness.’’ I hope that this helps explain the traditional teaching of
the Church:21 procreation is ‘‘the fruitfulness and saving power’’ that
orders sex to the generosity of being and reorders sex away from violence; thus marriage itself needs the procreative participation in the
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God Who is bonum diffusivum sui est if marriage is to possess the drama
of Christianity. Wojtyla in  puts that teaching this way:
For the Church, in arranging the objective purposes of love in a
particular order, seeks to emphasize that procreation is objectively, ontologically, a more important purpose than that man
and woman should live together, complement each other and
support each other . . .
(LR, ; ).22
This same priority of procreation continues to be assumed in Gaudium et
Spes (para.  and ) when the Council Fathers say, ‘‘By their very
nature, the institution of matrimony itself and conjugal love are ordained for the procreation and education of children . . .’’ (see HV,
para. ; FC, para. ).
The failure to observe the ontological priority of procreation in eros
is but a sign of the grip the ontology of violence has over us. In his
own conception of eros, Plato observed the ontological priority of procreation in sex,23 so perhaps Humanae Vitae was correct to cast the
logic of artificial birth control in terms of Cartesianism. However
much a thinker like MacIntyre can now laugh at the ‘‘silliness’’ of
Cartesian philosophy,24 it remains the case that Western culture is still
very much enamored of him and his metaphysics of violence (see my
chapter ). In rejecting any form of Cartesian dualism, Humanae Vitae
(HV, para. ; VS, para. ) affirmed ‘‘the moral meaning of the body’’
(VS, para. ) and affirmed that the person can be moral, that is,
diffusivum sui only if the body is also diffusivum sui (HV, para. ; LR,
, n. ). Thus, against Descartes and the logic of artificial birth
control that separates us from our ecstatic bodily nature, Catholic
teaching proposes that embodied persons have a formality of procreation, that sensuality has moral knowledge, and that the human mystical participation in God is lived through a mystical flesh (LR, ). Yet,
recalling that the body has a double aspect, Catholic teaching also
identifies a pronitas to transgression in sensuality which has been exacerbated by sin to an inclinatio. Artificial birth control simultaneously
does a violence to the positive propensities of the flesh, rejecting its
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ecstatic movement, and advocating this violent self-mastery of the flesh
does nothing to assuage the negative propensity of the flesh to dominate the other but, indeed, only exacerbates it25 by diminishing the
ecstasy of the other. This is why contraception cannot be a human
right, as Nussbaum thinks. By contrast, Catholic teaching proposes an
ecstatic body that promotes the ‘‘culture of the person.’’ In the first
place, a violent conception of self-mastery is replaced by a ‘‘rhetoric of
desire’’ (Hibbs) or ‘‘a pedagogy of the body’’ (TB, ) that reduces the
domination of concupiscence and, thus, the domination of persons.
Sensuality integrated into prudence, the ostiarius of the Law, is given
‘‘the correct gravitational pull’’ (LR, ). Such a gravid sensuality is
Christoform, and the ostiarius of the Holy Law of the Cross can be
cultivated by, for example, shame, a natural ‘‘rhetoric of desire’’ (LR,
–); culture (TB, ); dress (LR, ); art (TB, ); education
(LR,); and, of course, liturgy (see my chapter ).
It would be well to pause here and bring out the assumption regarding the violence of sex and sexual excitement. Describing the first moment he desired a woman, C. S. Lewis writes:
What I felt for the dancing mistress was sheer appetite; the prose
and not the poetry of the Flesh. I did not feel at all like a knight
devoting himself to a lady; I was much more like a Turk looking
at a Circassian whom he could not afford to buy. I knew quite
well what I wanted.26
I would be surprised if anyone really doubted that Lewis has pretty
well captured the experience of sexual desire. I do not think that
Thomas, or Paul VI, or John Paul II does doubt it (LR, ; TB, 
and especially TB, ). Another way to say this is that they all assume
Augustine’s phenomenology of sex (LR, –). To many, Augustine’s classic discussion in the City of God (XIV, cc. –) is now simply
beyond the pale: outright laughter greets its mention or a rolling of the
eyes among the more discreet. And yet, if pressed, these same people
have no good explanation for the peculiar facts surrounding our sexual
practices that Augustine observes. Augustine offers a social phenomenology and it is this which impresses our authors, as it does anyone, in
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fact, asked to really confront Augustine’s keen observation. Of course,
when an Augustinian sensibility about sex and sexual excitement is
assumed by a ‘‘cool’’ author like Kundera, no one seems to find it
implausible.27
Impressed by Cicero’s dictum that ‘‘all right actions desire to be set
in the full daylight,’’ Augustine observes that even spouses hide their
sex acts despite these being quite licit. Augustine wonders why Christian spouses living out the commandment of God do not invite their
other children to watch their parents’ attempt at procreation. I imagine
that parents in the West today who did so would be arrested and their
children removed from their care. Augustine draws out the peculiarity
here: ‘‘This right action craves for recognition in the light of the mind’s
understanding, but it is equally concerned to escape the light of the
eye’s vision.’’28 Augustine’s explanation of this observation also impresses. Sex acts are hidden from view, even when utterly licit—indeed,
in John Paul II’s view, when nothing less than a participation in the
triune love life of God—because there is a violence involved.29 Sex is
but an exemplary moment of the basic condition of the human ‘‘dominated by the lust to dominate.’’30 Human history, the history of the
city of man, is, for Augustine, but the history of the myriad instances
of human action ‘‘dominated by the lust to dominate.’’ Veritatis Splendor (para. ) speaks of ‘‘the domination of concupiscence’’ and Wojtyla argues that devotion to another’s good is not possible if love is
‘‘dominated by an ambition to possess, or more specifically by concupiscence born of sensual reactions’’ (LR, ). Obedience to the moral
law of the love that wounds the lover is necessary, then, if the relations
between men and women that are now marked by lust and domination
(Catechism [para. ]) are to be transformed, redeemed. This is the
argument at the heart of Humanae Vitae. This encyclical stands in the
Augustinian tradition of non-utopian politics wherein laws to moderate violence and domination are to be promoted. Artificial birth control is not benign, for it does not promote a law of generosity, the
ecstatic body that alone is a deposition of domination, and so can in
no way moderate the violence of sensuality. It is a rejection of the
objective law of the self-diffusion of the good, and yet without an
objective law there is no law in sex. The sexual act itself is forbidding
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to the self-mastery of those ‘‘dominated by the lust to dominate.’’ The
Holy Law of the Crucified Lover can make of us ‘‘vessels of mercy,’’
our spirit and bodies ‘‘broken,’’ and it is only such a law that can
moderate us as ‘‘vessels of wrath.’’31 Humanae Vitae then would have
us replace a formality (inclinatio) of domination by a formality of procreation and the self-diffusion of the good.
If any reader seriously doubts the accuracy of Augustine’s phenomenology of sex,32 I simply ask that the reader judge if the phenomenology offered by Irigaray is a remotely accurate account of sexual
experience. Augustine versus Irigaray then: I think the reader will agree
that Augustine, no stranger to the flesh of ancient Rome, is the better
phenomenologist.
Irigaray takes erotic sensuality, ‘‘the touch of the caress,’’ to establish
a flesh, a relationship between self and other, ‘‘that is still and always
untouched by mastery.’’33 The caress is fecund, bringing the other alive
in the moment of caress, and thus the other perpetually escapes mastery
or domination, for the caress literally gives birth to the other who is,
as it were, ‘‘otherwise than the caress.’’ The caress is procreative prior
to any conception, it is ‘‘an amorous impregnation that seeks out and
affirms otherness while protecting it’’ (FC, ). Sensual pleasure does
not take ‘‘pleasure in the perversity of the naked but contemplates and
adorns it’’ (FC, ) and attains to a ‘‘communion in the most inward
locus of the feeling and the felt’’ (FC, ). In this communion
wrought by sensual pleasure, the ‘‘moment of ultimate sympathy,’’
(FC, ) Irigaray’s lover is, we are told, ‘‘awakening me to another
birth—as a loving woman’’ (FC, ). If Mills and Boons were in need
of a phenomenology of sex, they could do no better than Irigaray:
‘‘The beloved’s beauty announces the fulfillment of the flesh. She is
more beautiful, or differently beautiful, when she makes love than
when she parades around in all her finery’’ (FC, ). What is most
remarkable about such an account of sensual pleasure is that both Irigaray and Wojtyla seek an erotic communion of persons isolated from
eroticized violence, separated from sex that consumes and dominates.
Both hold a principle in common: sex is justified, made just, through
fecundity. Irigaray understands the caress to give birth to both lover
and beloved and so separates fecundity from procreation: ‘‘Prior to any
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procreation, the lovers bestow on each other—life’’ (FC, ). Wojtyla,
to the contrary, argues that fecundity must be procreative: sensual pleasure, he argues, is not a Mills and Boons ‘‘moment of ultimate sympathy,’’ but unless interiorly structured by the ecstatic Thomistic body,
and thus the formality of procreation, sex is violent. Indeed, Irigaray’s
understanding of ‘‘communion’’ of lover and beloved is fairly strained.
The fecundity of the caress ‘‘awakens’’ lover and beloved but does so
in that ‘‘they are returned to the deepest level of elementary flux, where
birth is not yet sealed up in its identity’’ (FC, ). Returned to an
‘‘elementary flux,’’ it is hard to see how it could be said of the lovers
that ‘‘each one welcomes the birth of the other’’ (FC, ). Irigaray
wants ‘‘ethical fidelity to incarnation’’ rather than the ‘‘sacrificial substitution’’ of procreation (FC, ). It is supposedly only with the former that there is a ‘‘letting go and giving of self ’’ (FC, ), and yet
how can this be so given that both/neither are in an ‘‘elementary flux’’?
That Irigaray’s attempt to found intersubjectivity upon pleasure should
collapse into an ‘‘elementary flux’’ is predictable. Wojtyla writes:
In these circumstances there cannot, however, be any question of
a ‘‘common I,’’ of the sort which comes into being when one of
the persons desires the good of the other as his own and finds his
own good in that of the other person. It is not possible to desire
pleasure itself in this way, because it is a purely subjective good,
not trans-subjective, nor even inter-subjective. At most we can
want another’s pleasure ‘‘besides’’ and always ‘‘on condition of ’’
our own pleasure.
(LR, )
If it can be agreed that an Augustinian phenomenology of sex and
sexual excitement is more accurate than that found in Irigaray—that
Genesis : –, glossed in the Catechism (para. ) as ‘‘the union of
man and woman becomes subject to tensions, their relations henceforth marked by lust and domination,’’ is true to human experience—
then, each and every ‘‘marriage act’’ (HV, para. ) does need to be
liberated from erotic violence in order to be congruent with God.
The obligation to diminish erotic violence to the degree this is possi-
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ble, I would argue, lies behind the claim of Humanae Vitae that persons
who are married have an obligation to procreate (HV, para. ). But
once more—and this repeats a point made in chapter —this assumes
that a reduction in erotic violence is a moral good. Bataille’s The Story
of an Eye rejects such an assumption and positively glories in an erotics
of violence that leads to insanity, mutilation, murder, and outraged
corpses. Those who do not share Bataille’s perspective and hold as a
moral good the diminishment of sexual violence ought then, I suggest,
to recognize the power of the norms of Catholic sexual morality. Those
norms assume the presence of erotic violence and seek to reduce it in
each and every sexual act, assuming, as they do, that persons are goods
diffusive of themselves. Those norms insist that sexual acts that make
use of contraceptive practices are ‘‘intrinsically evil acts’’ (VS, para. ),
for the sexual act ‘‘intentionally rendered infertile’’ ‘‘of its very nature
contradicts the moral order’’ (VS, para. ), as it cannot escape violence. Such sex is not ecstatic sex, for there is no deposing of the bodily
self and ‘‘must therefore be judged unworthy of man’’ (VS, para. ).
Quite clearly, the Magisterium here assumes the deposition of the Crucified is normative for what it is to be human (cf. GS, para. ). That
is, if persons are goods diffusive of themselves they are required to take
as objects of their acts objects ‘‘capable of being ordered to the good
and to the ultimate end, which is God’’ (VS, para. ), the Lover on
the Cross ecstatically deposed.34 Erotic violence is reduced when persons are ecstatic, when spouses act so as to serve the good of the other
in their sexual acts. The good of the other can be served only when a
person has deposed his body, sensuality, and reason, in a love that
wounds the lover. Sex, without the lesion of the wound, ultimately
betrays sex itself (secare) (TB, ). Thus, pace Hauerwas, who thinks
the natural law could never give a justification for why each and every
sexual act requires a gift of self that is not separated from the gravid
sensuality of the spouses, Wojtyla writes: ‘‘Every such act must have its
own internal justification, for unless justice is done there can be no
question of a union of persons’’ (LR, ). The ‘‘internal justification’’
is a wounded flesh in which violence is diminished through the procreative lesion.35 Even when the infertile period of the cycle is used to
avoid conception (HV, para. ), such acts of love are still ordered to
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the procreative lesion, for the root of that lesion is the ostiarius, the
abiding of eros in law, the law of the Cross upon which is founded a
self-mastery (LR, , n. ) ordered to justice. It is worth repeating
that even someone like Irigary who rejects Augustine’s phenomenology
still thinks that sex needs an ‘‘internal justification.’’ Rejecting Catholic
norms, as she does, leads Irigaray to seek an alternative theory that
clearly acts as justificatory reasoning for her norms.
Once the double aspect of the body is appreciated, and once the
propensity of sensuality to reduce the other to one’s own good through
domination is understood, then the need for sexual acts to be bodily
redeemed through the deposition of the ecstatic body becomes clear.
Through the natural law formed according to the glory of the One
‘‘slain before the foundation of the world’’ (Apoc. , ), sexual acts
have always already been claimed by vulnerability; claimed by the obligation to reduce the transgressive pronitas of sensuality and therewith
to make possible the inhaesion of the other in the lesion of the lover.
Put more phenomenologically, the body’s formality of procreatio is
nothing short of a participation in the ‘‘sprinkled blood’’ (EV, ) of
‘‘the One who was pierced’’ (EV, para. ). At least, such a phenomenology is vivid with maternity. Wojtyla’s Love and Responsibility ()
posits the person as always already claimed by ethical responsibility, as
does Levinas’s  Otherwise than Being (EI, ). Levinas explains this
in terms of maternity. For Levinas, maternity is ‘‘gestation of the other
in the same’’ and ‘‘the groaning of the wounded entrails by those it
will bear or has borne’’ (OTB, ). Thomas makes a similar point
when he writes that the love that wounds the lover is a love that serves
the other (quodammodo amans amato inservit) and helps deliver the
other (ut quasi personam amati amans gerat [III Sent., d. , q. , a. ]),
an instance of the viscera caritatis (ST I–II, q. , a. ). The ‘‘Marian
attitude’’—a feminine dimension of service to the other which is universal in men and women (MD, para. ; ; )—appears only in an
explicitly thematic way later in John Paul II’s Mulieris Dignitatem: a
papal encyclical influenced perhaps by Levinas’s discussions of the feminine as ‘‘the of itself other, as the origin of the very concept of alterity’’
(EI, ; cf. MD, para. ) and his claim that every human being participates in the masculine and the feminine. Indeed, Levinas asks whether
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this last point is not the meaning of Genesis .: ‘‘male and female
created He them’’ (EI, –; a theme central to the early meditations
of TB). But, already in , Wojtyla points out that the Latin for
marriage, matrimonium, emphasizes maternity so as ‘‘to ensure that the
partners treat each other as persons’’ (LR, –). Marriage calls each
partner to the Marian, that is, the matris munia of matrimonium: a call
to the ‘‘office of fatherhood and motherhood’’ (GS, para. ), for each
office in its own very real and vivid way is a giving of the self usque ad
sanguinem. Levinas, it appears, is working a seam explored by Thomas
long ago. In his commentary on the Psalms, Thomas links Ps. : 
factum est cor meum tamquam cera liquescens in medio ventris mei to
Paul’s (Phil. ) quomodo cupiam vos esse in visceribus Jesu Christi.36
In marriage, man and woman are ‘‘one flesh’’ (Gen. :) and this
mutuality expresses itself in sexual intercourse (LR, ). The objective
moral purpose of marriage is to ‘‘create in principle the possibility of
love and exclude the possibility of treating a person as means to an end
and as an object for use’’ (LR, ). Marriage is an institution whose
inner logic is the ‘‘personalist norm.’’ As Wojtyla frames it, this norm
runs: ‘‘Anyone who treats a person as a means to an end does violence
to the very essence of the other, to what constitutes its natural right’’
(LR, ). Marriage, as an institution, is part of the order of justice (LR,
), for it is a person’s ‘‘natural right’’ to be treated as a person.37 This
personalist norm is known through reason and is, as it were, the ‘‘natural content’’ of the Gospels and is thus also ‘‘the basic law of the whole
supernatural order, of the supernatural relationship between God and
man’’ (LR, ). Wojtyla, pace Weigel,38 is in continuity with Hauerwas’s understanding that ‘‘the church has always assumed that marriage
is a reality that is prior to love.’’39 To understand the institution of
marriage as a structure of ecstasy is quite crucial: indeed, the grandeur
of marriage consists in the gift of self that it promotes (LR, ). The
gift of the self promoted by marriage, the ecstasy of the ‘‘personalist
norm,’’ is rooted in marriage as an institution of bodily diffusion.
Hence, marriage is inescapably a call to participate in creation, to render the service of being deposed to the beginning of another person’s
existence, for ‘‘willing acceptance of parenthood serves to break down
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the reciprocal egoism . . . behind which lurks the will to exploit the
person’’ (LR, ). Wojtyla puts the point thus:
But love forcibly detaches the person, so to speak, from this natural inviolability and inalienability. It makes the person want to
do just that—surrender itself to another, to the one it loves . . .
This means the renunciation of its autonomy and its inalienability. Love proceeds by way of this renunciation, guided by the
profound conviction that it does not diminish and impoverish,
but quite the contrary, enlarges and enriches the existence of the
person. What might be called the law of ekstasis seems to operate
here: the lover ‘‘goes outside’’ the self to find a fuller existence
in another. In no other form of love does this law operate so
conspicuously as it does in betrothed love.
(LR, –)
Sexual acts internally structured, as they are, by the formality of procreation ‘‘fully justify’’ sex (LR, ). Such sex is ordered to justice, for it
both affirms the person as a good, as a good diffusive of itself (HV,
para.  & para. ), and welcomes the (unborn) stranger as per the ius
gentium. This is what Humanae Vitae affirms when the encyclical argues that the unitive and procreative aspects of sex are inseparable.
This also has a Trinitarian basis.
Though Thomas does not explain the processions of the Trinity in
terms of ecstasy, St. Bonaventure does, and Humanae Vitae also (see
MD, para. ). Humanae Vitae (para. ) clearly models the two meanings of the conjugal act, the unitive and procreative, on the unicity of
nature among the Persons and the distinct personalities of the Persons
on account of various relations of origin. Nowhere is the identity and
distinction within the Trinity more gloriously described than in St.
Bonaventure’s Itinerarium. Relating the equality between the Persons
of God to God’s declaration in Exodus, ‘‘I am Who am,’’ and relating
the distinction among the Persons to Christ’s pronouncing of baptism
(Matthew : ) ‘‘in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of
the Holy Spirit,’’40 Bonaventure stresses that identity and distinction
are necessary if God is to be a God of love. Taking Dionysius’s axiom
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bonum diffusivum sui est as a metaphysical datum, Bonaventure argues
that were God merely to be the God of identity He would fail to be
genuinely a God of love. Truly diffusive because truly loving and free,
God communicates His very nature to another (which does not happen
in creation). Yet, were this all, God would be something akin to Aristophanes’s bizarre creatures who possess the same nature and ‘‘identical
faces’’ (Symposium, a). Thus God, truly diffusive, free and loving,
escapes narcissism, in a communication from one person to another
identical by nature but distinct by personality. Anything less, and Dionysius’s axiom is unmet. Bonaventure explains the distinction among
the persons by way of origin: ‘‘He who proceeds and He who produces
are distinguished by their properties and yet are one . . .’’41 Humanae
Vitae assumes this theory of love when it claims that ‘‘the conjugal act
preserves in its fullness the sense of true mutual love and its ordination
toward man’s most high calling to parenthood’’ (HV, para. ). Lest
sexual acts become narcissistic, lest one partner dominate the other,
reducing the other to an ‘‘identical face’’ of the ‘‘lover’s’’ desire, sexual
acts must be related to the formality of procreation: ordered by the
metaphysics of diffusion to communicate nature to another who is a
distinct personality, a child. I have shown in chapter  that Thomas’s
Christoform natural law assumes this same theory of eros: the mutua
inhaesio must become a concretio, the deliverance of self, spouse, and
child.
Sex separated from the Marian attitude is ultimately corrosive (LR,
) at the level of the person, the social, and the political. The person,
as a good, and as diffusivum sui therefore, is naturally ecstatic, ordered
to the bodily gift of self to another (LR, ).42 An implicit claim made
by Humanae Vitae (para. ), which still scandalizes (and Wojtyla at
one time seems to have thought it ‘‘improper’’ [LR, ]) is that a
culture of artificial birth control supports a culture of abortion (EV,
para. , where the claim is explicit). If we recall the scholastic principle
about God’s agency conservatio est continua creatio, we ought not to be
surprised that in the severing of sex from the procreatio of the ecstatic
body we also sever our desire from conservatio; and ultimately, from
the conserving of the social and political goods that sustain us. Since
most women have abortions because they are encouraged to do so by
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their husbands or boyfriends, as Hauerwas has forcefully pointed out
(MD, para. ),43 defending marriage as an institution of hospitality
and service to the other which is itself rooted in sex as the woundedness
of ecstatic flesh must be central to the political mission of the Church.
When marriage is so understood, spouses are separated from ‘‘a consumer attitude’’ (LR, ; TB, ; MD, ), an attitude identified by
Hauerwas as at the heart of liberal societies. Hauerwas is, of course,
completely right that the traditional teaching of Christian marriage is
a politics, a rejection of liberalism. Marriage understood as an institution of the ecstatic body at once announces to the social and political
orders that violence is here challenged and moderated (HV, ), and it
announces to the spouses themselves that their vocation44 is the personalist norm; that each is ordered by the ecstatic character of desire itself
(LR, ) to be bodily diffusivum sui. But against Hauerwas, I have
just shown that such a marriage is structurally reliant upon sex understood as a wounding of the flesh. For in procreation, as John Paul II
has profoundly noted, man and woman know themselves in the child,
the foundling. For the child is ‘‘a revelation of the new man,’’ a revelation of Christ, the foundling born of the ecstasy of the Incarnation.
Thus, the child is a revelation of ‘‘their living image,’’ the sacrum of
their being imago dei (TB, ).
The ‘‘objective aims’’ of the institution of marriage (LR, ) are a
communio personarum (spouses and children), through which persons
are liberated from ‘‘subjectivism and from the egoism which it inevitably conceals’’ (LR, ). Marriage supports a person’s attempt to live
outside the singularity of the person’s bodily constitution (cf. ST I–II,
q. , a. ) and therewith the attempt to moderate the transgressive
character of the body. Marriage as an ecstatic institution has a foundation in natural law, which itself is founded in the ecstatic body of
Christ (HV, ). The subsidiary miracle in the Eucharist, the turning
of the water into wine, shows that the eucharistic body of Christ is a
nuptial body as the subsidiary miracle memorializes the miracle at the
wedding feast of Cana (ST III, a. , a. ; q. , a. ; ScG. IV, c. ,
para. ). This brings us to an important final question: Does the Christian teaching on marriage—and the attending teaching on procreation
and contraception—have to rely on an imitation of Christ in his ‘‘total
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gift of himself ’’ (VS, para. ) on the Cross? It is worth quoting here
a theologian commenting on the  Catechism:
. . . a fundamental besetting problem of Catholic teaching about
marriage: a conflation of the ideal and the real. A picture of marriage as ‘‘total’’ self-gift which could attract and inspire were it
held out in the same evangelical mode as Jesus’ commands to
‘‘love your enemies’’ or ‘‘leave and follow me,’’ becomes oppressive and alienating when it skewers married persons on standards
which are not only impossible, but also inequitable in relation to
church expectations in other realms of life.45
Veritatis Splendor’s short response to such a critique runs: ‘‘And of
which man are we speaking? Of man dominated by lust or of man
redeemed by Christ? This is what is at stake: the reality of Christ’s redemption. Christ has redeemed us!’’ (VS, para. ; HV, ). A longer
response begins by acknowledging that it certainly is the Church’s position that sexual love, the fervor coitus, as Thomas puts it (Sent., II, ,
, , , ad ), requires ‘‘the full gift’’ of a person if sex is not just to be
the use of the other (LR, ) or even a mutually agreed use of each
other (LR, ).
Yet, the idea of a ‘‘full gift’’ of a person is a complex one. It is
crucial to note that Thomas’s theory is not in the first place a concept
of woundedness based upon the virtue of charity. While love of the other
might liquefy the lover’s body unto martyrdom, in the first instance the
body is wounded when sensuality follows the guidance of reason, when
reason looks to the mutual proportion between things, that is, to justice. Wojtyla makes this point, saying, ‘‘The order of justice is more
fundamental than the order of love’’: to be just is a matter of treating
persons according to what is rightly due to them for ‘‘the person has a
value higher than that of an object for consumption or use’’ (LR, )—
which also means that woundedness in relationship to justice (HV,
para. ) is not a call to the utter disregard of one’s own body or person,
for reason and sensuality together look to the mutual proportion between the lover’s body and that of the other. Of course, love of a
person does not consist merely of being just toward that person and,
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given the connection among the virtues (ST I–II, q. ), the justice
owed to the other is exercised only in love. Nevertheless, marriage as
ecstasy is a work of justice—giving what is rightly due—at the behest
of love: it is only the love that wounds the lover which can configure
the flesh so as to enable a communio personarum in the flesh (LR, ).
In Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre has rightly observed that
misericordia in Thomas is a work of justice.46 Just as I showed in chapters  and , Thomistic natural law has the structure of the Cross, so
Thomas (ST II–II, q. , a. ) insists that mercy and love are not
opposed to justice. When John Paul II speaks of ‘‘the spousal significance of the body . . . profoundly inscribed in the essential structure
of the human person’’ (TB, ), he has in mind the viscera misericordiae (Col. : ). Hence, it is quite appropriate to speak of Christ’s
‘‘total gift of himself ’’ as a ‘‘fulfillment’’ of the law. Christ ‘‘invites’’
and ‘‘calls’’ us to live the life of the law, ‘‘a love which gives itself
completely’’ (VS, para. ). And concretely, about the call of Christ,
he writes, ‘‘The commandment ‘You shall not murder’ becomes a call
to an attentive love that protects and promotes the life of one’s neighbor. The precept prohibiting adultery becomes an invitation to a pure
way of looking at others, capable of respecting the spousal meaning of
the body’’ (VS, para. ). Is it ‘‘impossible,’’ as the earlier quoted theologian would have it (!), for a husband and wife to justly exhibit ‘‘an
attentive love which protects and promotes the life’’ of his or her
spouse, or the lives of their children? Do Christ and the Church for the
sake of justice here demand something ‘‘oppressive and alienating’’?
And what are we to make of the scriptural witness: ‘‘Beloved, if God
so loved us, we ought also to love one another. . . . We love, because
he first loved us’’ (I Jn : , ; as quoted in VS, )? And more, if
married love is not a bodily donation of the self to the spouse and
children, what would be the ethical content of marriage? Recalling the
Pauline and Levinasian ‘‘deposition,’’ Wojtyla writes of married love:
‘‘Betrothed love, the love that is a gift of self, commits the will in a
particularly profound way. As we know already, it means disposing of
one’s whole self, in the language of the Gospels, ‘giving one’s soul’ ’’
(LR, ). Hauerwas has argued that Christian marriage be a politics,
a contesting of the norms of the city of man. If spousal love in ‘‘reality’’
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is a consumer ‘‘love’’—as our earlier quoted theologian thinks—what
exactly is the mission of marriage? What, indeed, could be the content
of a Christian marriage if it is not true that ‘‘giving himself to another
human being must be simultaneously a way of giving himself completely to God’’ (LR, , n. )?
Throughout this chapter, I have assumed that a giving of the self is
always a bodily giving of the self. I hope to have established that such
a bodily giving of self in sex must, on account of the transgressive
character of sensuality, be sex ordered to procreation, for it is only in
such sex that violence is overcome in the diffusion of goodness. That
is, I take myself to have presented the (perhaps submerged) argument
of Humanae Vitae and shown that its argument is correct. More, its
argument refutes those who argue that contraception is a human right.
In the following chapter, the application of Ecstatic Thomism to sexuality discussed in this chapter shall be further expanded upon. I shall
argue that the Church’s understanding of the family as a politics of
hospitality can find a foothold inside a marriage only where the norms
of Catholic sexuality can be practiced (HV, para. ). While Hauerwas
has argued that we ought to be responsible for children that we did
not choose because ‘‘we learn that our lives graciously are not our
own,’’47 so we need to respond in our sex lives to an ecstatic metaphysical order that we did not choose either (HV, para.  and para. ). In
both cases, we engage our deepest humanity as we realize the ius gentium of welcoming the stranger: in the one case, the unborn, in the
other, God. I will defend this claim through the politics of response
one finds in Aurel Kolnai. His social and political thought will be
linked with theories of eros found in the Symposium, and, however
unlikely it might seem, Fides et Ratio as well. Importantly, I will use
Kolnai’s defense of privilege to suggest a renewed basis for a Catholic
sexual politics. Thereafter, in chapter , I will argue that Kolnai best
defends the political thinking found in Humanae Vitae which, odd
though it might seem, stands as something of a critique of the political
thinking found in recent Catholic social thought.
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Humanae Vitae is best understood as a complex argument drawing
upon phenomenology, metaphysics, natural law, speculative theology,
biblical witness, and political philosophy (cf. TB, –). Commentary
on the text typically supposes that natural law reasoning is front and
center and that little else is presupposed.1 In showing the hidden theological depths of the argument, I have also presented the Church’s
sexual ethics as an example of Ecstatic Thomism, defending a metaphysics of the body as a self-diffusive good. Commentators have often
supposed that Wojtyla’s recent formulation of the Church’s ethics is
largely phenomenological because they presume that Wojtyla’s philosophy of the body is basically that of the gendered body as described by
Scheler and Stein. I do not doubt that John Paul II thinks that men
and women sometimes have different social ‘‘offices,’’ as Gaudium et
Spes puts it (GS, ), and, like the Council Fathers, he thinks that these
are to a large degree a function of the different natures of men and
women (MD,  and ). Without dismissing, or yet deciding the validity of, the Church’s argument upon this point, I do doubt that this
aspect of the Church’s thinking is utterly central to a Catholic philosophy of the body. Rather, I have argued for a deep continuity between
Aquinas and papal thinking about the body (Paul VI and John Paul
II) and thereby shown that an extremely elaborate metaphysical conception of the body is at the root of Humanae Vitae and its recent
defense in Wojtyla’s philosophical theology. Actually, I do not see how
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this interpretation can effectively be doubted if an assumption is made:
in Fides et Ratio, John Paul II is not engaging in self-criticism. This
encyclical emphasizes the centrality of metaphysical thinking in the
development of theology. John Paul II clearly warns there that a failure
on the part of the theologian to develop a robust metaphysical conception is bound to seriously impoverish any resulting theology. It would
be odd, indeed, if John Paul II’s understanding of the Church’s theology of the body did not include a rich metaphysical understanding of
the body—and I have shown that it does. On this understanding, John
Paul II is both a leading contemporary Thomist and the latest exponent of a papal ecstatic theology. I now want to show how this Ecstatic
Thomism has influenced the Church’s teachings on sexual politics, and
how these teachings might be defended.
The argument of the chapter begins with Wojtyla’s critique of Plato
regarding both the metaphysics of desire and the place of the family in
the social order. It will end with an elaboration of ‘‘the politics of the
family.’’ Such a politics is, I think, somewhat embryonic in Wojtyla’s
thinking. The basic idea appears in the  Apostolic Letter Familiaris
Consortio, and I understand Fides et Ratio () to be a profound
philosophical elaboration of the idea. I will show why this is so in the
first part of this chapter, and in the second I will show how the idea
can usefully be developed, and well defended, through the social philosophy of Aurel Kolnai. Thus, as before, Wojtyla’s writings form a
part of the argument I will present, but the argument also relies heavily
upon Kolnai (–). Both thinkers are Eastern Europeans and
Catholics, Thomists with a phenomenologist’s sensibility,2 and both
wrote doctoral dissertations on Scheler. However, whereas some have
started to call John Paul II’s social encyclicals examples of ‘‘progressive
Thomism,’’ one would not think to say this of Kolnai’s writings. Ultimately, in chapter , I will show that the primary goals of Catholic
social thought might be better attained by Kolnai’s conservative
thought than by the ‘‘progressive Thomism’’ started by Maritain and
absorbed by the encyclical tradition.
In this chapter the argument is made that the ‘‘politics of the family’’ is a restatement of Augustine’s anti-utopian politics: that the goal
of political order is to moderate the lust to dominate but not to seek
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its eradication. Familiaris Consortio understands the hospitality of the
family to contrast with the city of man’s lust to dominate and to limit
the power of the state. The family is a natural institution and the basis
of ‘‘the existence of all large societies’’ where, as always, Wojtyla’s use
of ‘‘existence’’ as ecstasy is to be assumed (LR, ). At the center of
the family is marriage, a sacramentum naturae: and ‘‘nature’s only aim
is reproduction,’’ the meaning of ‘‘nature’’ coming from the verb,
nascor, to be born (LR, ). If marriage is an institution ordered to
hospitality, then the sex acts that are at the center of conjugal love
must be acts that ecstatically depose the flesh (TB, –). It is only
such sex that can oppose the lust to dominate within sex (TB, ) and
therefore, it is only such sex that can establish the family as an institution of hospitality counter to the city of man’s lust to dominate. The
‘‘politics of the family’’ has then Mary’s bodily gift of self as an exemplar, for Mary is ‘‘the incomparable model of how life should be welcomed
and cared for’’ (EV, : emphasis original; cf. MD, ). And yet she is
more: as the ‘‘progenitrix’’ and the one ‘‘a sword has pierced’’ (Lk. :
), she is an exemplar of welcoming the stranger. For as the woman at
the center of salvation, the Incarnation, she welcomes the foundling,
the One whose origin remains a mystery and the One whose coming
is novitas mundi: she is the first witness to the new ‘‘beginning’’ and
the ‘‘new creation’’ (MD, ). As the one who welcomes the foundling,
Mary’s face is set against the founding principles of ‘‘Progressive Democracy’’ (Kolnai): for ‘‘the absolute self-consciousness of modernity
is the form of an absolutely reactionary consciousness: the form of
the absolute reaction of self-consciousness to the Incarnation.’’3 Mary’s
viscera caritatis, or ‘‘the groaning of the wounded entrails’’ (Levinas),
exemplifies a right ordering of the powers of the animal rationale. Kant
rejects the human understood as an animal rationale as being nothing
but a pretium vulgare. Rather, he insists, is the human being homo
noumenon, absolute self-consciousness, and so, to be shorn of any distinguishing characteristics whatsoever: the stranger, the foundling, the
One of mysterious origin (‘‘we do not know where he comes from’’
[Jn :]), whoever resists the identitarianism of homo noumenon, must
needs be rejected as a pretium vulgare.
How this Christoform politics counters the politics of the city of

................. 11244$

$CH8

03-18-05 08:28:46

PS

PAGE 139



Ecstatic Morality and Sexual Politics

man can be seen in the case of gay marriage. State enforcement of gay
marriage contradicts a bodily politics of hospitality. The fundamental
issue here is that civil society is characterized by hospitality, not equality. Indeed, the central error of those who wish state power to contradict civil society is to mistake marriage as a right, a matter of equality,
when marriage is an institution of privilege. The family as hospitality
is based upon a natural privilege: those sex acts able to moderate the
lust to dominate are those acts ordered to the self-diffusiveness of the
good. Since gay sex does not have this privilege there can be no privilege of gay marriage either. Admittedly, not all privilege is natural privilege. However, all privilege has the character of ecstasy and has its
justification in the moderation of domination. This is the basis of the
privilege of the male priesthood. Thus, a further argument will be
made that the privilege of the male priesthood is a quasi-natural privilege related to the inclinatio ad peccatum. In more modern language, it
is a privilege to address a gender-specific problem: male violence. The
privilege of male priesthood is a channel of divine justice. Eucharistic
enactment through the male body in persona Christi seeks to moderate
male violence by teaching, again and again, the deposition of male
sensuality through a love that wounds the lover. Here, a concern of
‘‘social justice’’—the just treatment of women by men—is addressed
by a theological justice dependent upon privilege. In the following
chapter, it will be argued that the antidote to the culture of death is
most effectively addressed by this same theological justice that is dependent upon privilege.
Fides et Ratio includes a remarkable critique of Plato’s theory of
desire as this is explained in the Symposium. At the end of the encyclical, John Paul II asks us to philosophize in Mary (philosophari in
Maria). Recalling that Plato encourages us to philosophize with Diotima, the profound import of John Paul II’s philosophari in Maria
emerges. Lying in the garden of Zeus, Resource, son of Invention, is
used by Poverty to gain her entry to the garden of Zeus, to end her
separation from the Forms (bc). Desire is born of this union and
is structured by the character of both parents, in Plotinus’s words,
‘‘undirected striving and the self-sufficient Reason.’’4 Desire is both
like the Forms and yet distant from them. Seeking ever greater union
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with the Forms, desire rightly educated takes on the character of reason
or philosophy. Poverty becomes Resource as a return to the source of
all reality is made. John Paul II is skeptical. For desire to return to the
One who is ‘‘the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world’’
(Apoc. , ), reason must order itself to faith, philosophy to theology,
human plenitude to Mary’s self-emptying poverty (FR, ; MD, ).
John Paul II’s skepticism regarding the discipline of reason to attain
Truth stems not only from biblical witness (Gn :), but from an
understanding of embodied desire itself. The power of reason is now
‘‘impaired by an aversion to the One’’ (FR, ). Existence is ‘‘the love
revealed in the cross of Christ’’ (FR, ), yet embodied rationality is
always already structured by a pronitas to self-enclosure: reason’s ‘‘selfconcentration,’’ as Plotinus puts it.5 Averse to the discipline of the
wound of ecstasy, and isolated from the Law, embodied reason is ‘‘distorted and inclined to falsehood,’’ inclined to become ‘‘more and more
a prisoner to itself ’’ (FR, ). It is less that poverty needs reason and
rather more the other way around. Here paganism is reversed.6 And
surely John Paul II is thinking of Bonaventure’s opening of the Itinerarium, ‘‘Here begins the reflection of the poor man in the desert.’’ The
poverty of the wound that can yet be glorified is ‘‘that which is nothing
to reduce to nothing things that are’’ (FR, ; quoting I Cor :). It is
the poverty of the wound that enables Anselm to pray to Jesus the
Lord, ‘‘You are greater than all that can be conceived’’ (FR, ). Thus,
it is only a rationality ordered to the faith of Mary, the wisdom of
Mary (FR, ), that has taken the ‘‘decisive step toward welcoming
something radically new’’ (FR, ). Only such a reason has been enabled to become hospitable, ‘‘welcoming something radically new.’’
Mary is thus an exemplar of welcoming the stranger. And this is possible only once bodily reason forsakes its claim to be ‘‘sovereign and
autonomous’’ (FR, ) and has become the ostiarius of the Law. Mary,
‘‘in giving her assent to Gabriel’s word,’’ becomes the one who bodily
‘‘giving birth to the Truth and treasuring it in her heart’’ (FR, ;
MD, ) becomes an exemplar for everybody. Mary accepts into her
heart Christ crucified (Luke : ), ‘‘the reef ’’ upon which the relationship between faith and philosophy ‘‘can break up’’ but also ‘‘the reef
beyond which the two can set forth upon the boundless ocean of truth’’
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(FR, ). Mary becomes a tutor, reversing in many senses the old Greek
model. Pausanias offered the young boy a relationship with a principle
of reason and virtue, the older man, while Mary offers to reason, young
and energetic, an attitude of hospitality so that there might be ‘‘reason
reflecting rightly upon what is true,’’ the Divine Word, incarnated,
crucified, resurrected.
The reflection on Plato’s theory of desire in Fides et Ratio is especially a reflection on the family and civil society. Catholicism’s theoretical defense of civil society extends back at least to St. Thomas’s Contra
impugnantes and is found especially eloquent expression in St. Thomas
More’s mauling of the social monism of his imagined Utopians. In
More, the privileges of civil society limit one another and any totalizing
power of the state.7 Vatican Council II reaffirmed this tradition (GS,
) and so too, I have argued, did Humanae Vitae. The Council also
affirmed that the family is both the foundation of society and a school
of ‘‘deeper humanity’’ (GS, ). Plato’s Symposium can help us to understand the Council’s claim about the family. Trying to understand
just what in the earlier theories of love recounted by Plato in the Symposium contributes to his own theory remains to this day one of the
most exquisite of philosophical challenges. All of the previous theories
are criticized, of course, and some more than others. The speech of
Pausanias introduces the basic idea of the need to civilize erotic desire
by linking it with the wisdom that comes from age and (one hopes)
virtue. This speech also stresses the principle (at least) that erotic desire
must be made procreative by creating the young anew as leaders in
service to the community. Both of these themes are taken up strongly
by Plato and are in sharp contrast to the speech from Aristophanes that
separates erotic desire from daily living, with Aristophanes explaining
that when the lovers have had the satisfaction of spent desire they can
go about their daily business in a more relaxed manner (c). John
Paul II adopts Plato’s thoughts on the centrality of desire or eros in
human activity but (unsurprisingly) stresses the utter centrality of the
family in the cultivation of youth. The importance of the family is
markedly absent in Plato, although it is to be noted that children are
desired under a logic of transaction and not hospitality (c).8 Pausanias as the historian introduces the reader to the classical practice of
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the youth being mentored in wisdom and virtue by the older man, a
practice that has had a long if (and significantly so) interrupted history
in the West. The single most startling feature of this practice is perhaps
less the exchange of sex for education as the immediate absorption of
the youth in the political realm; indeed, more graphically put, the
absorption of the boy into affairs of state.
The social monism inherent in such a conception was, of course,
much moderated by the hierarchy of Athenian society and the radical
exclusions of the hierarchy—the slaves, women, the disabled, and so
on. Nevertheless, the ‘‘politics of the family’’ of Vatican II and John
Paul II is a fresh statement of Christian political pluralism against social
monism. A statement very much needed, it seems, when the idea of
the family is under such imminent threat from a renewed social monism: gay marriage. Against Pausanias, the Christian family presumes
to cultivate the youth, with the family acting as a barrier to the absorption of youth into the political. Most crucially, as John Paul II conceives it, this separation of youth from the political happens in the
family with a peculiar institutional character; that is, the family cultivates hospitality in youth rather than the fiat of political action which,
as Arendt has pointed out, was so dear to the Athenians. Thus, the
family is itself double in aspect. As an institution of civil society it
resists the political and yet by so doing builds political pluralism. The
hospitality of the family separates it from the structure of exchange
which defines the political in Pausanias, the lust of domination that
defines the political in Augustine, and subverts the political of
Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction. For this reason, however, in a second aspect, the family is thoroughly political.9 As an institution of
hospitality, the family reaffirms the ius gentium10 and welcomes the
stranger. The family stands as an institution of liquefactio that reminds
the political of the hospitality of the ius gentium: ‘‘There is no contract
of distribution: sharing is simply the essence of family life.’’11 Historically speaking, I take it to be of the utmost significance that it is within
the Christian Middle Ages that a host of institutions emerge (hospitals,
for example), all exhibiting the institutional character of hospitality,
and all of which contributed greatly to political pluralism. It surely is
significant that, as Christianity strongly reaffirmed the idea of the fam-
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ily, there emerged in the Middle Ages the idea of cultivating youth
in schools and universities. Political conservatives have lamented the
absorption of these intermediary institutions into the power of the state
as nothing short of a new social monism characteristic of collectivism.
It is probably in some such sense that John Paul II’s Ex corde ecclessia
should be understood: and in America it is probably Hauerwas who
has had the most to say about the policing of Christianity by the state.
A great defender of liberalism, Nussbaum certainly believes that for
purposes of equality the Church should be policed. The autonomy
of civil society is rightly diminished, she argues, when, for example,
Georgetown University was forced by local city law to give official
recognition to its student gay and lesbian organization, this coercion
was, she says, ‘‘the right result.’’12 Nor has religious reasoning any role
to play in debates over public policy unless ‘‘it takes care to indicate its
harmony with . . . the democratic political culture.’’13 The tendency of
progressive democracy to social monism is amply on display here. I
want to show later in this chapter, and in the next, how profound and
far-reaching the difference is between the hospitality of the family and
the fiat of the political.
The meaning of a politics of the family is stated in an especially
provocative way by John Paul II in his  Familiaris Consortio. With
the family at the root of civil society all of society is ordered to hospitality, the ‘‘original character’’ of the family (FC, ). Welcoming the
stranger is a part of the ius gentium, and, as Dupuis has pointed out, a
large part of Christ’s ministry.14 In a remarkable use of Scripture, Vitoria writes, ‘‘ ‘I was a stranger and ye took me not in’ (Matt. : ),
from which it is clear that, since it is a law of nature to welcome
strangers, this judgement of Christ is to be decreed amongst all men.’’15
In other words, Vitoria takes the sayings and actions of Christ, as well
as the parable of the Good Samaritan, as an historical witness to the
ius gentium and its promulgation of the obligation to welcome the
stranger. Certainly, Christ identifies Samaritans as ‘‘foreigners.’’ He
heals them (Lk :–) and he offers one of these ‘‘foreigners,’’ the
Good Samaritan (Lk : –), as an example to the Jews (Lk : )
of how to welcome the stranger. An example of ‘‘family politics’’ is how
its theory of civil society as interiorly ordered to hospitality provides a
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powerful rejoinder to one of the classic arguments for abortion. The
famous essay of Judith Jarvis Thompson rests on the assumption that
there is no right to life because the parable of the Good Samaritan is
not an obligation but at very best a counsel of perfection.16 Just how
dehumanizing is such an argument is seen only when rejection of the
stranger is understood to be against the ius gentium. Yet, it is not only
abortion which contravenes the hospitality of civil society but sex unordered to the diffusiveness of procreation. At the heart of civil society is
the family, and at the heart of the family is Mary’s hospitality to the
Law. The ‘‘Marian attitude’’ orders conjugal love and thus the Church
teaches that the very institution of marriage by its ‘‘very nature’’ (GS,
) is ordered to procreation and the education of children. For the
hospitality of the family begins in the ‘‘conjugal charity’’ of the
spouses, in their liquefactio (MD, ) as they ‘‘participate in and are
called to live the very charity of Christ who gave Himself on the Cross’’
(FC, ). If civil society is to moderate the dominatio of the state then
the heart of civil society must not itself be consumed by the libido
dominandi.17 Rather, for the stranger to be welcomed, civil society
must have as its foundation the bodily giving of self, the love that
wounds the lover: ‘‘in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been
brought near in the blood of Christ. For he is our peace, who has made
us both one, and has broken down the wall of hostility’’ (FR, ;
quoting Acts :–). Marriage can foster the deposing ecstasy of civil
society only if the privilege of the married state is reserved for those
whose sexual acts in principle are able to possess the character of hospitality. Hospitality is possible only in those sexual acts whose character
is the residing of the Law in the flesh, in the fervor coitus (Sent. II, q.
, , , ad ) of the love that wounds the lover.18 As Aurel Kolnai has
magnificently argued, privilege is response, not fiat.
Up to this point the argument of this book has relied (in part) on
Aurel Kolnai’s ethical writings. The remainder of the argument depends upon his political writings. Central to his political thinking is
the idea, and reality, of privilege. While the rest of the book is an
illustration of this idea, and, I hope, a demonstration of its power, a
few brief remarks on the idea are called for. Kolnai was an implacable
opponent of communism at a time when the majority of European
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intellectuals were not only sympathetic to communism but many infamously excused its barbarism. But the problem at the heart of contemporary politics that Kolnai identified was the tendency of classical
liberalism to collapse into progressive democracy and thereafter into
socialism and communism. Privilege restrains and moderates this collapse, argues Kolnai. As an early and implacable opponent of fascism
(a Jewish convert to Catholicism, he had to flee Europe), he was thoroughly hostile to idiosyncratic rightist gestures to counter liberalism
and its dialectical tendencies. He thought the intellectual defense of
the sites of privilege that continue to exist within liberal society would
help restrain its dialectical attraction to ever more egalitarian forms of
politics. The principle of diversity is privilege, argues Kolnai: height is
its phenomenological appearance (hierarchy and inequality) and liberty
its political form. Crucially, the justice of privilege lies in its being a
response, in a sense to be explained, to an objective order of value.
Marriage, understood in principle to be a locus of acts of self-diffusion,
is a privilege par excellence. In such sexual acts, one participates in the
self-diffusiveness of being itself. One is loyal to a measure to which one
has submitted and thereby submitted ‘‘to what is highest in man and
higher than man’’ (PL, ). Because ‘‘the prime gesture of the human
person’’ is response (PL, ), sexual acts hospitable to self-diffusion are
the most human acts. Here phenomenology and theology meet: Von
Hildebrand has observed that ‘‘in every value response our attitude has
the basic feature of self-donation,’’19 which put otherwise is to say that
‘‘Christ . . . fully reveals man to man himself ’’ (GS, ). The privilege
of marriage is an institutional acknowledgement and affirmation of the
special moral and existential character of certain sexual acts. If David
Hume is right that wise political order is a meeting of human passions
and institutional arrangements, the privilege of marriage should continue to be so affirmed. To set marriage upon a principle of equality is,
as Kolnai puts it, to ‘‘speak the idiom of Identity’’ in which humans
assert their sovereignty to posit and generate not only civil society but
reality itself.
The metaphysical core of the concept of social Totality is the
concept of Identity; and the postulate of Identity, again, is im-
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plicit in man’s pretension to metaphysical sovereignty, his aspiration to be God: for if I admit any entitative ‘‘otherness’’ of mind
and will on a footing with myself, if I am aware of any human
consciousness and purpose really distinct from my own, if I recognize any valid law and authority over and above my will—and
not an efflux and manifestation thereof—I cannot be God.
(PL, )
Such fiat is nothing less than ‘‘a radical enmity to Being’’ (PL, –)
and betokens totalitarianism. The privilege of marriage is a conservation of self-diffusion, not a locking up of the human in state enforcement: it is a bulwark of liberty because it protects diversity20 and resists
the reduction of the diffusiveness of being to the totality of identity.21
The autonomy of civil society, the diversity of its institutions and practices, is threatened by the logic of equality which reduces diversity to
monism and therewith invites totalitarianism. If the mark of totalitarianism is the destruction of the self-sustaining autonomy of civil society,
and if the family is at the heart of civil society, then to force sameness
(PL, ) on civil society, gay and straight now marrying, is already to
have destroyed civil society. Identity will replace political pluralism, for
behind equalitarianism, as Kolnai so forcefully points out, is a horror
of division, a revolted activism, for ‘‘no man must hold more or be
more than his fellow man’’ (PL, ). Just as I argued in the last chapter
against Nussbaum’s claim that contraception is a human right because
such a putative right is the institutionalization of something inherently
violent, so a right of same-sex marriage would be the institutionalization of sex acts that cannot ecstatically depose the flesh. The goal of
Catholic politics has always been non-utopian, an effort to moderate
domination. Catholic political reflection takes its bearings from Augustine and his assumption that the city of man aims at domination.
He argues that the state is homicidal at its foundation and that such a
foundation is an archetype (and not the teething problems of a prototype to be overcome later in some new, say, ‘‘democratic dispensation’’) of political order.22 Like Augustine, the Thomist tradition
acknowledges that domination is fundamental to the state.23 Crucially,
however, the Catholic tradition does not thereby think that the domi-
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nation of the state is a straightforwardly evil and diabolical power24
(which is not to deny that on occasion it might be such). The state
aims at peace, a good, and even despotic states have the same aim albeit
realized very poorly. The point of politics is to retrench higher goods
by moderating the pervasiveness of the domination of the state (Hume
argues identically). This goal cannot be furthered by gay marriage, as
the identitarianism of the logic is nothing less than totalitarian, bringing civil society under the domination of the state. Such state action
would be utopian, insisting upon identity where there is none, setting
its institutions in opposition to the ius gentium, nay, in opposition to
Being, denying Being its character as diffusivum sui.
Roger Scruton has already pointed out the non-ecstatic character of
homosexual desire:
In the heterosexual act, it might be said, I move out from my
body towards the other, whose flesh is unknown to me; while in
the homosexual act I remain locked within my body, narcissistically contemplating in the other an excitement that is the mirror
of my own.25
And more:
. . . there may be a diminished sense of risk. The move out of the
self may be less adventurous, the help of the other less required.
In an important sense it is open to the homosexual to make himself less vulnerable and to offer, because he needs, less support.26
Martha Nussbaum has reacted to Scruton’s claims here. She argues
that most heterosexual couples fail Scruton’s moral criteria for sex. And
who can doubt that most heterosexuals are narcissistic, risking little in
relationships which they can barely commit to? And the same is true
of millions of marriages across the world, as well. Yet Nussbaum’s real
objection is different: the moral cannot be the basis for the political.27
This claim sits rather uneasily with the moralizing character of her own
substantive liberalism.28 Nussbaum clearly thinks that the state should
get involved in legislating civil society for the sake of equality, which
acts as a moral norm of the political (this is her basic justification for
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abortion). That ‘‘no man must hold more or be more than his fellow
man’’ (PL, ) is undeniably a moral claim.29 Whatever the validity of
equality as a moral norm, that the good is diffusive of itself is, I want
to argue, a fundamental description of the good (and Being) and as
such a prior norm. Homosexual sex (a quite different issue from homosexual friendship)30 is incapable of the love that bodily wounds the
lover. Heterosexual sex often does fail to be such a bodily love, but it
is not incapable of being such. Civil society is a response to Being, and
as such, civil society inevitably has the character of welcoming the
stranger, and not the character of sameness. The institution of marriage
as known throughout the ages in the ius gentium, a matter of ‘‘moral
consensus’’ (Kolnai), reflects this dynamism of Being, and a stateconstructed and enforced institution of sameness would contradict this
dynamism and subvert the ecstatic order itself. Scruton agrees with
John Paul II that sexual desire is ‘‘nuptial,’’31 but the deepest reason for
this is that Being itself is nuptial, having the theological interior of the
‘‘the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world’’ (Apoc. : ) and
to Whose wedding feast we are all invited. Privilege, as Kolnai explains
it, is ‘‘the social projection, the institutional recognition, the traditional
embodiment of the essentially insurmountable dividedness,’’ and I
would add, the insurmountable diffusiveness, of Being (PL, ). Privilege then is a participation in Being and a moral obligation to serve the
other through the wound and this even in our sexual acts. Heterosexual
marriage is affirmed in the ius gentium, which itself is a response to a
profound theological order, and it is in this privilege that a metaphysical hospitality to the stranger is already always active (Levinas’s ‘‘maternity’’).
For at least one thinker, this metaphysical hospitality, the hospitality
of the love that wounds the lover, is to be especially opposed by the
logic of identitarianism. It is no surprise therefore that this thinker
took up a strongly Stalinist position in his later theorizing. Sartre has
some famous pages on sliminess and stickiness. Kolnai has addressed
the phenomenology of disgust or bodily aversion, but Sartre adds a
metaphysical color which speaks volumes. The slimy is ‘‘the outline of
a fusion of the world with myself,’’ an outline wherein there is a ‘‘bestowal of self ’’ and an appearance of the world as a ‘‘leech sucking
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me.’’32 Sartre regards the slime of the wound as nothing less than the
compromising of his autonomy. His version of liberty is the ‘‘pitiless
hardness’’ and ‘‘metal’’ of the For-itself ‘‘which is everywhere fleeing
and yet everywhere similar to itself ’’ (emphasis added).33 There is an
arresting of the freedom of consciousness in the slimy and it is this that
is disgusting and repugnant. What disgusts, argues Sartre, in the
wound of love, a ‘‘leech sucking at me,’’ is the diminishment of autonomy; the ‘‘metal’’ of the self ’s armored isolation is no longer operative.
Sartrean autonomy flees the moral obligation of the wound of love, the
hospitality of love. For the slime of the wound ‘‘does not flee, it
yields,’’34 and so I become possessed by the wound, unable to flee, but
the other is then like a leech sucking at me, inflaming the wound, ‘‘the
For-itself is suddenly compromised.’’35 For Sartre, unsurprisingly, we
have here a ‘‘feminine sucking,’’36 a disvalue opposed to Levinas’s ‘‘maternity’’ and John Paul II’s ‘‘Marian attitude.’’ The sharing of the good
with another, the fundamental act of hospitality, is in principle rejected
here and a constant fleeing into the unbroken identity of autonomy
valorized.
The role of such principled individualism in sustaining the culture
of death will be discussed in the next chapter and in my closing remarks. Contrasting with a metaphysics of identity, and thus isolationism, is privilege and a metaphysics of ecstasy, both being foundations
of the appetitus socialis (Grotius).37 This metaphysics reduces to a halftruth Scruton’s claim that social order is not spontaneous but rather
‘‘the elaborate artefact of centuries of institution-building.’’38 And he is
partially right in arguing that the institutions of erotic love and private
property are not natural rights, rather ‘‘both are the products of institutions which sustain them, and both grant their benefits, not as rights,
but as achievements and privileges.’’39 For Kolnai, privilege is not an
exemption from state power, for such a position assumes the universality and primordiality of the state. Rather is privilege originaliter and
thus prior to the state.40 For Scruton, who is more of a statist than
Kolnai, privilege (for the most part41) is in the grant of the state.42
Kolnai agrees that the state must support privilege by legal privilege,
but legal privilege is a response, at least oftentimes, to privilege originaliter. Nevertheless, Scruton is correct that the institution of marriage
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does nothing less than sustain and protect ‘‘the unfair privilege which
every love contains.’’43 Scruton rightly resists any right to marriage
whether heterosexual or homosexual. It is understandable why the 
Catechism speaks of rights to marriage and family: once Maritain’s synthesis of natural law and natural right had been broadly adopted in
Catholic social thought the re-writing of privilege as right was inevitable. There is some inconsistency here, however: the Catechism very
explicitly describes the family as ‘‘the original cell of social life . . . a
privileged community’’ (para. –; emphases original). As political theorist Robert Kraynak has recently insisted, the history of rights
is one of expansion and subversion of natural orders.44 Such subversion
ill serves Catholic doctrine. Maritain hoped to forestall the subversive
dynamism of rights by linking them thoroughly to the natural law.
This approach is presumed in all contemporary documents of Catholic
social thought. This approach of Maritain’s links rights to a metaphysical order of sociality, but the venture seems ill-advised for two reasons.
No one thinks that rights are inherently social; people quite rightly
think that the word captures a non-social principle of absolute freedom
from which no social duty of obligation can be read off.45 If Maritain
had had to think about the topic, he would have argued that there is
no right to gay marriage because it presumes unnatural eroticism. The
problem with such an argument is that rights are not called ‘‘natural
rights’’ because they are a part of nature but because they are metaphysically prior to nature. Rights are a metaphysico-political lattice upon
which humans articulate fluid natures as per the possible interactions
of the rights lattice work. This is what Rousseau meant by promoting
rights and by defining human essence as liberty.46 I agree with Maritain
that some putative rights, whether to contraception or gay marriage,
are unnatural. Unnatural in the sense that they are violence because
they reject the moral order of the self-diffusion of Being. The state
imposition of gay marriage is totalitarian, for it trespasses upon civil
society, and the violence of this imposition is double, for it imposes
what is itself an institutionalization of metaphysical violence.
Privilege is guided then by the Christoform natural law, and the law
of nations derived from it, and gay marriage is not, and never has been,
an institution of the ius gentium. Aquinas, of course, recognizes that
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natural law needs to be supplemented by human law which, if congruent with natural law, becomes part of natural law. Such a variegated
understanding of the moral order is clearly necessary. Certainly, not all
sexual politics can be read off directly from the natural law. Humanae
Vitae argues that sexual acts must be ordered to procreation and can
sensibly insist on this because sexual acts can be read off from the basic
inclinations of the natural law. Those who reject Catholic teaching on
the grounds that the Christoform natural law could not establish that
each and every act of sexual intercourse must be ordered to procreation
elide, in my opinion, the character of sex acts. I have explained this in
the previous chapter. Yet, what of something like the Catholic prohibition of woman’s ordination? Oftentimes this is defended by recourse
to a kind of natural law argument. Max Scheler and Edith Stein have
both spoken of the relational character of woman, as have some contemporary secular feminist authors, which is sometimes contrasted
with male aloofness, or a certain transcendent bearing to the world.47
John Paul II is certainly taken with Stein’s identification of a ‘‘feminine
genius.’’ I have presented a very different Wojtyla, however: the advocate of a Thomistic metaphysical argument in which all human bodies
are structured by a Christoform natural law. If this were so, one might
think John Paul II inconsistent. One might argue that since all humans
are already and always in persona Christi there are no grounds for resisting woman’s ordination. There are no such grounds to be read off
from the basic inclinations of the natural law, I acknowledge, but then
Eucharistic celebration is a matter of divine law. Passing no judgement
on arguments from ‘‘original personality’’ (John Paul II), and granted
the Christoform natural law as I have developed it in these pages, still
it does not follow that women’s ordination is warranted: for there is a
quasi-natural variant of the Scheler-Stein thesis against women’s ordination that is, I think, irresistible. This argument will help clarify why
the moral order is variegated through different categories of privilege.
To begin with preliminaries, that God revealed Himself fully and
uniquely to the Jews and those who would then become Christians, is
the privilege of Christianity itself. This is insisted upon by Paul,48 and
is strongly affirmed in the foreword to the Indian edition of Dupuis’
Religious Pluralism: Archbishop Henry D’Souza ends his foreword,

................. 11244$

$CH8

03-18-05 08:28:50

PS

PAGE 152

T h e We d d i n g F e a s t of th e L a m b   

‘‘the singular privilege which we have received in coming to know and
acknowledge Jesus Christ the one Lord and Saviour of all.’’49 John Paul
II speaks of consecrated life as a privilege stemming from the bestowal
of grace to some (TB, –): he further adds that consecrated life is
a greater contribution to the Kingdom of God than the married state
on account of its radical adoption of the Cross (TB, ). Vitoria in
his disputes with the Reformers casts the central problem of priestly
mediation in terms of equality and privilege. The Reformers deny the
mediation of the sacraments (and thus priest) because they reject the
idea that a privileged locus of access to God is a Christian idea.50 This
same question undoubtedly animates Dupuis’ Religious Pluralism and
there is no reason to doubt that Vitoria would think of Dupuis as a
Reform theologian. Famously, and with tremendous consequences for
the tradition of Catholic social thought, one finds this same embarrassment in Maritain.51 Privilege is a ‘‘divisive principle’’ and only an expression of ‘‘selfishness and particularism.’’52 In a truly remarkable
formulation, Maritain speaks of God’s sovereign right and claims that
natural right is more basic than obligation.53 Curiously, he even speaks
of ‘‘the infinite rights of God.’’54 So committed to the equalitarianism
vouchsafed by rights is Maritain that he is willing to posit a univocal
possession of right between God and creatures so as to sacralize right
and make the equalitarianism unassailable: ‘‘every right possessed by
man is possessed by virtue of the right possessed by God.’’55 How God
could be thought of as having a right when Aquinas insists that there
is no relationship of justice whatsoever between God and creatures
(ScG II, c. , para. ) is very hard to understand. Embarrassments
aside,56 Christianity is a privileged religion and ordination is a claim to
that privilege: As Donoso Cortés said about priests: ‘‘their highest and
incommunicable privilege is not in their authority, but in the power to
make the Son of God obedient to their voice.’’57 What is desired in
women’s ordination then is access to privilege.
Suarez explains the privilege of the priesthood as an exemption from
state power. This would not be how Kolnai would put it (no exemption being needed) nor Scruton (privilege being an establishment of
the state), but Suarez’s definition of priestly privilege is well worth
noting, nonetheless. He writes,
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For the privilege of an exemption is a certain freedom from subjection to another. It is a certain moral power so as not to be the
equal of the power of, or to be free to act without regard to, or
with impediment from, another: thus this power given by God
Himself is said to be divine law, not as a precept, but as a gift of
God.58
The Church itself is a privilege and gift of God, and to Suarez’s mind,
it is on this basis that the Church is exempt from state power. As
privilege within the Church, priesthood is a gift of God that cannot be
a precept, that is, not a natural privilege. Why should women then not
be recipients of this divine gift? If there is no natural basis for the
privilege is it not arbitrary?59 The answers to these questions rely on
the answer to another: are the wounds that stem from the love that
wounds the lover different for men than for women? It certainly is true
that women—and Levinas makes this central to his ethics—can be
wounded in a very particular way, and quite literally, through maternity (MD,  & ). If we follow the Council Fathers and acknowledge
the different offices of motherhood and fatherhood we readily see that
offices command different depositions of the body. Different offices
require different virtues and different virtues require different articulations of the body: a university professor must be brave, because all
humans must be brave, but not in the same way as a U. S. Marine is
called upon to be brave. All offices are ecstatic, but if men and women
both could hold the office of sacramental priesthood, if both were
called to be, in the most radical sense, in persona Christi, would the
bodily gift of self be different? Presumably not. However, if we keep
before us that the goal of privilege, of politics, is to moderate violence,
then the continuation of the male privilege of sacramental priesthood
is not arbitrary, but just. It does a divine justice that opens out onto
‘‘social justice.’’ I strongly suspect that there is a natural pronitas to
violence peculiar to male biology: whatever the case may be, however,
there is certainly a biblical (TB, –), historical, and sociological
record that men do more violence than women. No one seriously can
doubt that the vast majority of domestic violence is done by men
against women (three women a day are murdered in the United States
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by husbands or boyfriends).60 Domestic violence has its origin in the
failure to articulate the male body in the justice of the love that wounds
the lover (‘‘for you are all one in Christ Jesus’’ [Galatians : ]). The
permanent reminder to men offered daily by the male priest on the
altar to conform their sensuality to the Deposed Lover is a priceless act
of justice: but the privilege of the male priest is to constantly recall to
men the Christological markings upon their bodies.61 It will certainly
be time for women to have access to the privilege of the priesthood
once more men turn up in hospital emergency rooms as the result of
domestic battery than women. This is not to argue that the male priesthood is a natural privilege. It is only quasi-natural, for it stems from
an institution of divine justice to moderate the inclinatio ad peccatum
peculiar to male sensuality. It is only quasi-natural, for, as I say, when
the sociological evidence regarding hospital admissions alters, the
Church in justice will have to act so as to protect men.
Broader issues respecting the connection between theology, privilege, and justice need to be addressed (for example, in the development
of an appropriate theology of religious pluralism or an adequate account of the relationship between nature and grace), but with regard
to sexual politics enough has hopefully been said to show why Christians cannot support gay marriage—on grounds that non-religious
people concerned with antitotalitarian politics should affirm also.
Upon a more consequentialist basis, an argument against women’s ordination has been made. Opposed to the politics of the family is the
Sartrean flight from hospitality: in fact, an aversion to the fundamental
sociality of the world.62 This flight is emblematic of the cult of abortion, ‘‘the most neuralgic issue’’ (Fukuyama) in sexual politics, and the
topic of the last chapter.
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THE POLITICS OF T HE CROSS

The god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them
from seeing the light of the Gospel of the glory of Christ.
— Cor. : 
Politics must be able in fact always to be checked and criticized starting
from the ethical.
—Levinas.

A Jesuit author has recently argued that Catholic moral formation
helped National Socialism to identify its enemies and helps explain
‘‘the savagery of its violence’’ toward those enemies. In his argument,
Catholic moral theology set the framework for the  Nuremberg
Laws prohibiting sexual relations between Germans and Jews. If Germans were identified with spirit and Jews with flesh, then not only is
Nazism’s desire to see the two kept apart explained but so too is the
violence visited upon the Jews: for is it not a central tenet of Catholic
moral theology that there is a war between spirit and flesh and that
flesh must needs be coerced by spirit?1
At least three questions immediately arise respecting this thesis. If
Nazism employed the struggle between spirit and flesh to legitimize
their persecution of the Jews, () was it Catholicism that provided the
logic of this struggle? After all, the pagan Plato, in his image of the
chariot, speaks eloquently of reason’s violent control of sensuality.
More, the architects of modernity, and thinkers who at best are only
ambiguously related to Christianity, also speak of a violent control of
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sensuality. Kant, for example, speaks of the need for reason to ‘‘stamp
out’’ the ‘‘rabble’’ and ‘‘mob’’ of sensuality.2 One might then argue
that the context of National Socialism was a secularized modernity3
and that Nazism could have found its violent logic of the war between
sensuality and reason there. I have shown in chapter  that one can
find such a logic even in ‘‘Cyborg feminism’’: and a conception more
self-consciously devoted to human liberation could not be found. I also
showed there that Malebranche clearly conformed his religious thinking to the thought of the Early Modern period, abandoning in dramatic fashion Aquinas’s notion of the love that wounds the lover in
favor of a Cartesian conflict between the parts of the human. In Malebranche one certainly does find talk about the ‘‘malignity of the passions’’ (TE, ) and ‘‘the gross and sensual Jews’’ (TE, ). Moreover,
() is it even true that Catholic moral formation relies on such a violent
approach to sensuality? True, Giles of Rome, a student of Thomas
Aquinas at Paris, does develop a violent model of moral formation, but
he does so in opposition to Aquinas: in Aquinas’s model, reason persuades rather than coerces sensuality.4 And, of course, it is Aquinas,
not Giles, who has been the foundation of Catholic moral thought for
the last  years or so. Although, as I showed in chapter , it is
undeniable that Thomas’s thought on these matters was seriously misunderstood in some Catholic circles at least. In light of questions ()
and (), the work of the Jesuit Gaston Fessard helps us to ask ()
whether it might be that the violence of Nazism had its roots precisely
in a failure to adopt a Christian theory of the flesh. Rather than looking
toward Catholic moral formation as the source of Nazi violence, Fessard argues for a quite different source: liberal political theory.
This chapter develops a critique of what might be called a ‘‘liberal
conception of the body’’ and the liberal political thinking that accompanies it. First, let me summarize the Thomistic understanding of the
flesh that has been discussed in these pages. Two basic things have been
seen: sensuality is not wholly negative, and spirit does not violently
control flesh. Regarding the first, sensuality is naturally ordered to ecstasy, as a good ordered to God, and sensuality contains important
moral knowledge which must not be ignored. Indeed, the rebellion of
sensuality against the false rule of reason can be seen as salvific. The
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rebellion of the flesh can be—as in the case of Merton—an attempt by
sensuality to live out its ecstatic possibility and therewith convert reason back to its rightful rule under God. As to the second, if reason
rules sensuality correctly, it does so through moral persuasion. This is
evident from Thomas’s account of the Fall wherein reason in rebelling
against God establishes itself as an idol. Rejecting the ecstatic propensity of the intellectual appetite, reason becomes enclosed upon itself in
its auto-determination (FR, ), abandoning its character as an artist
patronized by God. The idolatry is violent since reason must now make
sensuality serve it rather than God, which can be done only by a violent
constriction of the natural ecstatic appetite of sensuality, or to be more
nuanced, a reason enclosed upon itself inevitably cultivates one of the
possibilities of sensuality. Sensuality denied its ecstatic opening is reduced to the particularity of the body and therewith its transgressive
pronitas. Thus, contrary to Bernauer, in Thomas’s conception: a coercive, violent rule of sensuality is a result of the Fall; such rule has its
origin in a sin of reason; and this rule is now perpetuated by a rejection
of the ecstatic propensity of sensuality and reason’s refusal to take on
the norm of the Cross, the love that wounds the lover.5
Bernauer, like so many others, misunderstands Catholic flesh. Defending Catholic flesh from its detractors is not yet to demonstrate that
the liberal conception of flesh is rooted in violence. This demonstration
has been ongoing throughout this book, however, and I want to bring
those arguments together now. I will explain () Gaston Fessard’s argument that liberalism’s conception of the body itself leads to a glorification of violence. Expanding on Fessard’s observation, () I defend John
Paul II’s claim that liberalism is a contemporary form of the culture of
death. Evangelium Vitae makes a major contribution to political theory
when it elaborates on the still shocking claim implicit in Paul VI’s
Humanae Vitae that a contraceptive culture promotes an abortion culture. At the root of both contraception and abortion is the rejection of
the obligation to welcome the stranger. This is a utopian gesture that
faces with hostility the generosity and hospitality of Being. By linking
political theory to the Church’s traditional understanding of the body,
Evangelium Vitae both identifies contraception, abortion, and euthanasia as emblematic of liberalism’s principled isolationism and
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decisionism and views these as revelatory of nothing less than the totalitarianism and tyranny which serve that isolationism and decisionism.
Against liberalism’s principled isolationism and its decisionist statism,6
John Paul II advocates a Christoform constitionalism. A Christological
natural law will help build a culture of life, he reasons: a politics of
liquefactio (Is. : –) will confirm the solidarity of the social body’s
‘‘sprinkled blood.’’ However, the argument of this chapter ends () by
insisting that the solidarity of the ‘‘sprinkled blood’’ cannot be confirmed if Catholic social thought continues to promote a politics of
rights against privilege. I argue that the encyclical’s conclusions are best
defended by continuing the Augustinian politics of Humanae Vitae, in
which power is moderated by loci of privilege. It is such a politics that
best fits the Church’s traditional theory of the body and not the rightsbased political philosophy the Church began to adopt after the war.
Let me say more about the structure of the argument, and especially
of sections () and (). At the heart of the culture of death, the encyclical argues, is the eclipse of God. To overcome this eclipse of God is the
horizon for contemporary Catholic political philosophy.7 To reinvigorate Catholic reflection on the political, the encyclical reaffirms the rule
of law and assumes a natural law jurisprudence. John Paul II reaffirms
the ius gentium, casting the entire problem of the culture of death as a
rejection of the stranger. Civilizations the world over have rituals to
welcome the stranger (the usefulness of Scripture on this law of nations
was discussed in the last chapter). Cultus is divine worship, and welcoming the stranger (liquefactio) is evidently linked to welcoming
Christ, the One whose face is nowhere described in Scripture.8 A politics which has abandoned hospitality in favor of a principled isolationism and decisionism has separated itself from the law of nations and
rejected the Christoform natural law upon which the ius gentium is
based, and therewith human bodily and spiritual inclinations to the
good. Thus, the culture of death is nothing less than a dehumanization
in which the other is radically rejected in a cult of homicide. Fessard is
so useful because he demonstrates that the principled isolationism of
liberalism stems from a structural violence against the body. Liberal
sexual politics is the defense of the enstatic body, the body in principle
isolated both from ecstatic reason (the ostiarius of the Law) and ecstatic
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sensuality. Such a body rejects its own propensity to self-diffusion,
separating itself from ecstatic Being: therewith it rejects the foundling
in enstatic sex; the unborn stranger in the womb; in its violent refusal
of the order of good and being, it rejects civil society; and in favoring
a utopian politics, it rejects God, the origin of strangeness, the God all
of whose ways are not even known by the Son (Mk : ; Mt : ).
The encyclical posits in opposition to this liberal sexual politics a
sexual politics of liquefactio, the sprinkling of blood in the love that
wounds the lover. The argument of the chapter thus far will be at one
with the encyclical. However, continuing a theme from the last chapter, the encyclical’s use of Maritain’s derivation of natural right from
natural law must be reconsidered.9 While some cherish this ‘‘progressive Catholicism,’’10 some express concern that Catholic social thought
has become too closely allied to liberalism’s advocacy of rights to be
able to launch an adequate critique of liberalism.11 A politics of rights
has been a staple of Catholic social thought since the  encyclical,
Pacem in Terris.12 Does the promotion of rights, even inside Maritain’s
carefully constructed natural law framework, help to recover God? Do
rights, in fact, promote a culture of life? It is disturbing, for instance,
that in a Europe trying to reinvigorate its politics of democracy and
rights after the war, capital punishment was abolished at the moment
when abortion was introduced.13 Yet, Catholic reflection on social and
political philosophy has an alternative available to it, an alternative that
continues to attract support. As is by now well known, Aquinas did
not defend a theory of rights and yet he held strongly to the rule
of law. Anscombe and MacIntyre have spoken favorably of law-based
conceptions of social ethics, and such a theory of obligation appears to
be the position of Levinas.14 In Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre
elaborates the justificatory reasoning for the politics of liquefactio found
in Evangelium Vitae but, pointedly, he does so without employing the
concept of rights, relying instead on Aquinas’s notion of misericordia,
the love that is owed in justice. The abolition of misericordia in the
culture of death has its roots in the liberal idolatry of the isolated
individual, as MacIntrye brilliantly portrays.15 Evangelium Vitae assumes much of Thomas’s legal and political theory and yet relies heavily upon Maritain’s ‘‘Progressive Catholicism.’’ I doubt that Thomas
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and Maritain’s Thomism can be made thoroughly consistent. Rather
than arguing that natural law is a controlling framework for the Catholic adoption of the Rights of Man and democracy, as Maritain suggests,
it would be better to understand natural law as a framework of privileges: in the last chapter I argued that marriage is better understood as
a privilege than a right and that only such an understanding serves
Catholic doctrine.
So the third part of this chapter is critical of the political reasoning
of the encyclical but in no way hesitant in affirming its conclusions.
Just as MacIntyre has provided the justificatory reasoning for Evangelium Vitae without recourse to a social ethics or politics of right, so too
can Kolnai’s theory of privilege. This theory advocates a vibrant civil
society of multiform privileges that moderate the exercise of power but
also, given the very character of privilege, overcome the eclipse of God.
For God must be eclipsed if the stranger cannot be welcomed. The
stranger is unable to be welcomed if an identitarian logic holds sway:
indeed, the very experience of dignity16 or conscience17 requires privilege and hierarchy. The logic of rights has for its raison d’etre an equalitarianism18 that is at root a horror of privilege and its protection of
diversity. This was demonstrated in the last chapter. Privilege not only
breaks identitarianism, allowing the stranger to emerge, but it also welcomes the stranger. Privilege is a response to the moral order, a response to the ‘‘order of ranks’’ among values (Scheler), which is
nothing less than a response to the Eternal Law. Vitoria was absolutely
correct to link privilege and grace. To stand in a place of privilege is
‘‘to ‘be a cause of grace’ [which] means to make the person a friend, to
make him ‘gracious’ (gratum) to another; that is, to ingratiate or put
someone in another’s good graces who was not so before.’’19 The body
opened by objective values, made ecstatic through the law, reduces
domination. This hospitality needs to be confirmed by institutions
which privilege the body’s response to the unborn stranger. By contrast, liberal equality, upon which are based both the argument for
abortion (Nussbaum) and the argument against welcoming the
stranger (Jarvis Thomson), makes the unborn (and in principle all of
us)20 persona non grata.21 This ‘‘bias for immoralism’’ is structurally
part of the drive to equality on the part of liberal democracy, for it
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necessarily includes a denial of the very idea of intrinsic goods and evils
as these presume hierarchy.22 It is, of course, for this reason that sexual
politics is such a battleground in liberal democracies, for nothing quite
exemplifies an order of values like purity and lust.23 Liberal democracy’s eclipse of God is not accomplished merely by the dismissal of
hierarchy built into the pursuit of equality but by its most basic logic.
As Kolnai observes, ‘‘the proclamation of man’s ‘sovereignty’ is bound
to displace his center of gravity into the nether regions of his being,
and to degrade his nature toward a level of sub-humanity.’’24 God’s
sovereign dominion over life and death is replaced by a pervasive and
jealous materialism, ‘‘the immanent sovereignty of human needs.’’25 A
politics of privilege stands as a critique of the enstatic rights of equalitarian liberalism and a caution to theology both.26 Rawls (and Catholic
defenders of abortion) bases his defense of liberalism on the ‘‘original
position,’’ a conceit ‘‘winnowing away the features which distinguish
persons from one another,’’ generating, as Scruton puts it, the ‘‘disprivileged.’’27 Theology, I will argue, can have no alliance with liberalism’s
‘‘disprivileged.’’ The rejection of privilege is an idolatrous gesture: a
rejection of ecstatic liquefactio, the stranger and life. This chapter links
Thomas’s Christoform law conception of social ethics to a politics of
privilege and in so doing will justify John Paul II’s description of liberal
democratic society as both totalitarian and tyrannical. Privilege, it will
be concluded, is not merely a defense of liberty but a defense of the
weak and innocent from the war waged upon them by the strong.
To begin assessing the liberal politics of the body, let us return to
our three guiding questions: () Is secularized modernity the source of
the contemporary conflict between flesh and spirit? () Is such a conflict dominant in Catholic thinking? () What sort of bodily politics is
needed to avoid this conflict?
() Like his contemporary, Albert Camus, Fessard sees in the French
Revolution an epochal event in which liberalism both rejected the
Church and religion as such28 and became a dominant political logic
that ultimately gave birth to two other political logics: Communism
and Fascism (see PL, ).29 In his  article Par-delà le fascisme et le
communisme,30 Fessard argues that liberalism’s rejection of any analogy
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between the structure and dynamics of the human body and the structure and dynamics of the body politic31 generates a violence internal
both to liberal theory and the liberal state. This violence cultivates
more violence, the violence of Marxist and Fascistic theory and practice.32 The philosophical interest of this analysis is immediate. Some
historians of ideas link the bloodbath of the twentieth century to the
rationalism of the Enlightenment, while others link it to a cult of the
irrational. One commentator has recently claimed that a third way that
proposes both as an explanation would not be possible.33 Yet, such is
found in Fessard. And more, Fessard takes the critique to the heart of
the liberal critique itself. The liberal critique of the ‘‘organic metaphor’’
is precisely that it does violence to persons by compelling them to
realize ends they do not recognize as their own good. Quite to the
contrary, liberalism assumes that there is no single end of human desire
but an ontological diversity of desires and goals.34 Fessard turns liberalism’s critique against itself: if Fessard is right, it is liberal theory itself
that is intrinsically violent, and historically, it is to blame for the shocking excesses of World War I (always conveniently forgotten by defenders of liberalism)35 and World War II. Fukuyama, perhaps liberalism’s
greatest popularizer in recent years, notes that Fessard was one of Kojève’s greatest students, and he might have done well to read him. For
Fukuyama is completely innocent of even suspecting the homicidal
undertow of liberalism36 or that Communism and Fascism might have
a common heritage in liberalism. His failure on the former is patent
when he reduces the politics of abortion, which he acknowledges is
‘‘one of the most neuralgic’’ contemporary political conflicts in the
United States, to a conflict of recognition between stay-at-home mothers and career women.37
Fessard’s ambitious analysis starts with a Thomistic anthropology.38
That said—and as was shown in chapter —I think the Thomistic
anthropology familiar to Fessard was a product of a Jesuit tradition of
interpretation: that tradition, oddly, owes less to Aquinas than to his
student, Giles of Rome.39 Still, it will be the latter’s violent theory of
the flesh in combination with Hegel that will help make Fessard’s telling critique of liberalism. And yet, one can also find in Fessard a return
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to Aquinas’s own theory of sensuality, which enables Fessard to offer
an alternative to the violence of liberal flesh.
For his analysis of liberalism and its progeny, Fessard takes as his
starting point that through liberalism’s defense of the ‘‘autonomy of
the rights of Reason,’’40 the human becomes a ‘‘defleshed individual,
[an] isolated atom,’’ and an ‘‘abstract citizen of an ideal humanity’’
(FC )41 who is incapable of bringing the intellectual and bodily appetites into a unity in which all would find satisfaction and peace.42 For
example, Kant, as has been noted, is explicit that sensibility is to be
stamped out. The failure to even attempt an integration of human
appetites is a violence to the human, argues Fessard, a violence that
de-stabilizes liberalism itself by generating the new political logics of
Communism and Fascism.43 These political logics sought to reclaim a
lost unity, both mobilizing ‘‘the irrational forces of the human which
democratic rationalism had let go without employ’’ (les forces irrationalles de l’homme que le rationalisme démocratique avait laissées sans emploi [FC  & ]). It is worth noting that Maritain consciously
attempted to avoid this pitfall by setting liberal democratic theory
upon a Thomistic anthropology. I shall argue later, however, that his
attempts fall foul of Thomas’s warnings against an overly Stoic characterization of the distinction between reason and sensuality.
Adopting what he calls the traditional doctrine of the human since
Aristotle, Fessard defines the human being as a ‘‘rational animal’’ but
also a ‘‘political and social animal’’ (FC ). From this definition, Fessard shows that liberalism and its twin progeny fail to affirm what it is
to be human and that under each of these political logics the human
and the body politic is violently divided against itself (FC ).44 While
liberalism rejects the reality of human sensuality and its propensity for
procreation, family, local and national association, Communism and
Fascism identify with the ‘‘irrational forces’’ of the human being. Yet
neither mystique seeks to integrate these appetites in the fullness of
human reality, being a unity of rational, social, and political appetites.
In both cases, the means to overcoming the oppositions within the
person and the oppositions within the body politic are an intensification and exacerbation of the violence inherent in the ‘‘irrational forces’’
themselves. Addressing these oppositions, both mystiques suffer an in-
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ternal contradiction since, as Fessard puts it, they ‘‘would wish to conquer the world by an irreconcilable conflict’’ (voudront conquérir le
monde, à une lutte irréconciliable [FC ]). Thus, Marxism refuses to
acknowledge the reality of the political relationship of domination and
servitude and the appetite for political life upon which it is based. In
its quest for a social existence in which there is no class division or
state, Marxist practice can only do a violence to the human. Insofar as
it envisages a final conflict to eradicate social division, and insofar as
social division is rooted in a human desire for the political relationship
of domination and servitude, Communism must do a violence toward
the human, and do so perpetually (FC –).45 In the case of Fascism,
the political relationship of domination and servitude is so glorified
that the violence inherent to this relationship forever thwarts the
human appetite for social coexistence (FC  & ):46 the appetite to
surmount division, both interior and exterior, is rejected as such
(FC ).
If all three ideologies bear within them ‘‘the same opposition’’ (FC
), how can Catholic flesh hope to unite the disparate appetites of the
human? Central to Fessard’s argument is the claim that the transcendence of liberalism is ‘‘an appeal to a perpetual transcendence’’ (cet
appel à une perpétuelle transcendance [FC ]) in which nature and tradition are rejected (FC –), while Communism and Fascism reject
transcendence altogether, reducing the human to a natural history. By
contrast, Catholicism, he argues, appeals to transcendence to overcome
the limitations of nature, but it does so in a fashion whereby nature is
cultivated and integrated into the life of grace. Recalling Thomas’s
dictum that grace perfects nature, Fessard argues that grace conserves
and fulfils human reason (conservait, bien plus accomplissait la raison
humaine [FC ]) and that the human is ‘‘the animal who tends toward
reason’’ (FC ). Built into the very structure of human desire is a
refutation of the atomized individual of liberalism: indeed, because
liberalism rejects the connection between humans that comes of the
sacrifice of self for other, Fessard adds that liberalism will forever remain incapable of satisfying human desire, since it makes no appeal to
the natural structure of ecstasy nor to the desire for grandeur, the root
of sacrifice (FC ). Interestingly, this point has become a centerpiece
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for the analysis of liberalism by France’s leading contemporary political
philosopher, Pierre Manent, himself a student of Fessard’s close friend,
Raymond Aron. An important part of this culture of grandeur and
sacrifice is the Eucharist: as was discussed in chapter , Fessard clearly
sees Eucharist as a mortification of sensuality in which the ecstatic
structure of sensuality itself is cultivated.47
By way of concluding Fessard’s argument: against the thesis that
Christian flesh provided National Socialism with a ready-made template for the persecution of Jews (and homosexuals), Fessard argues
that the violence of both Fascism and Communism is a violence of
liberalism itself; a consequence of the fact that liberalism sets human
desire violently against itself. The failure of liberalism to develop a
Christian sensuality, never mind an erotic liberalism,48 by rejecting a
transcendence intimately linked with the natural, generates the violence of Fascism toward both reason and flesh (in that it seeks only to
exacerbate division through a glorification of violence). Thus, Fessard
helps show both that Catholic flesh is not necessarily violent flesh, nor
is anti-liberalism necessarily a glorification of violence. Rather, the loss
of the ecstatic body inevitably flips over into violent political forms.
Fessard clearly seeks a reaffirmation of hierarchy within the body, and
in the third and final part of this chapter it will be shown how this
inevitably is to re-affirm privilege in the social and political orders.
() However elegant Fessard’s analyses, his identification of the tyranny and totalitarianism forever incipient in liberalism is easily dismissed. Yet, the most shocking pages of Evangelium Vitae do insist on
such a relationship. Six years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Evangelium Vitae appeared in print. It is the longest papal encyclical of John
Paul II’s pontificate and the encyclical which the pope himself thinks
is the most important he has written. Evangelium Vitae is a sharp rebuke of certain ideas about human life that are prevalent in liberal
democracies, including the United States. This encyclical, if you will,
casts its uncompromising moral gaze upon us, as it had upon the Communist world and its violent ideology. I want to focus on John Paul
II’s claim in Evangelium Vitae that contemporary liberal democracy is
totalitarian and tyrannical (EV, ).49
What is so interesting about this papal claim is that, surely, nothing
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is easier to dismiss than the claim that tyranny and totalitarianism
characterize the Western liberal democracies! We are, after all, nothing
like the militant secular atheists of the totalitarian Communist governments of old. After all, we hold dear to the separation of powers, popular government, free speech, due process, and justice for all. Why then
would anyone think that the Church should distance itself from our
political forms of life as it did the despotisms of the old Eastern bloc?
Even Kolnai, who speaks of ‘‘the original sin of American democracy’’
being ‘‘the primal gesture of the Rebellion’’ against King George III
(PM, ), spoke of America only as a Totalitas sine tyrannide (PM,
). Is the Church seriously trying, as Mark Lilla puts it, ‘‘to deny any
essential difference between tyranny and the free societies of the
West’’?50 Jacques Maritain certainly thought there was an essential difference. He refused to acknowledge any interior connection between
liberalism and tyranny, regarding the American Constitution, for example, as a ‘‘peerless’’ and ‘‘outstanding lay Christian document,’’ albeit ‘‘tinged with the philosophy of the day.’’51
Maritain wrote these words in his classic  Man and the State.
Kolnai thought this book full of ‘‘Christian-leftist social fantasies’’
(PM, ) and said of the book that in it the ‘‘Anti-Christ [is] begged
to accord an asylum to Christ.’’52 Although this characterization might
seem extreme, profound grounds for reservation about Maritian’s characterization of the American Constitution have since emerged.53 As
Stanley Hauerwas has recorded about the early s, Christians in
America knew a debate was emerging about whether abortion might
be made legal in certain cases but were completely surprised and
stunned when abortion became an American ‘‘institution.’’54 In other
words, Christians, shocked by the slaugther of the innocents, can no
longer be sure that an essential difference does exist between tyranny
and the putatively ‘‘free societies of the West.’’
If Hauerwas and Maritain were surprised by the course liberal democracies took, Aurel Kolnai was not. Maritain’s junior by eighteen
years, yet dying in the same year, Kolnai’s prophetic voice chills us
today. A man who once shocked Raissa Maritain when he told her
over dinner that he did not believe in democracy,55 Kolnai in 
spoke of ‘‘the Progressive Democratic trend towards a medical and
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psychiatric dictatorship.’’ At the  World Youth Day at Denver,
John Paul II echoed Kolnai when he spoke of the twentieth century as
‘‘an era of massive attacks on life . . . a continual taking of innocent
human life.’’ Evangelium Vitae leaves us in no doubt what he meant
by those words: commenting upon his own Denver text, John Paul II
writes that Western democracies exhibit ‘‘an objective ‘conspiracy
against life,’ ’’ wrought through ‘‘scientifically and systematically programmed threats’’ to life (EV, ). A medicalized tyranny is here exposed as regnant throughout the West (EV, ; ; ; ),56 as nothing
less than a terror claiming the lives of millions of innocents equal to
the terrors of Communism and Nazism. The numbers of innocents
killed through abortion well justify the analogy (EV, ) and if euthanasia is sanctioned by the liberal state, the numbers of innocents killed
with state approval and cooperation will mushroom and far outstrip
the innocents killed by the Communists and National Socialism. Indeed, American and European initiatives at the United Nations Conferences in Cairo and Beijing, on population and women respectively,
saw a new imperialism, with the West attempting to export abortion
by insisting it be made a right enshrined in international law.57 John
Paul II has come to see abortion, as his biographer, George Weigel puts
it, ‘‘not as one issue, but the issue for the emerging world culture that
would sustain, or corrupt, the free societies of the future.’’58 Who can
doubt John Paul II’s insight here?59 Abortion clearly is the horizon
for contemporary Catholic political philosophy because it strikes at a
fundamental assumption within Catholic political philosophy, indeed
an assumption of any antitotalitarian politics. In Aquinas’s theory of
homicide the innocent may not be killed on private or public authority. To kill the innocent on public authority is tyranny and because the
state has no authority to kill the innocent, the state has no legitimate
power to give this authority to private individuals. The exercise of such
power by the state can only be criminal violence.60 If Aquinas is right
in this definition—and he does appear to be—John Paul II is quite
correct that the modern liberal state is a tyrant state, its tyranny and
totalitarianism all in the service of a principled isolationism that rejects
the stranger.
But is raising the specter of liberalism and its cult of abortion, what
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D’Souza has called ‘‘the bloody essence of modern liberalism,’’61 just
confusing possible genuine philosophical criticism of liberalism with
‘‘the politics of theological despair’’? Do we not now know that, as
Mark Lilla has recently pointed out, Carl Schmitt supported vicious
rightist movements because he wanted to be ‘‘a real Catholic . . .
against the abortionists’’?62 And isn’t claiming some moral proportion
between the state totalitarianism of Communism and the tyranny of
National Socialism with liberalism reckless, a failure of character, as
Mark Lilla suggests?63 Might it not be possible to simply call back
liberal democracy to its deepest aspirations and promise? Don’t the
texts of Maritain and John Paul II suggest this approach? This is the
interpretation of John Paul II’s thought found in Weigel’s work,64 and
is perhaps the typical interpretation of First Things.65
An interesting question then emerges: Does Evangelium Vitae refuse
all accommodation with liberal democracy? Or, to put the question a
little differently, can Catholic social thought safely accommodate itself
to liberalism? Ever since Pius IX condemned liberalism when he issued
the Syllabus of Errors in , Catholics living in liberal states have
had to wonder what accommodation with liberalism is possible. When
looking at Evangelium Vitae’s treatment of three of the typically studied architects of the liberal democratic tradition, an outline of a critique of rights can be discerned. The remainder of the second part of
this chapter will document this critique. In the third part of this chapter, this critique will be given the flavor of Kolnai, a flavor found more
recently in MacIntyre and Kraynak. Kolnai suspects that an eclipse of
God and hence of man (EV, ) is built into the logic of rights found
in progressive democracy. It is not enough, as Maritain thought, to
root rights in natural law. Rights will sheer off from natural law and its
obligations, thinks Kolnai, as progressive democracy’s equalitarianism
actively seeks to erode any constitutionalism built upon natural law
and its ranking of values (PL, ). Moreover, Kolnai stands as a corrective to recent decades of Maritain-inspired Catholic social thought,
and Evangelium Vitae is no exception. To demonstrate why Kolnai is
useful to Catholic social thought is to demonstrate that a wrong turn
has been made and that the influence of Maritain has not been a good
one.
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John Paul II’s hostility to the architects of liberal democracy and
rights theory is quite evident. Like Kolnai, but quite unlike Maritain,
John Paul II shows signs of concern that the ideas of Locke, Hobbes,
and Rousseau do not merely ‘‘tinge’’ the liberal democratic tradition
but constitute its core. For John Locke, ownership of the product of
my labor is inalienable because it is rooted in a prior inalienable relationship, my ownership of my body. All political order, all sovereignty,
is centered upon this absolutely foundational owning of the body. This
position is explicitly rejected in Evangelium Vitae (; VS, para. ).
Locke’s position is a further explication of Thomas Hobbes—routinely
identified as the founder of the liberal democratic tradition—and his
elaboration of the idea of the individual in the state of nature. Hobbes
developed the idea of the individual as prior to any obedience to religion, state, civil law, race, or sex in order to establish that the individual
was sovereign.66 Hobbes and Locke share, whatever their other differences, a rejection of the Thomistic natural law tradition. It is undeniable that the character of this rejection has had a galvanizing effect,
especially in its Lockean form. A mainstay of abortion rights philosophy is the Lockean-inspired argument that my body and whatever
might be growing in it is mine to do with as I will: it is also the
mainstay for the putative licitness of sex change operations, as well as
the operations connected with the more recent psychiatric phenomenon of body dysmorphia.
In his  article, Thomistic Personalism, Wojtyla identifies Descartes as the origin of the assumption that ‘‘consciousness and selfconsciousness constitute the essence of the person’’ (PC, ). The
person in Descartes’s view (and here an echo of Fessard can be heard)
is no longer ‘‘a substance, an objective being with its own proper subsistence—subsistence in a rational nature,’’67 with its sensuous, bodily
inclinations and dynamisms. This view contrasts sharply with that of
Thomas, for whom consciousness and self-consciousness are, Wojtyla
tells us, ‘‘derivative, a kind of fruit of the rational nature that subsists
in the person’’ (PC, ). Many years later, John Paul II sums up the
consequence of the Cartesian theory: ‘‘A freedom which claims to be
absolute ends up treating the human body as a raw datum, devoid of
any meaning and moral values until freedom has shaped it in accor-
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dance with its design’’ (VS, para. ). Unsurprisingly then, and by
contrast to a theory of rights that would separate morality from a set
of sensuous, bodily inclinations rationally moderated, John Paul II appeals to the Thomistic tradition of lordship of self (EV, ; VS, para.
–), which is explicit that no one has an absolute lordship over his
or her bodily self.68 This appeal to lordship is full of meaning, connoting as it does, hierarchy, privilege, community, and vassalage. This
limited lordship over self is an implication of the fact that we are all of
us already claimed by, and must be obedient to, the lordship of the
natural law. It is this prior claim upon us that gives freedom ‘‘an inherently relational dimension’’ (EV, ) and which makes my bodily gift of
self to another normative (EV,  and ).
Matters stand quite otherwise with Thomas Hobbes. He conceives
of the natural law as restricted to self-preservation that is inseparably
tied to another human dynamism, the lust to dominate. Together the
propensity to self-preservation and the lust to dominate are normative
for the political. These twin principles are rejected in at least four places
in Evangelium Vitae (; ; ; ). Such an understanding of the political inevitably leads to what has, in fact, come to pass: our liberal democracies are structured by a tyranny of the strong over the weak (EV,
 & ). The claim that today’s democracies are tyrannies is justified
by both the unlimited character of these democracies—the British parliament proudly boasts that it is sovereign and governs subject to no
law—and the fact that innocence is no longer a protection against
falling victim to their legislative authority (EV, ). In the traditional
teaching on homicide, a homicide can be morally licit on public or
private authority only if someone is ‘‘dangerous and infectious to the
common good on account of some sin’’ (ST II–II, q. , a. ). If
someone does not meet this definition, then the government cannot
kill him or her, nor can a government give the authority to kill to any
other person. Judges who make law that allows the innocent to be
killed are usurpers (ST I–II, q. , a. ). What protects you and me
from tyranny is our innocence (VS, para. ); it is the ‘‘wall of magic’’
(de Maistre) that separates us from despotism.
Actually, things are darker than is even suggested in the language of
the tyrant state. For Evangelium Vitae argues that the tyranny afoot in
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the modern liberal democratic states is nothing less than ‘‘a war of the
powerful against the weak,’’ in which the unborn, sick, disabled, and
elderly are identified as the enemy (EV, ; ; ). This is not meant to
be taken as hyperbolic. Such an argument follows quite lucidly once
the natural law theory of homicide is rejected. This is clear from the
work of Carl Schmitt on war. Schmitt rejected natural law, for he was
convinced that there can be no moral justification for homicide. This
does not mean that one cannot kill, however, for there is an existential
justification. The enemy to be fought in war is the one who ‘‘negates
his opponent’s way of life.’’69 Who can deny that vast numbers of the
unborn who are aborted are aborted because the liberal state allows the
powerful to wage war on a perceived existential threat, that their children ‘‘negate’’ their ‘‘way of life’’? John Paul II merely points out here
that liberal democratic states, separated as they are from the natural
law, easily fold into the Schmittean logic of politics and war. Indeed, a
Schmittean decisionism appears to have entered into the works of some
Catholic moral theologians (their ideas are critiqued at VS, para. -).
John Paul II’s treatment of the architects of rights theory identifies
the theory’s deepest logic as an eclipse of God (PL, ; ). The eclipse
of God is a central explanation of the culture of death, and the root
cause of this eclipse is the liberal idolization of absolute autonomy (EV,
) and the decisionism that is its necessary consequence. This is most
clear in Rousseau’s contribution to the liberal democratic tradition.
His contribution, in the words of Pierre Manent, is to think: ‘‘it is
natural for man to change his nature because man, at bottom, is not
nature but liberty. And liberty is that power by which man gives orders
to his own nature, or changes his nature, or is a law unto himself.’’70
John Paul II speaks eloquently of a sinister turn in our democracies,
where there is a widespread tendency to interpret ‘‘crimes against life
as legitimate expressions of individual freedom, to be acknowledged and
protected as actual rights’’ (EV, ; ; ). Of course, the power of tyrant
states to give a patina of legality to widespread criminality is not new.
Commentators as diverse as de Maistre and Albert Camus are agreed
that rank criminality was legitimated during the French Revolution,
and both identify the same source: the political philosophy of Rousseau. There should be little to surprise us here. Once the individual is
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recognized as ‘‘a law unto himself,’’ as a sovereign without any constitutional restraint, as it were, why would one be surprised that the
sovereign would become a tyrant? Is it not an axiom of the liberal
tradition itself that unlimited power corrupts? That there is widespread
collusion on transforming crimes against the innocent into rights recognized in ‘‘law’’ should disturb us, but it ought not to surprise us.
And now it seems that the state should grant us all a right to health,
or the right to design our offspring, a right to be founded on a ‘‘scientifically and systematically programmed’’ (EV, ) cannibalization of
human life at its inception. This returns us to Kolnai. Recall his comment cited earlier concerning ‘‘the Progressive Democratic trend
toward a medical and psychiatric dictatorship.’’ John Paul II writes:
Choices once unanimously considered criminal and rejected by
the common moral sense are gradually becoming socially acceptable. Even certain sectors of the medical profession, which by its
calling is directed to the defense and care of life, are increasingly
willing to carry out these acts against the person. In this way, the
very nature of the medical profession is distorted and contradicted, and the dignity of those who practice it is degraded.
(EV, )
Why is it that parts of the medical profession are ‘‘increasingly willing’’
to participate in crimes against the innocent, and what is the root
reason that liberal democracies tend toward ‘‘a medical and psychiatric
dictatorship,’’ in Kolnai’s words? The utopian mind is the root cause,
and it received powerful formulation in Rousseau’s political conceptions. Here is the vision of one professor of medicine at UCLA’s School
of Medicine.71 Dr. Gregory Stock, Director of the Program on Medicine, Technology and Society at UCLA, hopes that embryo experimentation and cloning will mean:
Parents would choose the embryo with the highest potential IQ
and the most desirable characteristics. Then they would cut and
paste genes from other embryos . . . to create a child tailored to
reflect the parent’s values . . . Stock speculates that parents could
design children to be optimistic and attractive and live until an
advanced age.
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And there is more,
. . . conservative, ‘‘tyrannical’’ politicians, many of whom he says
lack even rudimentary scientific education, are trying to inject
themselves into what he believes should be personal reproductive
and medical decisions.
The utopian mind exhibited here is quite classic; it has experimented
before in history and with disastrous and despotic results. Following
Kolnai, we easily identify the desire to substitute a perfect world for an
imperfect human world; the claim that the power to reject and destroy
the basic structure of reality should be in the hands of ‘‘one unitary
and sovereign human authorship’’; not the conservative non-scientists
but those who are the enlightened avant-garde of a new social revolution. Behind all this lies Rousseau’s appeal to us that human essence is
liberty and that we can order and change our nature according to our
will (PL, ). The new terror in Stock’s vision that medicine be permitted ‘‘to create a child tailored to reflect the parent’s values’’ is but a
reflection of the violence of the monistic utopian mind itself caught,
as it is, in a contradiction: as Pierre Manent puts it, ‘‘the utopian group
or sect simultaneously desires sovereign mastery over nature or history
and docile servitude under it.’’ For, of course, Stock and others like
him want some human qualities, but through ‘‘cutting and pasting’’
human embryos they mean to reject other qualities that make us
human. Certainly, the stranger will never appear again. Stock’s vision
does appear to typify a certain American thinking and may well justify
Kolnai’s words:
The American Totalitas sine tyrannide then is in one important
sense the most genuine and most successful of totalitarianisms.
Utopia, in America, displays its more moderate face; but, the
protest of human nature against Utopia is most effectively silenced there.
(PM, )
() Evangelium Vitae clearly rejects the basic arguments of the architects of the liberal democratic tradition. And yet, what of Maritain’s
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natural law rights theory as the underlying political philosophy of
Evangelium Vitae? The similarities between the document and chapter
 of Maritain’s Man and the State are strong (EV, ; ; ).72 The
natural law constitutionalism of Maritain and the encyclical is, at least
for a liberal, a fairly attenuated defense of democracy. For, like Thomas
Aquinas, the encyclical insists on the sovereignty of the natural law
(VS, para. ) and not the people of a nation.73 The natural law in the
Thomistic tradition is a participation in the eternal law, a participation
in the rationality of God (ST I–II, q. , a. ; VS, para. ). In the
Thomistic tradition, all constitutions have an extra-constitutional
foundation in an objective moral structure from which determinations
of good and evil can be made (VS, para. ; ). Laws that governments
might promulgate that diverge from this objective structure of good
and evil are not laws but violence, and are to be resisted as such (ST
I–II, q. , a. , ad ; EV, ). They are to be resisted because they
depart from promoting the common good (ST I–II, q. , a. ). What
is often called ‘‘the democratic process’’ must be obedient to this prior
sovereignty. Nevertheless, at one with Maritain, John Paul II claims
that natural law provides ‘‘the principles of fundamental equality’’ (EV,
) among human persons and specifies the ends to be pursued in a
democracy and the means to be employed (VS, para. ). He also
argues that the Church has the ‘‘right always and everywhere’’ to proclaim moral principles and to make ‘‘judgments about any human matter’’ required for the defense of ‘‘fundamental human rights or the
salvation of souls’’ (VS, para. ). The language of ‘‘fundamental’’
equality and human rights soon gives way, however, to the elaborate
rights of Maritain’s Man and the State.74 Although these rights are not
enumerated in Evangelium Vitae, Maritain’s elaboration of the rights
of man can be found in John Paul II’s early Laborem Exercens and later
Centissimus Annus. A certain tension exists, then, between the critique
of the architects of the democratic rights tradition and the avowal of
Maritain’s natural law version of this same tradition. One might think
that Evangelium Vitae is trying to pull away from Maritain’s synthesis
but, according to Weigel, to view the later John Paul II of the s as
backing away from his earlier enthusiasm for the ‘‘democratic project’’
is ‘‘profoundly mistaken.’’75 Indeed, Evangelium Vitae says that democ-
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racy is ‘‘a most precious and essential good of society’’ (EV, ), which
verges on prohibiting other political forms.76
Certainly, however, a tension in the encyclical highlights the persistence of two strains in Catholic social thought. As was seen in the last
chapter, the ‘‘politics of the family,’’ Catholic teaching on sex and
marriage, clearly rely upon ideas of privilege and hierarchy (TB, )77
despite the (inconsistent) fact that, as was also pointed out in that
chapter, the  Catechism does speak of a right to family and marriage.78 Perhaps if one understood Catholic social thought to argue for
a mixed regime in which a democratic element stood alongside privilege, one would have a way to reconcile the strains within the tradition.
There are many meanings of democracy after all, and Evangelium Vitae
distances itself pointedly from what is called ‘‘the democratic culture
of our time’’ (EV, ). Marsilius of Padua developed a medieval democratic tradition and was not alone in doing so. A thinker like Hayek
has a constitutional theory of democracy that shares something with a
Thomistic law conception of social ethics and politics.79 Interestingly,
Hayek, in seldom-commented-upon passages, draws our attention to
the Spanish Jesuits of the Early Modern period, especially de Molina
and de Lugo. He finds them to be articulating a conception of political
and economic liberty rooted in the natural law tradition.80 For the
most part, Kolnai thought a mixed regime was practically the best that
could currently be hoped for,81 although his constitutional proposal for
a post-Franco Spain was vibrantly monarchical.82 Weigel has observed
that John Paul II’s thinking about democratic liberalism is ongoing.83
It seems undeniable that he has become somewhat more skeptical.84
Might it be then that in Evangelium Vitae the Church is not seeking a
moderated democratic liberalism (Maritain’s position) but a political
order in which democracy is an element among other political forms?
This is no real solution, however, since to my knowledge other possible
political forms are nowhere mentioned in recent Catholic social
thought or political instances of privilege and hierarchy. A definite
point of contact does exist though. Commenting on Paul, John Paul
II argues that holiness is a state (can we read status?) rather than an
action (TB, ). This state is primarily of an ‘‘ontological character’’
and secondarily of a moral character. It is a principle of division, of
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‘‘alienation’’ even (TB, ), for the status of holiness ‘‘is a separation
from that which is not subject to God’s influence.’’ Just as the family
is not strictly political and yet in a second aspect contributes to political
pluralism, so holiness has this double aspect. Privilege in Kolnai is
more thoroughly political, of course, but this Pauline notion of holiness could find direct applications in the political: one need only think
of a re-sacralization of the law or Smith’s notion of the piacular. Indeed, Kolnai’s point is that the manifold loci of privilege, dividing and
separating political power, is a manifold of holiness. Privilege is ecstatic
in straightforward ways—whether this stems from a phenomenology
of height85 or Smith’s ‘‘invisible hand’’ (as this is explained in his Theory
of Moral Sentiments)—but it is ecstatic in its deepest sense as a response
to a moral order. Of course, this propensity would be intensified once
linked to a hierarchy of grace, for grace ennobles (TB, ), but this
would also require Christian theology to reclaim an adequate (nonequalitarian) theory of grace.
The tension within Catholic social thought stems from a failure on
the part of Catholic social thought to develop a politics congruent with
the Church’s traditional theory of the body. When thinking about the
body, sex, and social order the Church relies on ideas of privilege and
hierarchy, yet in its consideration of the political the language shifts
definitively toward rights, even if the natural law foundation of democracy is a departure from liberal thinking. One might argue that this is
the point liberals have been making, that the Church needs to bring
its sexual and social thinking into line with the liberal democratic sensibility. The problem with such a position is, however, that the Church’s
sexual and social thinking is so profoundly Christological (my chapters
 through ), while her recent political thinking is, well, derived from
Maritain. The conclusions of Evangelium Vitae are better defended
through Kolnai’s thought, for social and political privilege are more
congruent with the Christological body than are the isolationism and
decisionism of rights. I will close this chapter with some of Kolnai’s
considerations of democracy. Catholic social thought must face up to
a fundamental question: Can liberalism’s principled isolationism be
separated from an otherwise ecstatically ordered democracy? De
Toqueville for one is skeptical: democracy ‘‘not only makes each man
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forget his forefathers, but it conceals from him his descendants and
separates him from his contemporaries; it ceaselessly throws him back
on himself alone and threatens finally to confine him entirely in the
solitude of his own heart.’’86
A highly moderated form of democracy must be sought by the
Church, which is only to affirm that the antitotalitarian tradition of
Catholic social thought from the Middle Ages and up into the papal
encyclical tradition once understood Kolnai’s central claim: the logic
of equal rights folds into the social monism of totalitarianism. In the
work of Kolnai, the Church has an already elaborated theory of why
such a politics is necessary and an outline of the public philosophy
required to make it persuasive. For Kolnai, and the basics of this position crystallized in the early ’s, democracy should be an element of a
political order with manifold foci of privileged orders, with a hierarchy
between orders, wherein rights are understood only to express sites of
social privilege (PM, ), giving a ‘‘multiform participation of the
citizens’’ in political power (PM, ). In other words, a genuine political pluralism must acknowledge the ‘‘given realities’’ of natural and
social privilege and the reality of power attending these hierarchies. And,
while the acknowledgement of such privilege is not incompatible with
a fundamental equality of all human persons under natural law (PL
), it is incompatible with an elaborate theory of equal rights. This,
thinks Kolnai, is the core of Catholic social thought—and it certainly
strikes me as a precise formulation of Aquinas’s understanding of politics and natural law.87
The social emphases promoted by Kolnai help develop a deeper
political liberty88 than liberalism (PM, ) or Progressive Democracy
which, argues Kolnai, is ‘‘totalitarian in its pretensions’’ (PL, ). This
returns us to our last question and the close of this chapter: Can liberalism’s principled isolationism be separated from an otherwise ecstatically ordered democracy? Kolnai offers reasons to doubt this. In his
 essay, ‘‘Three Riders of the Apocalypse,’’ Kolnai closely compares
and contrasts progressive democracy, Nazism, and Communism.
Communism is systematically totalitarian in a way that Nazism and
progressive democracy are not. These last two ‘‘represent the maimed
forms of normal human society,’’ not suppressed as such but in the

................. 11244$

$CH9

03-18-05 08:29:00

PS

PAGE 178

The Politics of t he Cross  

first case overlaid ‘‘with a fiendish tyranny totalitarian in temper,’’ and
in the second ‘‘infiltrated by the virus of subversive utopia bound for a
totalitarian goal’’ (PL, ). To date, argues Kolnai, the pre-modern
inheritance and liberal civilization (Hume, Smith et al.) have restrained
progressive democracy, but the ‘‘inward logic’’ is to systematically eat
away at this pre-modern and classical liberal foundation of political
pluralism founded upon privilege (PL, ). These moderating influences cannot continue indefinitely, however (PL, ), and progressive
democracy shares with Nazism ‘‘biological and eugenic points of
view,’’ which emphasis ‘‘ranks higher’’ than the pursuit of political
power, as such, that marks Communism. Interested in the exercise of
power, Communism is less interested than the other two political
forms with ‘‘an all-round predetermination of the ‘human material,’
including its natural quality’’ (PL, , emphasis original). The prescience of these comments is obvious: fifty-odd years later our most
fundamental political disputes revolve around the relationship between
liberty and sex, generation, and biological manipulation. For what animates leftism is:
the preposterous endeavor to abolish contingency and man’s dependence on an order of things he cannot fathom and an order
of right and wrong he can discern but not decree or improve
upon, the endeavor in a word to subject all things that affect his
condition to a human counterfeit of Providence.
(PL, ).
In , Kolnai observed that progressive democracy must be supported so that Communism might be defeated. However, support
could mean no more than a ‘‘partnership’’ between progressive democracy and conservatives, which cannot be the ‘‘final aim’’ of conservatism. Later, the Christian conservative task will be ‘‘the breaking of its
totalitarian monopoly’’ (PL, –). By way of an attempt at this task,
in the closing comments to this book, I will try to identify some ways
in which privilege is still present in contemporary thought, how it
might be fostered, and the eclipse of God overcome.
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‘‘Privilege:’’ There is no dirtier word, right?1 Perhaps. When I went to
the lectures of Gerry Cohen as an undergraduate you would have described him as a dyed-in-the-wool Communist. But that was in the
mid-eighties and a lot has happened since then: and Gerry Cohen has
been thinking a lot. In answer to the title question of his  book,
If You’re So Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? Cohen answers that
the best egalitarians can hope to do is to live out their privilege by
sending their children to the very best fee-paying schools and cultivating in them and themselves egalitarian sentiments: as such a person
and parent, he says, ‘‘I thereby make it more likely that some who
enjoy privileged positions will use them for egalitarian ends.’’2 This
might seem a stunning admission, and in a way it is, but what is most
impressive is its thoughtfulness. Cohen spends  pages trying out
other answers and finding them wanting. I have argued more: privilege
is a positive good; and more, Catholic sexual politics relies on privilege
and must explicitly acknowledge that it does so.
Jeremy Waldron is hardly wrong when he alerts readers that there
really are people out there who are inegalitarian theorists.3 Yet he also
acknowledges that almost no theoretical defenses of basic equality have
been attempted.4 Relying upon the theory Locke worked out in the
s, Waldron assumes it a basically Christian thesis that, as Locke
puts it, ‘‘All Men by Nature Are Equall.’’5 On the one hand Waldron’s
argument that Christianity must have a central place in our political
deliberations is very welcome; on the other, I’m pretty sure no theologian could agree with Locke. Contemporary Christian egalitarians
would surely argue that we are supernaturally equal as always elevated
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by grace, a structural, but not natural, participation in God. Conservative Christians would likely follow medieval tradition and argue that
humans have a natural equality since each has a rational desire to see
God. However, it will be insisted, this equality is quite secondary to a
participation in God having to be achieved by acts of love,6 and consequently that humans can alienate their dignity.7 A conservative
(Scheler, say) might even deny that in Christian doctrine there is either
an obvious supernatural equality among humans or any sort of natural
equality.8 The position I have defended is that basic equality is simultaneously natural and Christological, granted by our participation in the
ecstatic norms of Eternal law: but following de Vitoria and Kolnai, I
deny what Locke and Waldron assume, that from some such basic
equality one can derive a social equalitarianism; there is no reason to
think that the norms of the Eternal law are thoroughly egalitarian9 and
besides, de Vitoria is quite correct when he stresses (following Thomas)
that Eternal law does not cancel out the varieties of law and the scope
of their autonomy.10
It is important that a defense of privilege, such as one finds in Kolnai, is neither a defense of a particular nor general inegalitarianism, as
explained by Waldron.11 It is not about finding particular persons born
to rule (as per divine right of kings, say), nor is it a general inegalitarianism based on the idea that a certain type of person is superior to
some other general kind or type of persons. I am most concerned to
defend the idea that certain acts must be accorded social privilege:
namely, in the sense explained by Saint Thomas in his discussion of
exstasis, those acts that wound the lover. This is to argue that privilege
is underwritten by an objective moral order.12 An implication of
Thomas’s Christological natural law is that sexual acts which permit a
bodily giving of self are normative. I defend this idea both as an interpretation of Thomas and as an ethical theory.
As an interpretation of Thomas, the argument began with metaphysics and Thomas’s theory of desire. The material things of creation,
being composites of matter and form, are conceived as various centers
of desire with their satisfactions already partially granted. This, I argued, is the significance of Thomas’s theory of the concreatum. This
theory was contrasted with other conceptions of desire in the Middle
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Ages, especially those of Averroes and Giles of Rome. These theories
differ from Thomas’s by loosening the relationship between desire and
its object (Averroes) and making the satisfaction of desire by its object
more conflictual (Giles). I later argued in chapters , , and  that the
medieval alternative to Thomas’s position is repeated in modern and
contemporary philosophy, both secular and religious. The persuasive
power of Thomas’s ecstatic morality, I argue, stems from his theory of
the body, which in turn is an application of his theory of the desire.
The contemporary value of Thomas’s philosophy of the body lies, unsurprisingly probably, in its middle position between two extremes.
The first, terribly out of fashion in one sense—but it was also in the
Middle Ages—is a view of the body as essentially evil. Thomas rejects
this by affirming again and again the idea that love of the body incites
us to a love of God. He also rejects another extreme, quite popular in
one sense today, that the body is absolutely wonderful, to be affirmed
and celebrated without reserve. Here, despite all the positive things
Thomas has to say, he identifies in the body a transgressive moment,
intensified by, but actually prior to, original sin. It is Thomas’s argument that the body is a problem because it includes an inescapably
transgressive dimension and unless its problematic status is acknowledged, and in our moral lives addressed, violence in, toward, and
through the body will remain with us. That an overcoming of this
violence is, in principle, possible, is a consequence of another dimension of the body: its propensity to ecstasy. This book has been an
enquiry into Thomas’s conception of the body as double in aspect,13
that the body is ‘‘a double nature’’ (Merleau-Ponty) being transgressive
and ecstatic in structure. This double aspect theory of the body is
enriched when Thomas makes it a foundation for natural law; a bodily
foundation which is itself more deeply founded on Christ’s own ecstatic body; Christ’s glorious body being a moral body, an exemplar of
a basic moral intuition, that the good is diffusive of itself. This argument confirms Veritatis Splendor and rejects the claim that in Thomas
‘‘a bodily giving of self ’’ is ‘‘not proper to the love of persons as
such.’’14 I show that Thomas is in complete agreement with John Paul
II when the latter writes: ‘‘The person, by the light of reason and
the support of virtue, discovers in the body the anticipatory signs, the
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expression and the promise of the gift of self, in conformity with the
wise plan of the Creator’’ (VS, ). I think Thomas’s metaphysical
analysis of the body is both brilliant and true, and I hope to have
shown that it both clips the wings of more contemporary naı̈ve theories
of the body and offers a basis for a contemporary sexual politics.
Though, in fact, something peculiar must be stressed here. There is
a certain disconnect between the contemporary mood about the body
in most philosophical literature (and in the culture generally) and the
philosophical principles used to explain the body. John Paul II has
recently noted that Western culture is in the grip of a contradiction
whereby its theoretical commitments are quite the inverse of its practices.15 The case that is his concern in Evangelium Vitae () is our
intellectual commitment to human rights and our total disregard for
them in both our domestic and international practices. With regard to
the body, a similar but different contradiction exists: the contemporary
mood is to celebrate the body; yet in our bodily practices and theories
of the body everywhere there is violence. My study agrees with John
Milbank’s claim in Theology and Social Theory that Western thought
has remained wedded to a metaphysics of violence,16 often ‘‘theologically promoted.’’17 Yet, the dominant wish of Western humanitarianism (and its citadel is the university) is to live in a world of less violence.
However, against Milbank, I think Thomism most thoroughly escapes
this rather than some modified version of ‘‘Spinozistic’’ socialism. John
Paul II’s sexual ethics offers a thoroughgoing challenge to contemporary liberalism because it relies on a theory of the body that delivers on
the dominant wish of humanitarianism. The Thomistic-Wojtyla theory helps establish a powerful contrast, therefore: a contrast between
embodiment as violence, despair, unintelligibility, and fragmentation,
and embodiment as serene, just, ethical, and hopeful. Wojtyla’s Thomism is not a brand of humanitarian Kantianism (Kraynak) since it
assumes the integration of sensuality and bodily appetite as interior to
moral sexual love. Nor is it comparable to the humanitarian Kantianism of Rahner: for the concupiscence of nature is not ‘‘harmless’’ but
always potentially transgressive, being a pronitas towards the use of the
other as a sexual value alone, exclusive of the value of person. And
it stands in marked contrast to other common theories of the body.
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Contemporary theories of the body are sometimes inescapably violent
even when their authors wish to escape violence (Foucault, MerleauPonty, Haraway); sometimes the violence can be escaped only through
annihilation (Schopenhauer); sometimes the violence is escaped by
conceding the Thomistic point that the body alone is unable to resolve
the violence (Smith, Levinas, and perhaps Merleau-Ponty); but at other
times the violence is just accepted (Deleuze) or even glorified (Bataille).
Thomas comes out very well from this contrast, I think, and from this
a number of things follow.
Such a Thomism is the foundation for the sexual ethics defended in
Humanae Vitae. The encyclical, I argue, having adopted Thomas’s theory of the body, develops a sexual ethics that diminishes violence. The
argument of recent papal Thomism respecting sexual politics runs: if
the goal of a sexual ethics is to decrease erotic violence and to promote
a social and political order of greater peace, then such a sexual ethics
requires a conception of ecstatic sexuality that affirms the person as
called to the liberty of gift. And with this argument, Paul VI’s encyclical assumes the anti-utopian cast of earlier Catholic political philosophy. As a foundation for contemporary Catholic thought on sexual
politics, Humanae Vitae neither denies the domination found in sex
nor seeks to eradicate it. Rather, in its teaching on procreation, and
now following a tradition begun by Augustine, it seeks to moderate
domination. It is a mark of an antitotalitarian politics that it seeks to
moderate violence rather than to glorify it or eliminate it. It is little
appreciated to what degree Catholic sexual ethics is such a politics. It
is John Paul II who has seen this most clearly. This is why, to the
horror of all, he has so assiduously linked contraception and abortion
as structural principles of a culture of death.
When an undergraduate, I went from Gerry Cohen’s (unreconstructed!) lectures to those of Roger Scruton, a longtime proponent of
privilege. If it now seems that Left and Right can agree on the centrality
of privilege and parents’ naturally seeking preferment for their children, I also think both can agree that ‘‘abortion’’ is really the dirtiest
word. John Paul II claims that those liberal democracies which sanction
and foster abortion (in Europe, at least, many governments pay the
costs of an abortion) are tyrant states and totalitarian. If liberals are
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aghast on hearing this, conservatives are no less so. It is not that conservatives doubt that abortion is the killing of babies, nor do they disagree
that a mark of tyranny is a governmental fostering of the killing of the
innocent, but still John Paul II shocks them. Part of the reason is that
it is hard for a patriot to be told that he has wrongly bestowed his love,
but a deeper reason is a point well taken: conservatives object that it is
absurd to suggest a moral equivalence between say, the American nation or the British establishment and Nazi tyranny and Bolshevik totalitarianism. One remembers the reaction to Churchill’s ill-chosen
comment that Attlee’s socialist reforms will come with a Gestapo to
enforce them. Behind much liberal argumentation, however, lies just
such an assumption of moral equivalence and, among many liberals,
Churchill’s ‘‘Gestapo’’ remark is pretty accurate about any rightist
agenda.18 Yet liberals remain aghast at John Paul II’s position because
the protection and promotion of abortion rights is, in America and
Britain at least, foundational to their politics: abortion is a hallmark of
liberty against tyranny!
This book closes against both liberals and patriots since its final and
longest chapter is given over to trying to show how John Paul II is
justified in his remarkable claim. Abortion is certainly an issue of culture, but it is also an issue of governance. By way of casting my comments in chapter  in a slightly different light, consider the work of
Peter Singer. Singer is an undeniably interesting thinker. It is not that
his arguments are especially deep or complex (but his books read all
the more eloquently for this); it is rather the audaciousness of his thinking. By this, I do not (directly at any rate) mean his advocacy for
infanticide, say, but his utopianism. It should be noted that Singer’s
effort to rewrite the laws governing homicide is not also an effort to
diminish the number of killings. His goal is to diminish pain and
increase pleasure and this will require more legal kinds of killing (and
inevitably more killing in toto). His goal is remarkable because here
democratic humanitarianism is self-consciously homicidal and its deep
nerve tissue of killing and pleasure consciously exposed. And how is
this a matter of governance? John Paul II speaks of abortion states as
totalitarian and tyrannical. Were Singer to succeed in having the courts
and legislators rewrite the laws respecting homicide, utilitarian techni-
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cians would determine who should be killed (for he, as much as MacIntyre, rejects rights of choice) and the basic rule of thumb will be to
kill those who are not, as he constantly repeats, ‘‘normal.’’ Kolnai identified as the primary logic of totalitarianism its identitarianism. Without hyperbole at all, Singer can rightly be said to be a totalitarian
thinker: through killing, his utilitarian technicians will strive to create
a utopia of normalcy and pleasure. The state which licenses Peter Singer’s technicians (has the Netherlands already done so?) will be both
tyrannical and totalitarian. By contrast, it is the argument of this book
that all political pluralists should recognize that contraception is a violence against the flesh whose issuance is a violence against the stranger
in the womb. The mark of a civilization is that it welcomes the
stranger, it is a part of the ius gentium to do so, and Catholic sexual
ethics is an attempt to submit progressive, democratic political practice
to this older, more primordial moral law.
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Preface
. See Milbank, Theology, , .
. See the classic work of Talmon, Origins of Totalitarian Democracy
. Weigel, Witness to Hope, .
. His writings are beginning to be collected and published. His 
essay on disgust has just been republished (Kolnai, Disgust). A collection of
his early essays in phenomenological ethics has recently appeared and a biography also (both with Ashgate). Also recently published are a set of his political
essays and part of his autobiography (both with Lexington Books). Some of
this interest is certainly created by his notable champions: Pierre Manent,
David Wiggins, and Bernard Williams.
. Kwasniewski, ‘‘St. Thomas, Exstasis, and Union,’’ –.
. Desire and Violence
. This, of course, helps make sense of the Pauline groaning of creation.
For a fascinating analysis of Christ as the satisfaction of the world, a theme
similar to that found in this chap. and my chap. , see Leahy, Novitas Mundi,
–: ‘‘Now the world in essence is the conception of Christ Absolute . . .
now absolutely no one being at the disposal of another shall be disappointed.’’
Cf. Leahy, Foundation, .
. For a detailed discussion of the concreatum, and for citations to where
the idea appears in many of Thomas’s texts, see my ‘‘Matter and the Unity of
Being,’’ The Thomist, vol. , –.
. Wojtyla, who is otherwise fond of Ricoeur’s philosophy, explicitly rejects his thinking on this point (TB, –), affirming instead the concreatum (TB, ).
. For the extreme of this position, see my chap.  and the discussion of
Gassendi.
. Przywara, Polarity, .
. Ibid., .
. I have in mind here representatives of the neo-Augustinian tradition.
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To what degree Bonaventure should be directly included in their number is
difficult to determine. It is probable that the greatness of his thinking eludes
easy classification.
. For the moderated role this conception of matter plays in neoAugustinian thought, please see my ‘‘Augustinian Interpretations of Averroes,’’ Modern Schoolman, vol. , –.
. I have presented this interpretation of Averroes elsewhere, with many
quotations and citations to his texts. See the article referred to in n. .
. For a similar analysis of the relationship between desire and meaning
in an intellectual mentor of Ricouer, see Ricouer’s preface to Nabert, L’expérience intérieure, vii.
. For the ease with which thirteenth-century Christian Platonists exposed Averroes’s Platonism, see my articles on Robert Kilwardby, and Book
X of Henry Bate’s Speculum divinorum: ‘‘Presence of Averroes,’’ Archiv, vol.
, –; ‘‘The Science of Music,’’ Acta Philosophica, vol. , –; Bate,
Speculum divinorum et quorundam naturalium: bks. VIII—IX—X, Ancient
and Medieval Philosophy, Series , forthcoming.
. See my ‘‘Was Medical Theory Heterodox?’’ Recherches de Théologie et
Philosophie médiévales, vol. , –. Cf. Foucault, Care of the Self, vol. ,
–.
. See the fascinating essay on Machiavelli in Manent, Intellectual History
of Liberalism, .
. Hobbes, De Cive, , . Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, .
. Fukuyama, End of History, , .
. I shall return to Smith’s position in chap.  when considering Diana
Schaub’s ‘‘erotic Liberalism.’’
. Gay, ‘‘Theories of Aggression,’’ Cultivation of Hatred, . John Paul
II identifies Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx as reifying and making absolute different biblical lusts (TB, ).
. Given Schmitt’s reputation, it might be a surprise to learn that his
views are quite complex and that his world might be a less violent one than
that defended by most contemporary liberal theorists. See my further comments in chaps.  and .
. McAleer, ‘‘Who were the Averroists?’’ Modern Schoolman, vol. ,
–.
. Brague, ‘‘Le destin de la Pensée,’’ in La question de Dieu selon Aristote
et Hegel, –.
. For a thorough discussion of Giles’s critique of Thomas, and his adoption of an Averroan metaphysics, see my ‘‘Disputing the Unity of the World’’
in Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. , –.
. Although expressed in different language, the same metaphysical point
can be found in Nabert; see Ricouer’s preface to Nabert, L’expérience intérieure
de la liberté.
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. Ecstatic Being
. Przywara pointed out the centrality of this principle to Thomist metaphysics as early as . The point was made later by de Finance, and then by
a number of others. See Przywara, Analogia, ; de Finance, Être et Agir, nd
ed., – and especially, , n. . Przywara also points out the home
Psuedo-Dionysius gained in Dominican mysticism (Przywara, Polarity, ).
. de Finance, Être et Agir, .
. As Cajetan puts it, ‘‘propria ratio boni est fundamentum et causa propria
appetibilitatis’’ (Commentary on the Summa, Leonine ed., I. . ).
. For a good introduction into the nature of the Cursus Conimbricensis
and the editorial methods used, see de Carvalho, ‘‘Medieval Influences in the
Coimbra Commentaries,’’ Patristica et Mediaevalia, vol. , –.
. Fr. Manuel de Góis et al., In libros Ethicorum Aristotelis , disp. .
. See the excellent pages on de Sade in Camus, The Rebel , –.
. See Bate, Speculum divinorum.
. Cf. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics, ; –. See Kant, Groundwork,
, .
. Kant, Lectures –. See Betz, ‘‘The Rhetoric of the Sublime,’’ Modern Theology, forthcoming.
. This seems to be an implication of John Paul II’s recommitment of
the Church’s mission to develop conscience. On the nature and implications
of this recommitment, see Becker and McAleer, ‘‘Contemporary Jesuits,’’
Budhi :–.
. Milbank and Pickstock, Truth, ; hereafter abbreviated as TA.
. For a brilliant (though sadly now forgotten) treatment of the visio dei,
de la Taille, The Hypostatic Union, –.
. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, .
. Foucault, History of Sexuality, vol. , –.
. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, ; on the centrality of
force in Leibniz’s metaphysics, see Klein, Lectures and Essays, .
. Merleau-Ponty, ‘‘Indirect Language,’’ in Signs, –; hereafter cited as
SN.
. Merleau-Ponty, ‘‘Introduction,’’ SN, .
. Merleau-Ponty, ‘‘Indirect Language’’ SN, , ; –.
. For Merleau-Ponty’s adoption of Marxism as dogma: ‘‘Marxism is not
just any hypothesis which can be replaced tomorrow by some other . . . it is
the philosophy of history . . .’’ (Merleau-Ponty, ‘‘The Yogi and the Proletarian,’’ in Primacy of Perception,’’ ; hereafter cited as PP); emphasis original.
. Merleau-Ponty, ‘‘Yogi ’’ PP, .
. Merleau-Ponty, ‘‘Yogi,’’ PP, .
. Merleau-Ponty, ‘‘Note on Machiavelli,’’ SN, –.
. Milbank, Theology, .
. I think Merleau-Ponty’s texts clearly show him to assume a metaphys-
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ics of violence and so I am rather less sanguine than some Catholic commentators about the suitability of his theory of the body for founding a Catholic
ethics. In a book I otherwise like very much, I find this regrettable assumption
very much in evidence. See J. F. Kavanaugh, Who Count as Persons? .
. de Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, –.
. Pope John Paul II, Crossing the Threshold, –.
. On Levinas’s lack of knowledge about the scholastics, see Peperzak’s
introduction to his edition of To The Other, ; hereafter cited as TO.
. I draw the various formulations of this paragraph from Przywara,
‘‘Husserl et Heidegger,’’ Les betudes philosophiques, –.
. Milbank, Theology, .
. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, , hereafter cited as OTB.
. Pascal, Pensée, . Aphorism  is quoted as an epigraph at the start
of OTB.
. ‘‘. . . quando igitur intellectus intelligit aliud a se, res intellecta est sicut
pater verbi in intellectu concepti: ipse autem intellectus magis gerit similitudinem matris, cujus est ut in ea fiat conceptio’’(Compendium theologiae, c. ;
emphasis original).
. A. Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, .
. Ibid., –.
. Ibid., –.
. Nancy, Birth to Presence, ; hereafter cited as BP.
. ‘‘Thus, the body has been turned into nothing but a wound. We have
not simply tried to dominate it through struggle, or hurt it, or even kill it; we
have tried to take away its absoluteness from it’’ (BP, ).
. Milbank, Theology, . Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, the
socialist collectivism of which Milbank admires, is critically discussed in my
chap. .
. The Politics of the Flesh
. ‘‘Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in  Politicorum, c. , est quidem in animali contemplari et despoticum principatum, et politicum. Anima quidem corpori dominatur despotico principatu, intellectus
autem appetitui, politico et regali. Dicitur enim despoticus principatus quo
aliquis principatur servis, qui non habent facultatem in aliquo resistendi imperio praecipientis, quia nihil in sui habent. Principatus autem politicus et regalis dicitur quo aliquis principatus liberis; qui etsi subdantur regimini
praesidentis, tamen habent aliquid proprium, ex quo possunt reniti praecipientis imperio. Sic igitur anima dominatur corpori despotico principatu, quia
corporis membra in nullo resistere possunt imperio animae . . . Intellectus
autem, seu ratio dicitur principali irascibili et concupiscibili politico princi-
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patu; quia appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti imperio rationis’’ (ST I, q. , a. , ad ); cf. ST I-II, q. , a. , ad .
. Some commentators on Thomas are confused about his position. One
goes so far as to say that on account of the Fall, the rule of reason over
sensuality is political, whereas through the gift of grace in the state of original
justice the human had despotic control over sensuality. See C. Gallagher,
‘‘Concupiscence,’’ The Thomist, vol. , –. This claim strikes me as extremely confused and I know of no passages in Thomas where he speaks of
despotic rule of sensuality being a gift of grace. Gallagher is, however, quite
correct that his opinion is that defended by Rahner in his  article, ‘‘On
the Theological Concept of Concupiscentia.’’ For a fuller discussion, see my
chap. . Rahner and Gallagher seem to be thinking of Augustine when he
argues the inverse of Thomas. Augustine cites Cicero approvingly: ‘‘The
members of the body are governed like children, because of their ready obedience, while the perverted elements of the soul are coerced like slaves under a
harsher regime’’ (Augustine, City of God, , c. , ).
. Merton, Seven Storey Mountain , 
. Milbank, Theology, –.
. Billot, De personali et originali, pars tertia, q. –, thesis , .
. Blanchette, Perfection of the Universee, .
. Ibid., .
. Rahner, ‘‘Theological Concept,’’ Theological Investigations, vol. , ;
hereafter cited as TC.
. TC, .
. The Catechism speaks of concupiscence as ‘‘an inclination to sin’’ (para.
 nd ), in fact following Aquinas’s language at De Malo, q. , a. ,
ad .
. Catechism, para. .
. Suarez, Opera Omnia, vol. , ed. Vivès, De peccato originali, disputatio
, sect. , a.
. Ibid., disputatio , sect. , a.
. Oddly, Pascal appears to deny that concupiscence materialiter loquendo
is a part of human nature, regarding it merely as a ‘‘second nature’’ (Pensée,
) acquired after Adam’s sin.
. For an excellent recent discussion of individuation in Thomas, see
Dewan, ‘‘The Individual as a Mode of Being,’’ The Thomist,  (–).
. Giraud, I See Satan Fall, .
. The phrase belongs to David Gallagher and he is of the opinion that
for Thomas a ‘‘bodily giving of self ’’ is ‘‘not proper to the love of persons as
such’’ (D. Gallagher, ‘‘Person and Ethics,’’ Acta Philosophica, vol. , , n.
).
. Suarez, Opera Omnia, vol. , ed. Vivès, De peccato originali, disputatio
, sect. , b. For the almost identical formulation, see TB, .
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. ‘‘. . . cum tamen D. Thomas et Augustinus dicant concupiscibilem et
potentiam generatricem ac sensum tactus fuisse maxime vulnerata. Respondeo
has potentias ex natura sua esse procliviores in objecta sua, vel certe magis
excitare et commovere hominem, et ideo dici magis laesas, quia justitia originalis in his potentiis majores impetus reprimebat’’ (Ibid., disputatio , sect. ,
a).
. de Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural ; hereafter cited as MS.
. MS, ; emphasis added.
. MS, –. One could add Nabert, Elements for an Ethic, ; –.
. Milbank, Theology, .
. See my chap. , where I discuss Thomas’s theory at length.
. See my, ‘‘Individuation and Ethics,‘‘ Budhi:, , –.
. For a succinct statement of this metaphysical problem, see Buffier,
Doctrine du Sens Commun, .
. For an interesting liberal attempt to overcome the classic justification
of abortion in the identity of persons with subjective rationality, see Waldron,
God, Locke, and Equality , . For the rejection in Catholic thought of the
argument for abortion on the basis of subjective rationality, see EV, . For
the claim that without rationality the human is no more significant than a
sparrow, see Dombrowski and Deltete, Brief, Liberal, Catholic Defence, :
do Pickstock and Milbank really want to associate themselves with such a
position?
. For MacIntyre’s refutation of any such idea in Thomas, see his Dependent Rational Animals.
. This is incompatible with the Church’s doctrinal definition that the
‘‘rational soul is per se et essentialiter’’ (VS, para. ) the form of the body.
This teaching of the Church was defined at the Ecumenical Council of Vienna
and reaffirmed at the Fifth Lateran Ecumenical Council (see also VS, para.
). For an excellent article on how Descartes handled the teaching of the
Fifth Lateran Council in relationship to his own metaphysics of the body and
soul, see Janowski, ‘‘Is Descartes’ Conception of the Soul Orthodox?’’ Revue
de Métaphysique, –. Reading this article alongside the Pickstock-Milbank
volume helps to identify the Cartesian heritage of the heterodoxy of their
thesis.
. Amor amicitiae is directed to subsistent goods while amor concupiscentiae is directed toward perfections of a subsisting being, that is, second perfections. The Milbank-Pickstock position makes the person a second perfection
and so an object of a love of concupiscence. Thus persons are reduced to a
means to other persons’ happiness. For an outstanding treatment of love and
the metaphysical issues involved, see Gallagher, ‘‘Person and Ethics,’’ Acta
Philosophica, vol.  , –.
. de Finance, Être et Agir, nd ed., .
. Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths, .
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. The Law of the Flesh
. As cited in von Balthasar, Theology of Karl Barth, 
. For a fine summary of this debate in recent decades, see Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune, chap. .
. See L. Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right.
. Milbank, Theology, .
. Hauerwas, Community, .
. The historicism is clear with one of Hauerwas’s students who writes
that both theoretical and practical reasoning is ‘‘situated within a particular
type of community of virtue’’ (W. Kavanuagh, Torture and Eucharist, ).
He relies on some of MacIntryre’s earlier work for this claim. Counter to this,
however, is MacIntyre’s more recent espousal in Dependent Rational Animals
of a metaphysical biology and the universal claims of practical reason that are
a consequence of our animal vulnerability.
. Klein, ‘‘On the Nature of Nature,’’ Lectures .
. von Balthasar, Theology of Karl Barth, .
. It is parallel to the liberal claim to judicial usurpation.
. The repudiating power of this Barthian understanding of word and
spirit is what Milbank hopes to capture by the title to his collection of essays,
The Word Made Strange. And it is strange indeed that the strangeness of the
‘‘Word’’ should get us only as far as the justice of socialism so proudly espoused by Milbank. For Letwin’s identification of the intellectual trend to a
defense of justice unrestrained by law, see her  John Bonython Lecture,
Law and Liberty.
. It is worth noting that what is rejected here is moral objectivity,
whether defended by natural law or the tradition of moral intuitionism. These
moral theories (broadly understood) found strong advocates in late twentiethcentury British moral philosophy, notably Kolnai and Mayo. Much of this
book is a contribution to this style of moral theory. I hope to write a book in
which moral intuitionism is used as a corrective to recent trends in theology
to dismiss nature in favor of grace. The imbalance began to emerge in Catholic theology with de Lubac but is amply on display in most contemporary
theology.
. The point ascribed to Suarez is present in Vitoria who was certainly a
source for Suarez. For the point in Vitoria attributed to Suarez, see de Vitoria,
On Homicide, –. Of course, I shall be arguing that Milbank misunderstands both Vitoria and Suarez.
. The same argument is found in Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune, –
, .
. For his rejection of the Catholic commitment to a natural social order,
see Milbank, ‘‘On Complex Space,’’ Word Made Strange, .
. All of the following quotations come from Milbank, ‘‘Critique,’’ Word
Made Strange, –.
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. ‘‘Human good is heterogeneous because the aims of the self are heterogeneous’’ (Rawls, Theory of Justice, ).
. Ingham, Harmony .
. Opus Oxoniense, IV, d. , q. un., n. ; ed. Vivès, vol. , a. Cf.
Lee, ‘‘Aquinas and Scotus.’’  Proceedings of the ACPA, –.
. Przywara, Polarity, .
. Cf. Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune, . General rules derived from
the first precepts of the natural law cannot be a concrete guide to action since
the good is ‘‘contingent and complex.’’ See , where, I would argue, Bowlin
reads Thomas as Scotus.
. M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics, .
. See Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune, , .
. See Ricouer’s preface to Jean Nabert, L’expérience intérieure de la liberté, xxv. A sustained refutation of a view like Nabert’s is found in Kolnai’s
essay, ‘‘Forgiveness,’’ in the collection of his papers, Ethics, Value and Reality,
–.
. A fine example of this misconstrual of Christian theology and metaphysics is found in Hans Jonas. His mistake on this point undermines the
entire story he wishes to tell of the development of Western science. See his
essay, ‘‘Is God a Mathematician?’’ in The Phenomenon of Life, –.
. This is basic to Bonaventure’s theology of order as well.
. Kolnai, ‘‘Ghost,’’ Philosophy –.
. Ibid., , n. 
. Kolnai’s  approach is somewhat similar to chaps.  and  of Finnis’s Natural Law and Natural Rights .
. Ibid., . Kolnai shows there is no reason to accept Brentano’s positing
of a conflict between natural law and moral objectivity. See Brentano, Origin
of Our Knowledge.
. Ibid., .
. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, ; hereafter cited as EP.
. John Milbank has spoken favorably of Deleuze’s Spinozism, albeit subject to certain modification (see Theology, ). Besides Deleuze’s cosmological
interest, I assume that what Milbank finds attractive in this Spinozism is its
equalitarianism. In chap. , I will show how such equalitarianism is constitutive of the culture of death.
. For the same in Marx, see Fessard, ‘‘Is Marx’s Thought Relevant?’’,
Marx and the Western World, .
. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, hereafter cited as EI.
. ‘‘Efficitur vero extra se ipsum, quando non curat sua sunt, sed quae
perveniunt ad bona aliorum; et hoc facit charitas (I Cor., XIII, v. ): ‘Caritas
non quaerit quae sua sunt.’ ’’
. ‘‘The world itself in essence is the body itself, is the living flesh of Jesus
the Nazarene transformed into being here at the disposal of another in essence’’ (Leahy, Novitas Mundii, ).
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. Pope John Paul II, Letter to Families.
. Pascal, Pensée, ; quoted by Levinas as one of the epigraphs to OTB.
. Gallagher writes, ‘‘The precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to
the precepts of love. Hence these fundamental precepts of the natural law
primarily command a love of friendship . . . ,’’ ‘‘Person and Ethics,’’ Acta
Philosophica, vol. , .
. As de Finance puts it, ‘‘la possibilité de cette participation repose tout
entière sur la nature essentiellement diffusive, généreuse, de l’acte’’ de Finance,
Être et Agir, nd. ed., .
. Clarke, Explorations in Metaphysics, .
. The Body as Cross
. As cited in Pascal, Pensée, .
. According to the editors of The Jerome Biblical Commentary, scholars
agree that the Gospel of John was originally conceived as ending with this
event, the most complete witness of faith in John’s Gospel: see The Jerome
Biblical Commentary, , n. .
. This event of the Passion is of extreme importance to John. Commenting on John’s Gospel, the editors of The Jerome Biblical Commentary say, ‘‘The
Church can be said in a sense to have been born from the wounded side of
Christ.’’ In addition to John, they cite Thomas, Ambrose, and Pius XII for
support. See The Jerome Biblical Commentary, , n. .
. Bellarmine, Seven Words, .
. ‘‘. . . quod caritatis proprium est transformare amantem in amatum,
quia ipsa est quae exstasim facit, ut Dionysius dicit. Et quia augmentum virtutum in hoc sacramento fit per conversionem manducantis in spiritualem
cibum, ideo magis attribuitur huic sacramento caritatis augmentum quum
aliarum virtutum’’ (IV Sent., d. , q. , a. , ad. ).
. Levinas, To the Other, .
. ‘‘Et ideo amans quodammodo penetrat in amatum, et secundum hoc
amor dicitur acutus. Acuti enim est dividendo ad intima rei devenire. Et similiter amatum penetrat amantem ad interiora ejus perveniens. Et propter hoc
dicitur quod amor vulnerat, et quod transfigit iecur’’ (III Sent., d. , q. , a.
, ad ).
. ‘‘Quia ergo Apostolus proprium affectum deposuerat per crucem
Christi, dicebat se mortuum proprio affectu, dicens Christo confixus sum cruci,
id est, per crucem Christi remotus est a me proprius affectus sive privatus’’
(Thomas Aquinas, Super epistolas sancti Pauli lectura c. , lect. , n. ).
. The same concern is raised by von Balthasar, see his Word and Revelation, .
. ‘‘. . . caro tamen ejus, et mysteria in ea perpetrata operantur instrumen-
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taliter ad animae vitam; ad vitam autem corporis non solum instrumentaliter,
sed etiam per quamdam exemplaritatem’’ (ST III, q. , a. , ad ).
. Bellarmine, Seven Words, .
. von Balthasar, Theological Anthropology, .
. Suarez, Opera omnia, ed. Vivès, vol. , De peccato originali, disputatio
, sect. , para. –; b.
. A study on this topic is already begun and develops the approach of
the Baroque Spanish scholastic Bãnez and the twentieth century French Jesuit,
de la Taille.
. ‘‘Amor significat coaptationem quandam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod
bonum. Nihil autem quod coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens, ex
hoc ipso laeditur: sed magis, si sit possibile, proficit et melioratur’’ (ST I -II,
q. , a. ).
. ‘‘Et sicut ignis non potest retineri a motu qui competit sibi secundum
exigentiam suas formae, nisi per violentiam; ita nec amans quin agat secundum
amorem’’ (III Sent., d. , q. , a. ).
. The Beguine Mechthild of Magdeburg writes: ‘‘As long as sinning continues on earth, Christ’s wounds shall be open: bloody, but not painful’’ (The
Flowing Light, ).
. ‘‘Sed quia nihil potest in alterum transformari nisi secundum quod a
sua forma quodammodo recedit, quia unius una est forma, ideo hanc divisionem penetrationis praecedit alia divisio qua amans a seipso separatur in amatum tendens’’ (III Sent., d. , q. , a. , ad )
. ‘‘Quia vero nihil a se recedit nisi soluto eo quod intra seipsum continebatur, sicut res naturalis non amittit formam nisi solutis dispositionibus
quibus forma in materia retinebatur, ideo oportet quod ab amante terminatio
illa qua intra terminos suo tantum continebatur, amoveatur. Et propter hoc
amor dicitur liquefacere cor, quia liquidum suis terminis non continetur’’
(Idem).
. Nancy has spoken of himself as developing a ‘‘Catholic theological
thesis’’ in his essay, ‘‘Deconstruction of Christianity.’’
. Nancy, ‘‘Corpus,’’ Birth to Presence, .
. Ibid., . See my earlier discussion of Nancy on this point in
chap. .
. Barthes, Camera Lucida, ; hereafter cited as CL.
. ‘‘. . . to pass over to peace through the ecstatic transports of Christian
wisdom. The road to peace is through nothing else than a most ardent love
of the Crucified, which so transformed Paul into Christ when he was rapt to
the third heaven that he declared: With Christ I am nailed to the Cross; it is now
no longer I that live, but Christ lives in me. This love so absorbed the soul of
Francis too that his spirit shone through his flesh the last two years of his life,
when he bore the most holy marks [sacratissima passionis stigmata in corpore
suo] of the Passion in his body’’ (Bonaventure, Journey, prologue).
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. Catherine of Siena, Passion for the Truth, –; hereafter cited as PT.
. Milbank, Theology, .
. Although I will not discuss it here, Thomas’s theory of love is congruent with his doctrine on homicide.
. ‘‘. . . dicendum, quod quamvis illa apertura vulnerum sit cum quadam
solutione continuitatis, totum tamen hoc recompensatur per majorem decorem gloriae, ut corpus non sit minus integrum, sed magis perfectum.
Thomas autem non solum vidit, sed etiam vulnera tetigit . . .’’ (ST III, q. ,
a. , ad ).
. I disagree with Kavanaugh—indeed gift is glory—when he writes,
‘‘The Eucharist is under the sign of gift, not of glory’’ (W. Kavanaugh, Torture
and Eucharist, ).
. All references to St. John of the Cross are drawn from The Collected
Works of St. John of the Cross; hereafter, Dark Night is cited as DN; The
Spiritual Canticle is cited as SC; The Living Flame of Love is cited as LFL.
. For the most recent of many attacks, and this one by a confrere who is
rather lacking in Christian charity, see O’Meara, ‘‘Interpreting Thomas Aquinas,’’ The Ethics of Thomas Aquinas, –. Signs of a rehabilitation can be
found. See the essay of Meng, ‘‘Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange,’’ Modern Schoolman, vol. , –.
. Pope John Paul II, Crossing the Threshold, .
. J. de Finance, Être et Agir, .
. See The Jerome Biblical Commentary, .
. I owe this observation to Peter Kwasniewski. See his unpublished dissertation, The Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas, , n. 
. The Politics of the Flesh Revisited
. Toletus, Enarratio in summam theologiae, vol. III, hereafter cited as EN,
with page number and column.
. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, hereafter cited as SCW.
. ‘‘Nota etiam secundo, quod isti duo appetitus in homine discordes
sunt. Nam unusquisque tendit in proprium bonum: rationalis in bonum animae, sensitivus in bonum carnis. Quum autem saepe contraria sint ista bona,
fit, ut appetitus et portiones istae sint contrariae et pugnantes inter se, significatae per Iacob et Esau, qui in ventre matris pugnabant’’ (EN, b). The
reference to Scripture is Genesis , –.
. ‘‘Unde noster appetitus quum in ea, quae contra rationem sunt, fertur,
dicitur sensualitas et fomes; quum vero a ratione movetur, dicitur voluntas
participata, seu voluntas carnis vel sensualis. Talis fuit in Christo’’ (EN, a).
. For an excellent summary of Trent’s teaching and the condemnation
of Baius by Pius V, see Rahner, ‘‘Theological Concept,’’ Theological Investigations, vol. , .
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. I am indebted for the following references to the excellent article of
McMahon, ‘‘Christological Turn in Recent Literature,’’ Thomist, vol. ,
–.
. See the comments on theologians MacIssac and Grelot in McDermott, ‘‘ Theology of Original Sin,’’ Theological Studies  (), –.
. S. Duffy, ‘‘Our Hearts of Darkness: Original Sin Revisited,’’ Theological Studies  (), .
. For original sin issuing from the free, personal decision of Adam, see
F. Suarez, Opera omnia, ed. Vivès, vol. , De peccato originali, disputatio ,
sect. , para. ; b.
. For a nice summary of the debate over the secular understanding of
‘‘original sin,’’ see Peter Gay, ‘‘Theories of Aggression,’’ The Cultivation of
Hatred, –. On the one side stand the ‘‘conservative, even reactionary’’
ethologists and sociobiologists who argue that aggression is innate to humans,
an inescapable reality of evolutionary biology. On the other side stand ‘‘the
Liberals,’’ who deny ‘‘the existence of preprogrammed drives’’ and rather pay
‘‘fervent tributes to the malleable qualities of the child.’’ The via media among
the seculars is held by the psychoanalytic school. Cultivation of our drives is
possible to some degree but violence belongs to a ‘‘stubborn innate core of
human nature’’ wherein ‘‘deeply buried but potent impulses . . . fiercely resist’’
cultivation.
. The references can be found in McMahon’s article.
. It is clearly crucial that theologians return to the distinctions of the
scholastics. They save us from rank confusion. Citing de Chardin’s sense that
it is ‘‘unhealthy’’ to keep bringing up the question of original sin, one theologian who wants to promote ‘‘the spirit of spontaneous joy and celebration’’
laments the  Catechism’s formulations on original sin. The Catechism’s
teaching on original sin (discussed at length in my chap. ) is dismissed as
‘‘wilful medievalism’’ and all the distinctions of the scholasticis brushed aside.
With nuanced thinking at an end, predictably original sin is said to be a
consequence of ‘‘the bare fact of being human’’ and ‘‘violence, injustice, cruelty’’ are now ‘‘intrinsic’’ to human nature. The theologian who wants to
bring us ‘‘the spirit of spontaneous joy and celebration’’ ends up having mired
us and God in a metaphysics of violence that can only entail that salvation is
the grace that eradicates nature. See Daly, ‘‘Original Sin,’’ Commentray . . .
Catechsim, –. Actually, I have never before read such a sad, bitter article.
. ‘‘ . Maior fuit fortitudo et temperantia Christi,
quae totaliter eiicit appetitus inordinationem; quam omnium Sanctorum,
quae tantum vincit, sed non eradicat appetitum’’ (EN, a).
. Lainez, Disputationes Tridentinae, vol. , . For the position that the
natural and supernatural are ‘‘opposed’’ to one another, see Buffier, Doctrine
du Sens Commun, . Buffier’s text was first published in  and used approvingly by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments.
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. ‘‘Sciendum est etiam quod sensualitas sive sensualis appetitus, inquantum est natus obedire rationi, dicitur rationale per participationem, ut patet
per Philosophum.’’ (Aquinas, Summa theologica [Marietti], III, q. , a. ). Cf.
ST I-II, q. , a. ; q. , a. , ad .
. Levi, Cardinal Richelieu, .
. Pascal, Pensée, .
. Ibid., .
. Both quotations are taken from de Lubac’s Mystery of the Supernatural,
–: de Lubac quotes both approvingly.
. ST III, q. , a. , ad .
. ‘‘Alio modo potest dici aliquis orare secundum sensualitatem: quia scilicet ejus oratio orando Deo proponit quod est in appetitu sensualitatis ipsius:
et secundum hoc Christus oravit secundum sensualitatem, inquantum scilicet
oratio ejus exprimebat sensualitatis affectum, tamquam sensualitatis advocata’’
(ST III, q. , a. ).
. Pieper comments about Thomas’s anthropology: ‘‘Man is not really a
battlefield of conflicting forces and impulse which conquer one another’’
(Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, ).
. See my ‘‘Matter and the Unity of Being,’’ Thomist, vol. , –.
. While Thomas argues that Christ has total authority over his human
nature, since, as God, Christ has total authority over creation (ST III, q. ,
aa. –), he has a sensuality just like other men (ST III, q. , a. ).
. ST I, q. , a. , ad ; ST I-II, q. , a. , ad .
. Hibbs, ‘‘A Rhetoric of Motives,’’ Thomist, vol. , –.
. Foucault, History of Sexuality, vol. : Care of the Self, –; hereafter
cited as CS.
. See my ‘‘Politics of the Flesh,’’ Modern Theology, vol. , –.
. On Giles’s loyalty to Augustine in his theory of the flesh, see Przywara,
Polarity, –.
. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy, –.
. For a much more detailed account of Giles’s theory of sensuality see
my ‘‘Sensuality: An Avenue,’’ Gregorianum, vol. , –.
. Ibid., d. , q. , a. , , vC; d. , q. , a. , dubitatio  lateralis,
, rD.
. Ibid., d. , q. , a. , , vB.
. ‘‘Ad quintum dicendum, quod omnes nascimur natura filii irae, sed
hoc non est secundum naturam institutam, sed secundum naturam corruptam, quod magis debet dici contra naturam, quam secundum naturam: vel
hoc non est secundum naturam formae, quae principaliter dicitur natura, sed
secundum naturam materiae, quae non est natura, nisi per analogiam ad formam.’’ (Ibid. d. , q. , a. , ad , , rC); emphasis is mine. Ibid., d. ,
q. , a. , dubitatio lateralis , vA.
. Ibid., d. , q. , a. , , rB.
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. ‘‘Quod ideo contingit, quia homo ex suis naturalibus habet pugnam
sensualitatis et rationis: ideo ait Philosophus, quod sunt in nobis motores
contrarii sensus et ratio: bestiae autem non habent hanc pugnam, idest, quia
carent ratione. Angeli non habent quia carent sensualitate.’’ (Ibid., d. , q. ,
a. , p. vC); ibid., d. , q. , a. , p. , rA.
. Ibid., d. , dubitatio  litteralis, , vD.
. Ibid., d. , q. , a. , , vB.
. Ibid., d. , q. , a. , p. , rD; ibid., d. , q. , a. , p. , vB;
ibid., d. , q. , dubitatio  lateralis, p. , vD.
. Ibid., d. , q. , a. , , rD.
. Ibid., d. , q. , a. , , rA.
. Ibid., d. , q. , a. , , vD.
. Aeg. Rom., In Tertium librum sententiarum, pars , d. , q. , a. ,
, rD.
. Aeg. Rom., In Secundum librum sententiarum, pars , d. , q. , a. ,
dubitatio  lateralis , rB; ibid., a. , dubitatio  lateralis, rA.
. de Vitoria, On Homicide, .
. See the comments of Doyle, ‘‘Vitoria on Choosing,’’ Hispanic Philosophy, Studies, vol. , –.
. Cf. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, –; A. Bloom, Love and Friendship, .
. Plato, Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII, –.
. Descartes, Passions of the Soul , vol. , –.
. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, –.
. Michael, ‘‘Descartes and Gassendi, Meeting of the Minds, .
. Charleton, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana, II, c. , art.
,.
. Gassendi, Syntagma Philosophicum, Opera omnia, vol. : Pars physica,
sectio I, liber III, c. , p. b; b; a, respectively.
. ‘‘Quippe, ut Simplicius prae aliis declarat, cum vellet Anaxagoras corpuscula illa sua secundum substantiam, contexturamve intimam differre inter
se, quod alia forent ex se calida, alia frigidas; alia carnea, alia sanguinea, quod
et iam ante deduximus.’’ (Ibid., b)
. Ibid., a. Cf. Jonas, ‘‘Is God a Mathematician?’’ in his collection,
The Phenomenon of Life, .
. ‘‘Si comparatio igitur iuvat, confer opus naturae non cum domo, sed
cum exercitu; materiam non cum lapidibus, sed cum militibus; agens non
cum fabro, sed cum Imperatore. Imperator videlicet, cum militantium unus
sit, totum tamen exercitum per turmas, ordinesque disponit, ac milites omnes
ad eius nutum ita moventur, ut ipse cum illis exercitum componat, sitque
interim ipsius praecipua, ac nobilissima pars.’’ (Ibid., sectio I, liber IV, c. ,
a)
. Malebranche, Treatise on Ethics (), ; hereafter cited as TE.
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. Haraway, ‘‘A Cyborg Manifesto,’’in SCW; hereafter cited as CM.
. Haraway, ‘‘The Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies,’’ in SCW; hereafter
cited as BPB.
. Haraway, ‘‘Introduction,’’ in SCW, ; hereafter cited as I.
. Haraway, ‘‘A Political Physiology of Dominance,’’ in SCW, ; hereafter cited as PPD; cf. CM, .
. For an example of his influence, see the structural role his thought
plays in chap.  of von Balthasar’s Theological.
. Fessard, Par-delà le fascisme et le communisme; hereafter cited as FC.
. Aquinas and Fessard would both reject Jacob Klein’s contention that
there is an inherent rivalry between nature and grace. See his ‘‘On the Nature
of Nature,’’ Lectures and Essays, .
. Cf. ScG II, c. –. Also, ST II-II , q. , a. , ad ; I-II, q. , a. ,
ad . Cf. Pope John Paul II, Theology of the Body –. Also, Gospel of Life,
in TB, ; herafter cited as GL.
. See ScG II, c. ; III, c. ; IV, c. .
. See TB, –; GL, .
. Gaston Fessard, ‘‘Recherches sur le sens de l’historie,’’ in Michael
Sales, SJ, Gaston Fessard, –; see GL, .
. See Pope John Paul II, Dignity and Vocation, in TB, –.
. For an analysis of a culture of sacrifice relying upon grandeur, honor,
piety and asceticism, as well as Eucharist, see Pope John Paul II, TB, –;
; ; and GL –.
. Fessard, ‘‘Symbole, Surnaturel, Dialogue,’’ Démythisation et Morale,
: hereafter cited as SSD.
. Fessard, La dialectique des Exercices spirituels, ; hereafter cited as DE.
Cf. Fessard, Pax Nostra, .
. ‘‘Avant cette conversion, la grâce, ce principe de liberté subjective, n’était qu’un accident, tombé du ciel, dans un moi dont la substance entière, dont
l’acte s’était d’abord posé vers Non-être. Après, c’est l’inverse: dans l’homme
nouveau, corps et âme sont création de la grâce et c’est l’existence objective
du péché qui devient un accident. L’appel à la liberté va du dehors au dedans;
la réponse au contraire.’’ (DE, )
. Is Contraception a Human Right?
. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, .
. I am not an American either, but the mind boggles that anyone could
think to reduce the grandeur of the Constitution to a right to sex with contraceptives. And more recently, as Catholic charities have just discovered, an
entitlement to sex with contraceptives. It seems Politically Incorrect host Bill
Maher was correct in saying that we are ‘‘one step away from saying that
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getting laid is an entitlement.’’ This point is made by Julia Gorin (Insight on
the News). I owe this reference to Kate Leahy.
. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, .
. And I assume that marriage is an institution ordered to love and peace,
and is instituted by the ius gentium as the best place for the raising of children.
. I cannot agree with Jean Porter that the encyclical makes its argument
‘‘by rational analysis prior to theological interpretation.’’ (Porter, Natural and
Divine Law )
. While I do not agree with everything in W. Kavanaugh’s Torture and
Eucharist, I agree entirely that a Christian bodily political practice is necessary.
I suspect Kavanaugh would not agree with the character of the bodily politics
that I think is required and for which I will argue in chaps.  and .
. Such a bodily politics is laid out by St. Augustine in the City of God,
.
. Sales, Gaston Fessard, .
. ‘‘. . . se retrouve donc le croisement d’un amour parental et d’un
amour conjugal, qui est le fondement du passage, du lien entre rationnel et
surnaturel . . .’’ (SSD, ).
. Weigel, Witness to Hope, .
. I think the work of Eugene Rogers is deeply flawed because he fails to
make the Thomistic-papal linkage of sexual acts to the Cross. Rogers never
thinks about the character of sexual acts (Sexuality and the Christian Body,
–, for example) and how they must relate to the Cross. Rogers takes as
the foundation for any discussion of sexuality the Trinity (). This is, of
course, quite appropriate. Humanae Vitae relates sexuality and the Trinity, as
I shall show shortly. But there is more. The teaching of Humanae Vitae can
also be used to relate the body to the Cross, and this Thomistic approach
provides a strong analysis of sexuality as lived by rational, sensuous animals.
Moreover, Rogers explicitly bases his analysis of the flesh on Rahner’s theory
of concupiscence, not noticing that it is riven by violence (–). In these
crucial pages, one again finds no analysis of the character of sexual acts and
how they might be made congruent with God. One could go on with the
problems in Rogers’ attempt to justify homosexuality to Christians, but the
problems I foresee in general with any such attempt will become clear enough.
. Weigel, Witness to Hope, –.
. I will not be considering reactions to John Paul II’s The Theology of the
Body: prepared as a series of -minute addresses delivered in four (multi-part)
sessions from –. That of Luke Timothy Johnson (Commonweal, Jan.
, ) is pretty typical. He thinks it intelligent to argue that when I hold
my breath I do not sever my commitment to breathing and so do I not sever
my commitment to ‘‘openness’’ when I use a contraceptive (). It clearly is
not intelligent to think I make a ‘‘commitment’’ to breathing in a way analogous to the commitment I make in marriage to love my wife in justice, nor is
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it intelligent to compare sexuality and the simply biological function of
breathing. Unless I’ve missed something, I am unaware of a philosophy of
breathing. Perhaps Plato missed a great opportunity when he failed to write
the Symposium on the topic of breathing? For a genuinely intellectual criticism
of the basic positions of The Theology of the Body one will always do better by
turning to the atheology of someone like Bataille.
. Cf. Anscombe, ‘‘Authority in Morals,’’ Ethics, Religion and Politics,
–.
. John Paul II gives a carefully crafted endorsement of Plato’s eros (TB,
, n. ; , n. , noting its ecstatic character and trajectory to the divine
(TB, ).
. That we are not dealing with anything like a ‘‘naturalistic fallacy’’ here,
see my chap. .
. The theory advanced here is not that of Aristophanes in the Symposium: while unredeemed sex is violent, it is not the case that sex as such is
against law. See L. Strauss, On Plato’s Symposium, .
. I take this point to be grudgingly acknowledged by Peter Gay when he
writes: ‘‘Nor, unlike sexuality, can aggression boast of specific executive organs. To be sure, we know that every part of the body can be enlisted, whether
in fantasy or reality, in erotic excitement and consummation; conventional
sexual intercourse plots the rising rhythm of sensations across diverse bodily
zones, to culminate in genital union. But it does culminate there; in both
male and female some fairly specialized organs seem virtually designed to accommodate the principal erotic pleasures’’ (Gay, ‘‘Theories of Aggression,’’
The Cultivation of Hatred, ). And we could add what Peter Gay does not
want to have to say: that, what he calls the ‘‘specialized organs,’’ are part of a
generative system which is ‘‘a complexity that is neural, glandular, vascular,
muscular, with internal and external organs,’’ only a small part of which is
concerned with pleasure (Duhamel, Catholic Church and Birth Control, ).
. I thus think Jean Porter’s optimism is misplaced when she writes: ‘‘We
are far more likely to regard sexual pleasure as good, and correlatively, we are
more open to the possibility that sexual activity can serve other legitimate
purposes besides procreation, including especially the expression and fostering
of love between two individuals’’ (Porter, Natural and Divine Law, ). As
with Rogers, nowhere in Porter’s work do we find a characterization of sexual
acts. There is no discussion of Augustine’s theory of sex, nor arguments made
by Wojtyla. Instead, we are told that because modern folk enjoy sex it is
obviously and without argument a good severed from procreation. At the same
time, I think Grisez et al. misunderstand the Thomistic-papal theory. For
Grisez, artificial birth control is contralife. Such contralife will exhibit nothing
less than a hatred and repugnance for ‘‘the possible baby they project and
reject’’ (Ford et al., The Teaching of Humanae Vitae, –, ). Grisez regrets
that recent papal statements have dwelt on contraception as a diminishment
of the good of marriage and much less on the diminishment of the good of
the person hated and rejected by the contralife will. The Thomistic-papal
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theory, however, understands contraception as a rejection of the self-diffusion
of the good as such and thus a diminishment of the good of marriage and the
good of the person hated and rejected.
. As Thomas conceives sexual acts as physically deposed by an ecstatic
sensuality (HV, ), he would reject Anscombe’s assumption that the physical
aspect of sex remains invariant while the intentional aspect of sexual acts can
vary. Anscombe displays a residual Cartesianism and not a Thomistic understanding. Thomas would not agree with Anscombe when, criticizing artificial
birth control, she says of artificially contraceptive acts that, ‘‘it is true that just
considered physically they may be acts of an intrinsically generative type; but
since the physical circumstances that make the acts in the concrete case nongenerative, are produced on purpose by the agent so that they may be nongenerative, they cannot be considered intrincially generative as intentional actions’’ (Anscombe, ‘‘You Can have Sex without Children,’’ Ethics, Religion,
and Politics, ; emphasis original). Grisez et al. appear to follow Anscombe
(Ford et al., The Teaching of Humanae Vitae, –). I think Thomas’s conception of sexual acts as interiorly deposed by ecstatic sensuality makes better
sense of the Pauline teaching: ‘‘Husbands should love their wives as their own
bodies’’ (Eph. : ). Among contemporary authors, Thomas’s position is
closest to that of Scruton, who defends sexual desire as ‘‘intentional pleasure.’’
This phrase in meant to be anti-Platonic and to capture the sense in which
sexual desire is both physical and spiritual. Scruton is quite wrong that Aquinas is a Platonist regarding sex (Scruton, Sexual Desire, , ).
. Oddly, while Rogers acknowledges in a footnote that the traditional
teaching ‘‘looks quite different’’ in John Paul II he does not address this ‘‘new
look’’ analysis of sexuality and this despite Wojtyla’s formulations having long
since been in print. See his comment at Sexuality and the Christian Body, ,
n. .
. I admire George Weigel’s achievement in writing Witness to Hope very
much. He is not correct, however, when he writes: ‘‘Rather than asserting that
either the begetting of children or the communion of the spouses was the
‘primary end’ of marriage Wojtyla’s sexual ethic taught that love was the norm
of marriage, a love in which both the procreative and unitive dimensions of
human sexuality reached their full moral value’’ (). Such a construction
would make Wojtyla’s position a ‘‘romanticism,’’ as understood by Hauerwas
(see his Community, –).
. Cf. Leo Strauss, On Plato’s Symposium, , .
. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, .
. This is the basis for Anscombe’s critique of artificial birth control. The
use of artificial contraception stems from an intentional action ordered to
orgasm and if orgasm is a moral object in its own right lasciviousness is encouraged. As Anscombe points out, lasciviousness is regarded by many moral
philosophers outside the Catholic tradition as an intrinsic evil (Anscombe,
‘‘You Can Have Sex Without Children,’’ Ethics, , ).
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. Lewis, Surprised by Joy, .
. One of many examples would be Kundera’s discussion of John Scotus
Eriugena, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, –. See also Scruton’s discussion of the Augustinian character of Kundera’s Laugther and Forgetting
(Scruton, Sexual Desire, ).
. Augustine, City of God, bk. XIV, c. , .
. Von Hildebrand rejects Augustine’s point here and argues instead that
the secrecy surrounding sex acts is an expression of a sui generis value of
privacy. This is an intriguing suggestion, and relies on the general approach
of moral intuitionism that is defended throughout this book. However, von
Hildebrand is anxious to avoid any hint that sex might be ‘‘something disgraceful and ugly’’ (von Hildebrand, Purity, ), and this is clearly one reason
he rejects Augustine’s analysis. This rejection also sits rather unesaily both
with his acknowledgement of the violence in sex and his insistence on the
need for a radical purification of sex. Please see my discussion of his views
later in this chapter, n. .
. Ibid., bk. I, c. , .
. Augustine, City of God, XV, c. , .
. The fundamentally different metaphysical perspectives on violence in
Freud and Thomas have been described in chap. . Nevertheless, both the
Christian and pyschoanalytic traditions share at some moments the same ‘‘appreciation of the share of violence in human erotic life’’ (Gay, ‘‘Theories of
Aggression,’’ The Cultivation of Hatred, ).
. Irigaray, ‘‘Fecundity of the Caress,’’ Feminist Interpretations, ; hereafter cited as FC.
. This is central to Bonaventure as well. In his Itinerarium, Bonaventure
stresses that Christian wisdom teaches that there is no access to God except
for him who enters through the door of the Cross, his robes washed in the
blood of the Lamb: ‘‘. . . up to God, into union with Whom no one rightly
enters save through the Crucified . . . no one can enter by contemplation into
the heavenly Jerusalem unless he enters through the blood of the Lamb as
through a door’’ (Bonaventure, Journey, prologue, ).
. This position is quite different from von Hildebrand’s. He rightly observes the character of sexual acts but argues that the violence is ‘‘buried’’ only
in an ordering of consciousness during sex, casting ‘‘an upward glance to
God.’’ This is possible only when the ordering of one’s consciousness ‘‘springs
from the background of a direct contemplation of God.’’ I doubt Augustine
thinks there could be, amid sexual acts, a ‘‘conscious reference to God’’ (von
Hildebrand, Purity, –; emphasis mine). There is something utopian in
von Hildebrand’s position. Not content with a moderation of domination, he
seeks its elimination. An ordering of consciousness to God in sex is to be
aimed for ‘‘so that the factor of brutal vitality is buried, not only for thought,
but for experience’’ (Ibid., ; emphasis original). Sexual experience must be-
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come ‘‘truly pure,’’ with Christian love ‘‘the requisite power to transform
thoroughly the entire qualitative texture of an experience’’ (Ibid., ). An
antiutopianism relies on a limited accommodation of domination, a certain
realist condonation. To the contrary, von Hildebrand’s utter rejection of the
character of sexual acts seems to stem from a persisting dualism in which
inclination is detachable from person. For the influence of Kant’s theory of
inclination upon von Hildebrand, see Waldenstein, The Common Good in St.
Thomas and Wojtyla, c. , sect.  (pro manuscripto). It would appear to be the
influence of Kant’s theory of inclination that leads von Hildebrand to cast too
great an opposition between Augustine’s city of man and City of God.
. I owe these biblical references to the unpublished dissertation of Peter
Kwasniewski, The Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas, .
. As will become clear over the course of the next two chapters, there
are reasons to have reservations about the idea of rights. It might be better for
Catholic thinking to follow the lead of Kolnai, a theorist of privilege. I see no
justification for Porter’s claim, nor does she offer any, that natural law promotes a politics of equality against hierarchy (Porter, Natural and Divine Law,
).
. See above, n. .
. Hauerwas, Community, .
. Bonaventure, Journey, .
. Bonaventure, Journey .
. I disagree with Kraynak’s thesis that the personalism of John Paul II is
perhaps overly influenced by Kantianism (Kraynak, Christian Faith, –).
I think the ‘‘personalist norm’’ is rooted in a Thomistic metaphysics of diffusion and not derived from any Kantian imperative. On the opposition between personalism and Kantianism, see my comments in chap.  and the
references there to Max Scheler.
. Hauerwas, Community, –. Polls in America show that the most
ardent defenders of abortion are males aged – (see Glendon, ‘‘Women of
Roe v. Wade,’’ First Things, ).
. I will argue in the next chapter that a Christian politics will be insufficient if it remains no more than a politics of vocation. Hauerwas seems to
favor some sort of Ortegan vocation of excellence as the Christian politics. I
will argue later that a personalist norm requires institutions of privilege. Thus,
I agree with Hauerwas that a Christian politics is not a politics of equality
and, to a certain degree, I can agree with him that it is a politics of nonviolence. I strongly doubt, however, that Hauerwas has the stomach for the
necessary politics of privilege.
. Cahill, ‘‘Marriage,’’ .
. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, –.
. Hauerwas, Dispatches from the Front, .
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. The Wedding Feast of the Lamb
. For this, see many of the contributions to ‘‘Contraception: A Symposium,’’ First Things, no. , –.
. For the biography of Kolnai, see Dunlop, The Life and Thought of
Aurel Kolnai. In the appendix to his biography, Dunlop wonders whether
Kolnai was really much of a Thomist. In my review of Dunlop’s biography, I
have pointed to ways in which he certainly was a Thomist: see Modern Age,
vol. , –.
. Leahy, private communication (Sept. , ).
. Plotinus, The Enneads, III, . , .
. Ibid., .
. ‘‘Love, then, has on the one side the powerlessness of its native inadequacy, on the other the resource inherited from the Reason-Kind’’ (Idem.).
. For example, see his wonderful pages on the importance of clothing
as a locus of privilege, Utopia, –.
. One cannot but wonder if the desire to have children from IVF, presumably so that the child might be ‘‘flesh of my flesh,’’ is not to misunderstand that every child appears as a foundling.
. Arendt underappreciates this crucial political role of the family (for
example, see her comments at Arendt, The Human Condition, –).
. On the family and its obligation to offer hospitality in Homer, see
Scruton, Meaning of Conservatism, . For the typical critique of moral reasoning from the ius gentium, and why the critique is not especially persuasive,
see Scruton’s comments in the same work (–). For a recent restatement
of the ius gentium, see Kass, ‘‘Wisdom of Repugnance,’’ Do the Right Thing,
–. For Smith’s interesting suggestion that the welcoming of the stranger
under the ius gentium is a response to commerce, see Adam Smith, Lectures
on Jurisprudence, –. In linking hospitality to the family, and given Scruton’s observation that the family is an institution of common property (Meaning of Conservatism, –), it is clear that Catholic social thought disagrees
with Smith. In chap. , I will return to this point when considering the ‘‘erotic
Liberalism’’ of political theorist Diana Schaub.
. Scruton, Meaning of Conservatism, .
. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, . The Catholic hospital system in
the United States is currently having to fight off sustained pressure to accede
to abortions within its hospitals (see Neuhaus, ‘‘While We’re At It,’’ First
Things, no. , ). Independent hospitals without the strong identity of
Catholic hospitals, and the resources of its system, have already had to accede
as per instructions from the U. S. Supreme Court (see Philadelphia Inquirer,
Thurs., Sept. , ).
. Ibid., .
. Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology, –.
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. de Vitoria, Political Writings, .
. Thompson, ‘‘A Defense of Abortion,’’ Sex and Gender, –.
. Again, for the way in which commerce, and its transactions, plays this
role assigned to the family in Catholic social thought, see Hume’s essay, ‘‘Of
Commerce,’’ in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, –; but especially
–. Still, the identical logic of Hume and Catholic social thought shows
to what degree there is a classical liberalism to the latter.
. At the time of writing, the right to gay marriage is becoming an increasingly important political issue both in America and England. Recent defenders have, of course, relied on a Cartesian justification that couples (or
multiple persons, in fact) joined ‘‘at the heart,’’ having an emotional commitment, have a right to marry. Such a defence elides the character of sexual acts
altogether and the question of the institutionalization of the violence of the
body or its hospitality. For a summary of the basic reasoning in defense of gay
marriage, see Kurtz, ‘‘The Coming Battle,’’ National Review, Nov. .
. von Hildebrand, Christian Ethics, .
. On the steady erosion of privilege and dismantling of diversity in English politics since the eighteenth century, see Letwin’s Pursuit of Certainty.
. At the time of writing, the campaign for gay equality in the United
States, including the right of marriage, has for its symbol an ‘‘⳱’’ sign. An
identity sign is not a sign of diversity but the logic of totalitarianism.
. Augustine, City of God, bk. XV, c. , –.
. de Vitoria, Political Writings, .
. Such is clearly believed by the theologian W. Kavanaugh: see his essay,
‘‘A Fire Strong Enough,’’ Modern Theology, vol. , –.
. Scruton, Sexual Desire, .
. Ibid., .
. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, –.
. Liberals always pretend they are not legislating morality by putatively
defending political pluralism. The following is the basic ‘‘Catholic’’ rationale
of a book that defends abortion for the health of the mother past six months of
a child’s development in utero (: and for praise of President Clinton’s veto
of legislation to outlaw partial birth abortion, see , n. ): ‘‘Our view is
that the obvious value of the pregnant woman as a dignified subject overrides
whatever minimal value the early fetus has. In fact, it would be cruel to deny
a pregnant woman the right to an early abortion except in cases of rape or
incest, since she can be treated cruelly, whereas the early fetus cannot.’’ (Dombrowski and Deltete, Brief . . . Defense of Abortion, ). If this is not a moral
statement then I have no idea how such a statement might read. As the tenor
of the statement makes clear, it is also not a statement the authors have any
intention of supporting by argument.
. Another great liberal, Dworkin, assumes, rightly, I’d say, that the
moral underwrites the political (Dworkin, ‘‘Rights as Trumps,’’ Theories of
Rights, –).
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. And note, a quite different issue from the institutionalization of gay
sex as a form of sex morally equivalent to heterosexual sex. Put differently, the
question of toleration is quite different from the matter of institutionalization.
. Scruton, Sexual Desire, . It might be noted that Scruton identifies
both Kolnai and Wojtyla as having views quite similar to his own. See his
comments on , , , , , .
. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, .
. Ibid., –.
. Idem.
. Ibid., .
. Idem.
. See Kolnai, ‘‘Standard Modes,’’ Mind, –.
. Scruton, Sexual Desire, .
. Ibid., .
. It is perhaps here that Kolnai and Maritain disagree most fundamentally. Maritain regards civil society as irrational and violent. It is no more than
‘‘a general pattern in private life, it does not know any principle of public
order . . .’’ (Maritain, Man and the State, ; emphasis added). Civil society
needs to be ‘‘subjected . . . to the command of an Idea,’’ the state (, ). It
is the state that brings justice (), and democratic states in particular that
bring social justice (). Despite what will be said later, Maritain’s idea of civil
society and the role of the state seem quite at odds with John Paul II’s positions on the public significance of married sex and the culture of death.
. See his comments on the establishment of the Catholic Church independently of the power of the State (Scruton, Meaning of Conservatism, ).
. Ibid., –.
. Scruton, Sexual Desire, .
. Kraynak, Christian Faith.
. Hobbes writes: ‘‘Right consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare;
whereas Law determineth, and bindest to one of them: So that Law and Right
differ as much as Obligation and Liberty . . .’’ (Hobbes, Leviathan, XIV, ).
It would be impossible to go through all of the rights literature, but here are
three disparate authors who all agree with Hobbes’ definition: Mackie,
‘‘Right-Based Moral Theory?’’ Theories of Rights, –; Scruton, Meaning
of Conservatism, ; Manent, Modern Liberty and Its Discontents, .
. For a championing of the constitutive decisionism at the foundation
of rights theory, see MacDonald, ‘‘Natural Rights,’’ in Theories of Rights, –
. And de Wachter admits, ‘‘human rights are a decision, an attitude, a relationship, a language, a way of seeing things’’ (de Wachter, ‘‘Ethics and
Human Rights,’’Tradition and Renewal, , ). This decisionism, as much as
any democracy severed from an autonomous moral order, falls foul of Moore’s
naturalistic fallacy: see Kolnai, ‘‘Ghost,’’ .
. See Ferrara and Wilson, ‘‘Ordaining Women,’’ First Things no. ,
–.
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. Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology, –.
. Ibid., –.
. de Vitoria, Political Writings, –.
. It is found equally among others: Congar, Power and Poverty in the
Church, ; Murray, We Hold These Truths, , , , and many other places
in that work.
. Maritain, Man and the State, , .
. Maritain, The Rights of Man, .
. Maritain, Man and the State, .
. Ibid., ; cf. . Against Maritain’s univocity, see MD, .
. Perhaps the most shocking of these is Maritain’s reversal of the priestly
privilege of exemption from military service. This is no ‘‘social privilege,’’
insists Maritain, rather ‘‘a socially humiliating condition’’ (Ibid.,–a).
. Cortés, Essays on Catholicism, .
. ‘‘Nam privilegium ipsum exemptionis quatenus est libertas quaedam a
subiectione alterius, est facultas quaedam moralis ad non parendum tali potestati vel libere operandi sine respectu vel impedimento illius: haec ergo facultas
a Deo ipso data dicitur ius divinum, non tanquam praeceptum, sed tanquam
Dei donum’’ (Suarez, Defensio fidei catholicae [] lib. IV, c. , a).
. Actually, even if it were arbitrary, this would not be decisive. There
would have to be a fundamental intellectual inquiry upon what political theory animates the Church.
. For this and other statistics about male domestic violence see www.hruth.org.
. What about abortions? It is after all women who have them. Please see
my comments in the last chapter.
. See the brilliant logical and phenomenological demonstrations of this
point in Kolnai, Ethics, Value and Reality, espec. –.
. The Politics of the Cross
. Bernauer, ‘‘Sexuality in the Nazi War,’’ Budhi, –.
. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, –.
. I think Dupuis is not nearly careful enough when he writes, ‘‘. . . and
the traumatic experience of the Shoah, or ‘Holocaust,’ designed this century
by leaders from Christian nations as the ‘Final Solution’ for the extermination
of European Jews (Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology, ).
. See my ‘‘Sensuality,’’ Gregorianum, , –; ‘‘Matter, Thomist, ,
–.
. For a brilliant treatment of the horror of reason for truth, a treatment
quite in keeping with Fides et Ratio, it seems to me, see Cortés, Essay on
Catholicism, –.
. It is important to specify the character of contemporary liberalism as
found throughout much of the Western world. It is, to follow John Courtney
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Murray’s usage, a Jacobinism or statist liberalism. For a thinker like Schmitt,
contemporary ‘‘radical Liberalism’’ (Cohen) is a curious creature. Classical
liberalism insisted upon a rigorous distinction between civil society and the
state (cf. Schmitt, Concept of the Political, –), but statist liberalism is more
a form of socialism. Muravchik is certainly correct that the fundamental insight of Tony Blair was to recognize that if socialism was to remain viable it
had to be relinked with liberalism: this link had first been suggested by the
literary executor of Engels, Bernstein, but subsequently ignored (Muravchik,
Heaven on Earth, , ). Hence the curious phenomenon of state promotion of social liberalism and social justice (judicial and state protection and
promotion of the right to abortion; welfare provision based upon extensive
taxation; the judicial and state promotion of gay marriage, etc.). Such state
intervention into civil society would horrify classical liberal thinkers like
Smith, Hume, Hayek, et al. For Hume’s role in the development of statist
liberalism, however, see Letwin, The Pursuit of Certainty. For an excellent
summary on how classical American liberalism was transformed into statist
liberalism, see Powers, ‘‘Transformation of Liberalism,’’ The Public Interest,
Fall , –. Kolnai’s term for contemporary liberalism, ‘‘Progressive Democracy,’’ is well chosen, and probably to be preferred.
. Actually, everyone interested in good political order should be interested in overcoming the eclipse of God. A religious attitude, by linking the
human with the Divine, enables the human ‘‘to fill a rightful place, to assume
a positional value as it were, in the Universe’’ (Kolnai, ‘‘The Humanitarian,’’
Thomist, vol. , ). By contrast, consider the remarks of Eichmann, the
Gottgläubiger, on the significance of human life (Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, ).
. See Endo, Silence.
. Maritain, Rights of Man, –; –.
. Shrader-Frechette, ‘‘MacIntyre on Human Rights,’’ Modern Schoolman
, .
. Christian Faith, –.
. This is especially true of paragraphs – of Pacem in Terris. If new
reservations about rights are emerging, quite how the tension between such
an encyclical and future encyclicals will be resolved makes for an interesting
thought. I am convinced, however, that a departure from Pacem in Terris will
only be a return to Thomas Aquinas’s own teaching. Pacem in Terris insists
on the right to private property while Thomas, famously and quite pointedly,
denied such a right (ST II-II, q. ). Vitoria appears to have been one of the
first Catholic theorists to speak of private property as a right (ius): on this, see
Kraynak, Christian Faith, . Vitoria stands as a transitional figure of some
importance then, for he is a theorist of both privilege and right. His theology,
like that of the Baroque generally, deserves more serious attention.
. Kolnai comments: ‘‘The selfsame mentality that rejects the concept of
punishing the evildoer as ‘superstitious’ or a ‘mere disguise for the primitive
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urge of revenge’ may glibly accept the ‘elimination’ of the ‘unfit for life’ or
the ‘maladjusted’ as an act of ‘higher humanity’ ’’ (Kolnai, ‘‘Humanitarian,’’
Thomist, vol. , ).
. By contrast, Maritain speaks of progress having been made because
natural law need no longer be thought of merely in terms of obligation (Maritain, Man and the State, ).
. See his humorous, and yet deep down, sad, example of the liberal,
Dependent Rational Animals, .
. Kolnai, ‘‘Dignity,’’ Philosophy , –.
. Kolnai, ‘‘Concept of Hierarchy,’’ Philosophy, , .
. See Fukuyama, End of History, –; Dworkin, ‘‘Rights as Trumps,’’
in Theories of Rights, ; Maritain, Rights of Man, . Nussbaum is quite clear
that women’s equality requires abortion rights (Nussbaum, Sex and Social
Justice, –).
. de Vitoria, Political Writings, .
. See Arendt’s comments on the relationship between euthanasia and
the extermination camps, in Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, –.
. In an extremely interesting book, Jeremy Waldron appears to try to
find some basis for protecting the unborn within Locke’s political philosophy.
Locke is said to provide the best account of basic equality, one rooted in an
explicitly Christian understanding of the human. For Locke, basic equality
relies upon viewing humans as imago dei, with the content of the imago being
a capacity for rationality (Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, ). Waldron
seems to imply, though nowhere says so, that the unborn could be protected
under a Lockean political framework analogously to born children. Children
ex utero are intended to become our equals in reason and, although not currently rational, they must be treated as persons developing rationality. On
account of their capacity for ultimately becoming rational they must be accorded the protection of the law (–; ). What is most interesting about
this argument is that the stranger, Locke’s ‘‘changeling’’ (), could never in
principle be protected from being aborted. Locke’s equality extends only to
those who bear the imago dei as rationality and such are only ‘‘all standardmodel humans’’ (). Any stranger who does not fit the ‘‘standard model,’’
having a capacity to exercise rationality, has no principled protection from
being destroyed: this would seemingly include the born handicapped, the insane, the incurably sick, the aging, as well as the unborn ‘‘changeling.’’ Still,
it is something to have implied that there exists protection for the ‘‘standardmodel’’ unborn human. Nevertheless, Anscombe appears to be right in her
assessment that there is no principled objection to killing the innocent in
modern Western thought (see the following note) and in principle all of us,
and this is the deep point of MacIntryre’s Dependent Rational Animals. For, if
a capacity for rationality is the basis of my protection from violent death, and
not my innocence, then given our animality and its constitutive vulnerability,
and disability therewith, we are all of us likely to fail to qualify sooner or later.
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. Kolnai, ‘‘Humanitarian,’’ Thomist, vol. , –. Anscombe very
much favors building ‘‘a law conception of ethics’’ on account of the decisionism in modern moral theory. She famously expressed her concern that in
modern ethics there is no principled objection to ‘‘the judicial condemnation
of the innocent’’ and trenchantly concluded ‘‘And that is my complaint’’ (see
her essay, ‘‘Modern Moral Philosophy, –).
. Ibid., .
. Ibid., .
. Ibid., .
. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, the themes of privilege as
negative and equality as positive, and Dupuis’s evident embarrassment about
the Church’s traditional claim of Christian privilege, is a constant in Dupuis’s
Religious Pluralism. One fears that Dupuis has not even suspected that a political equalitarianism might be animating his theology and that his theology is
perhaps in service of an idol. It is also worthy of note that Fukuyama positively glories in the fact that secularism has ‘‘infected,’’ as he puts it, Catholic
thought profoundly (Fukuyama, End of History, , n. ). He thinks this
infection and weakening of Catholicism is a crucial contribution to the stability of Western liberal democracies. The same has been observed by Scruton
but observed with alarm (Scruton, Meaning of Conservatism, , ).
. Scruton, Sexual Desire, .
. Fessard, Hegel, le christianisme et l’histoire, .
. Fessard’s preference for capitalizing Liberalism, Communism, and Nazism has not been followed here.
. Fessard, Par-delà le fascisme et le communisme.
. Cf. Manent, Intellectual History.
. Cf. Muravchik, Heaven on Earth.
. Lilla, The Reckless Mind, .
. Rawls, Theory of Justice, .
. See Maritain’s odd and very potted history of the ‘‘accidental’’ flaws
inside liberalism (Man and the State, chap.  and especially , ).
. Fukuyama, End of History, .
. Ibid., .
. For those familiar with twentieth-century French intellectual history,
the claim that Fessard has Thomas at the centre of one of his most dramatic
interventions in political theory might sound strange. Out of the thousands
of pages Fessard wrote, Thomas and his texts appear only on a few pages and
then usually in footnotes. His interlocutors are rather the figures most prominent in the French university tradition that moves from the philosophers of
reflection like de Biran, Nabert, and Blondel to the classic texts of Plato,
Spinoza, and Liebniz and thereafter onto Hegel. Indeed, on the surface at
least, Fessard’s intellectual training and interests barely differ from those of
Paul Ricoeur or Levinas. This is to say, for instance, that his texts are quite
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unlike those of his contemporary fellow Jesuit, the German Karl Rahner. Nevertheless, unlike Ricoeur, and far more like Rahner, Fessard’s thought is structured by an appeal to a Thomistic anthropology.
. For the presence of this violent theory of flesh in the work of Karl
Rahner, see my ‘‘Politics of the Flesh,’’ Modern Theology, vol. , –.
. On reason as the judge, and not the pupil, of nature in Kant’s philosophy, see Letwin, The Pursuit of Certainty, –.
. For Scheler’s haunting description of Kantianism, see Scheler, Formalism in Ethic, .
. Note that Hume’s famed reversal of rationalism rejects any claim to
‘‘privilege’’ on the part of reason or generation as a principle of order. See
Letwin, The Pursuit of Certainty, .
. Just as contemporary Jacobin liberalism is a statist decisionism so, confirming Fessard, Kolnai identifies the dialectic between liberal anarchy and
liberal totalitarianism as inherent to progressive democracy (PL, –).
. On the presumption of pervasive violence within liberal theory, cf.
Goerner and Thompson, ‘‘Politics and Coercion,’’ Political Theory, vol. ,
.
. For the deepest sources of this in the liberal horror of servitude, see
Cortés, Essay, –. For Kant’s identification of sonship with slavery, see
Waldenstein, The Common Good in St. Thomas and Wojtyla (pro manuscripto).
. For the deepest roots of this in the liberal flight from sociality, see EV,
– and MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, chaps.  and .
. Fessard, Pax Nostra, ; see my chap.  for the use I make of this
argument in defending the privilege of male ordination.
. In a very interesting book, Diana Schaub shows how Montesquieu
tried to develop a liberal sociality. Vanity, Montesquieu’s ‘‘sociable humor,’’
civilizes and builds political authority independently of domination. Of the
court of Peter the Great, Schaub comments: ‘‘The court as couturier achieved
what the court as censor could not’’ (Schaub, Erotic Liberalism, ). In this
Montesquieu is very much of the same school as Hume and Smith. Unfortunately, Schaub’s own examples reveal the shortcomings of basing politics and
ethics upon vanity. Citing one of Montesquieu’s sources, a  ethnology of
the island of Madagascar, we learn that the native women of the island practice abortion because of the harm that nursing does to their breasts: that is,
they abort because their breast will no longer be found as sexually appealing
by the men of the island (, n. ). As Schaub comments perceptively: ‘‘Although regular resort to abortion is attributed to savage women, perhaps
highly civilized women are even more likely to allow vanity and the quest for
unencumbered sexual pleasure to interfere with propagation’’ (). Smith
himself, while acknowledging the worth of vanity, did not doubt that it was
a corruption of the moral sentiments.
. The claim is worth quoting in full both to capture its boldness and to
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help capture the strains of political thought found in the encyclical. John Paul
II writes:
The original and inalienable right to life is questioned or denied on the
basis of a parliamentary vote or the will of one part of the people—even
if it is the majority. This is the sinister result of a relativism which reigns
unopposed: the ‘‘right’’ ceases to be such, because it is no longer firmly
founded on the inviolable dignity of the person, but is made subject to
the will of the stronger part. In this way democracy, contradicting its
own principles, effectively moves toward a form of totalitarianism. The
state is no longer the ‘‘common home’’ where all can live together on
the basis of principles of fundamental equality, but is transformed into
a tyrant state, which arrogates to itself the right to dispose of the life of
the weakest and most defenseless members, from the unborn child to
the elderly, in the name of a public interest which is really nothing but
the interest of one part. The appearance of the strictest respect for legality is maintained . . . Really, what we have here is only the tragic caricature of legality; the democratic ideal, which is only truly such when it
acknowledges and safeguards the dignity of every human person, is betrayed in its very foundations . . . (EV, ) (emphasis original).
. Lilla, The Reckless Mind, xi.
. Maritain, Man and the State, . Maritain has spoken about ‘‘the originally Christian character of human rights’’ (Maritain, Rights of Man, ).
. Kolnai, Privilege and Liberty, ; hereafter cited as PL.
. It is well worth noting here that the Jesuit John Courtney Murray’s
classic work of American Catholic political philosophy, We Hold These Truths,
contains some very dark passages about possible future ‘‘Jacobin’’ interpretations of the Constitution.
. Hauerwas, Community, .
. Kolnai, Political Memoirs, ; hereafter cited as PM.
. Aldous Huxley, whose politics come close to Kolnai’s, was disturbingly
prophetic in Brave New World. It should be noted that the problem the novel
presents is not that of privilege but rather the loss of any true privilege: the
quasi-humans of Brave New World are utterly equal in having been extruded
from the monistic logic of the hatchery. By contrast, the Catholic concept of
the person is complex. All persons are equal in being made in the image of
God but unequal in their exact natural composition. That is, the person is a
crossing of the theological imago dei and the Aristotelian-Thomistic rational
animal. Another layer of complexity is added by Vatican II’s reaffirmation of
‘‘offices,’’ at least those of motherhood and fatherhood (GS, para. ). An
example of the complex theory of equality espoused by the Church might be
John Paul II’s claim that marriage is an institution of equality wherein a diversity of roles exists on account of the personal originality of man and woman
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(MD, ; ). The reincorporation of privilege would further intensify the
traditional anti-utopian and anti-monistic tenor of Catholic political thought.
. Weigel, Witness to Hope, –; –.
. Weigel, Witness to Hope, .
. In , Malcolm Muggeridge pointed out that in the first decade of
the legalization of abortion in England, it was already true that more babies
had been killed in England than English lives lost in World War I (see his
speech published as Malcolm Muggeridge on Humanae Vitae, ).
. Malcolm Muggeridge points out that euthanasia was one of the crimes
cited at Nuremburg and adds sadly that it took only thirty years for a war
crime to become an act of compassion (Ibid., ), the ‘‘mercy death’’ of the
Nazis (Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, ).
. D’Souza, Letters to a Young Conservative, .
. M. Lilla, The Reckless Mind, , –.
. In an otherwise superb article, Kavanaugh ends up trotting out the old
‘‘industrial-military complex’’ vision of American political order. Sadly, this is
a good example of what Lilla is getting at. The first part of the Kavanaugh
article is extremely fine and shares the Augustinian sensibility assumed in this
book. The second part of the article shows that he misunderstands Augustine’s
politics, however. See W. Kavanaugh, ‘‘A Fire Strong Enough to Consume
the House,’’ Modern Theology , –.
. Weigel, ‘‘Catholicism and Democracy,’’ Logos, vol.  , –.
. This is also the position of a Catholic school of thought found in
France with Pierre Manent and in the United States with a political theorist
like Dan Mahoney. Both are champions of Kolnai but read him as rather
more sympathetic to liberal democracy than I do. Dunlop’s recent Kolnai
biography has gathered material from letters and notes that make the ManentMahoney reading untenable, I think. This is not the place to show this, however. It should be pointed out that Manent and Mahoney do not think that
Kolnai can be brought as close to Maritain as assumed by John Hittinger. I
take many comments throughout my book to dispute strongly claims found
in Hittinger to this effect: see Hittinger, Liberty, Wisdom, and Grace, espec.
chaps.  and .
. For Mill on the sovereignty of the individual, see J. F. Kavanaugh,
Who Count as Persons, ; and all of chap.  for how this contention is currently creating a culture of killing.
. There is little doubt that Pickstock and Milbank are Cartesians in this
sense. See my discussion of their views earlier in chap. .
. For the transition of Thomas’s dominium over self and body into a ius
over self and body, see de Vitoria, On Homicide, , n. .
. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, .
. Manent, An Intellectual History, .
. As reported in The Baltimore Sun,  April , A, A.
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. For the continuing influence of Maritain in Catholic social thought,
see Hittinger, Liberty, Wisdom, and Grace.
. John Paul II writes: ‘‘It is therefore urgently necessary, for the future
of society and the development of a sound democracy, to rediscover those
essential and innate human and moral values which flow from the very truth
of the human being and express and safeguard the dignity of the person:
values which no individual, no majority and no state can ever create, modify
or destroy, but must only acknowledge, respect and promote’’ (EV, ).
. Man and the State, –.
. Weigel, ‘‘Catholicism and Democracy,’’ Logos, vol.  , .
. This is a development on Gaudium et Spes where the classical Catholic
position is stated.
. For marriage as a site of privilege in understanding the Trinity, and
therefore for living a Christian life, see Waldenstein, ‘‘John Paul II and St.
Thomas,’’ Anthropotes .  (), –; .  (), –.
. Indeed, according to John Paul II ‘‘the most essential power’’ for mastery of concupiscence is an honouring of the body and spouse (TB, ; ).
In classical liberalism, vanity replaces honor and nobility as basic values. Of
course, in statist liberalism none of these values is significant. Indeed, at least
in America and typically speaking, statist liberals, in the very way that they
dress and present themselves, reject the value of vanity so dear to classical
liberalism. As St. Thomas More pointed out, style of dress is a very significant
political issue. This point is wittily made in the cover design of Letwin’s book,
The Pursuit of Certainty.
. For Hayek’s concern that democracy has ceased to be constitutionally
founded, see his ‘‘Whither Democracy?’’ in New Studies in Philosophy, –;
henceforth cited as NS.
. See his ‘‘Liberalism,’’ in NS, ; ‘‘The Result of Human Action,’’
Studies in Philosophy. See his short comment on their idea of the pretium
mathematicum in ‘‘The Pretence of Knowledge,’’ NS, .
. Cf. Kraynak, Christian Faith. Scruton sees no difficulty within English
constitutionalism for a substantial reduction in democratic participation, and
even muses whether the electorate would really care (see Scruton, Meaning of
Conservatism, ).
. Dunlop, Life and Thought of Aurel Kolnai, –.
. Weigel, ‘‘Catholicism and Democracy,’’ Logos, vol. , .
. Note Fides et Ratio () where the pope speaks of the ‘‘growing support’’ for a pragmatic concept of democracy which denies ‘‘any reference to
unchanging values’’ and where great moral questions are ‘‘subordinated to
decisions taken one after another by institutional agencies’’ (FR, ).
. See his superb analysis of ‘‘the raised position’’ in his essay ‘‘The Concept of Hierarchy,’’ Philosophy,  (), –.
. As quoted by Scruton, Meaning of Conservatism, .
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. Catholic social thought appears to have lost sight of the manifoldness
of social order and the way to describe it. De Vitoria has a brilliant examination of the varieties of law and how these laws can coherently affirm equality
and privilege as part of social order. See his splendid pages on property, On
Homicide, –.
. That abortion is an attack upon political liberty is clear from Leahy’s
definition of the person: the person is, he writes, ‘‘the essential and absolutely
non-inevitable perfect specification of freedom no longer postponed’’ (Leahy,
‘‘Person as Absolute Particular’’ [pro manuscripto], .)
Concluding Remarks
. For example, Peter Garnsey casts his informative study of privilege in
ancient Rome as a study of ‘‘the techniques of discrimination.’’ See Garnsey,
Social Status and Legal Privilege.
. Cohen, If You’re So Egalitarian, .
. Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, .
. Ibid., .
. Ibid., .
. The following quotes are drawn from passages cited by de Lubac (Mystery of the Supernatural, –): ‘‘With respect to capacity for and participation in glory . . . [rational creatures] all exists equally to the image, and the
image is equal, because all are ordered immediately to a single end, namely
God in whom all are beatified (Matthew of Aquasparta); [man] was made in
the image of God because he was made rational; he has not arrived to the
likeness of God, because he has not imitated the gift of God’’ (Rupert of
Deutz); ‘‘God made [man] a rational creature, so that he might participate in
his likeness, which consists in seeing him’’ (St. Thomas; emphasis added). For
a recent statement of such a position, see Nicolas, ‘‘Les rapports entre la nature
et le surnaturel,’’ Revue Thomiste, vol. , –.
. ST II-II, q. , a. , ad . And the following from St. Gregory of
Nyssa: ‘‘God is above all love . . . The Creator has impressed this character
also on us . . . Therefore, if this love is not present, all the image becomes
disfigured.’’ (As quoted in Waldenstein, ‘‘John Paul II and St. Thomas,’’ Anthropotes, vol. : , –).
. Scheler, Ressentiment, –.
. Consider this episode from St. Francis’s life: ‘‘After his strength was
restored, when he had dressed as usual in his fine clothes, he met a certain
knight who was of noble birth, but poor and badly clothed. Moved to compassion for his poverty, Francis took off his own garments and clothed the
man on the spot. At one and the same time he fulfilled the two-fold duty of
covering over the embarrassment of a noble knight and relieving the poverty
of a poor man’’ (Bonaventure, Life of St. Francis, in Bonaventure, ).
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. See de Vitoria, On Homicide. I discuss this question at some length in
a book I am currently writing on privilege and homicide.
. Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, .
. Cf. Kolnai, ‘‘Sovereignty,’’ Ethics, Value and Reality, –.
. I was first introduced to the idea of ‘‘double aspect’’ interpretations of
the body by Brian O’Shaughnessy while a student at London. Please see his
two-volume work The Will.
. Gallagher, ‘‘Person and Ethics,’’ Acta Philosophica, vol. ,  n. .
. For contradictions in how the body is viewed in contemporary Western
society, being both affirmed and denied simultaneously, see the fine comments of Sarah Coakley, ‘‘Introduction’’ in Religion and the Body, –.
. Milbank, Theology, .
. Ibid., –.
. Although I am a foreigner writing in the United States, no American
could accuse me of misreading the tenor of the Left’s comments after September  or their comments about the government of President George W. Bush.
I cite the bumper sticker that reads: ‘‘The Real Axis of Evil: Cheney, Bush,
Ashcroft.’’
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———. ‘‘Who Were the Averroists of the Thirteenth Century? A Study of
Siger of Brabont and Neo-Augustinians in respect of the Plurality Controversy.’’ The Modern Schoolman  (May ): –.
McDermott, B., SJ. ‘‘The Theology of Original Sin: Recent Developments.’’
Theological Studies  ().
McMahon, K. ‘‘The Christological Turn in Recent Literature on Original
Sin.’’ The Thomist  (): –.
Meng, Jude Chua Soo. ‘‘Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP, on Aristotle,
Thomas Aquinas and the Doctrine of Limitation of Act by Potency.’’
The Modern Schoolman  (November ): –.
Merleau-Ponty, M. The Primacy of Perception. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, .
———. Signs. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, .
Merton, Thomas. The Seven Storey Mountain. New York: Harcourt, .
Michael, Emily. ‘‘Descartes and Gassendi on Matter and Mind: From Aristotelism Pluralism to Early Modern Dualism.’’ Meeting of the Minds: The
Relations between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy. Edited by Stephen S. Brown. Brepols: .
Milbank, John. Theology and Social Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, .
———. The Word Made Strange. Oxford: Blackwell, .
Milbank, J., and C. Pickstock. Truth in Aquinas. London: Routledge, .
Muggeridge, Malcolm. Malcolm Muggeridge on Humanae Vitae. New York:
National Committee of Catholic Laymen, .
Muravchik, J. Heaven on Earth: The Rise and Fall of Socialism. San Francisco:
Encounter Books, .
Murray, John Courtney, SJ. We Hold These Truths. Kansas City: Sheed and
Ward, .
Nabert, Jean. Elements for an Ethic. Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. Birth to Presence. Translated by B. Holmes, et al. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, .
Neuhaus, Richard John. ‘‘While We’re At It.’’ First Things  (April ):
.
Nicolas, J. H., OP. ‘‘Les rapports entre la nature et le surnaturel dans les
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